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STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF KOŚALA

By Rajendra Bihari Pandey

The history of Kośala and the cultural attainments of its people occupy a place of pre-eminence in the annals of India's glorious past. Tradition, the Epics and subsequent literature allude to it a hoary antiquity but the word Kośala either as a place-name or as the name of a people does not find mention in the earliest literature of India, the *Ṛg Veda.*[1] It is only in the later-Vedic literature that our attention is drawn by some texts, viz., the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* and the *Kalpa-Sūtras* towards the existence of a country like Kośala. Since then it became the centre of intense political activity and came to be regarded as one of the sixteen great states of Jambūdvīpa, *i.e.*, Bhāratavarṣa.[2] Its prominence is further confirmed by Buddhaghoṣa's commentary on the *Dhammas-angaṇī*, where Kośalas figure as one of the great Kṣatriya tribes in the times of the Buddha.[3] The famous Sanskrit

[1] The Ṛgvedic Āryans had (even assuming that the Aryans came from outside India or even from the land of the Seven Rivers) not penetrated into the mainland of the country beyond the Yamunā, which is definitely referred to in the *Ṛgveda*. The reference to Gaṅgā is to be found in one of the 'Bālakhilyas' whose incorporation in the body-text of the *Ṛgveda* may or may not have taken place till a considerably later period.

[2] *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, Vol. IV, p. 256; cf. *Viṣṇupurāṇa*, Ch. IV. Aṁśa 4.

[3] *Aṭṭhaśālinī*, P.T.S., p. 305; see also Khuddakapātha commentary, pp. 110-111.

Grammarian, Paṇini, too, does not lose sight of it, and mentions it in one of his sūtras.[4] It is, however, unfortunate that such a prosperous and powerful kingdom could not stand the tides of time and disappeared from the political horizon because of the growth of Magadha Imperialism which usurped its supremacy within a very short time.[5]

Location.

Scholars differ regarding the location of Kośala. Macdonnel and Keith are of the opinion that Kośala lay to the north-east of Gaṅgā and roughly corresponds to the Oudh.[6] According to Rapson too, the kingdom of Kośala lay to the east of Pañcāla and to the west of Videha and represents the modern province of Oudh in the Uttar Pradesh.[7] Elsewhere, its northern frontier is stated to have been in the hills in Nepāl, its southern boundary the river Gaṅgā; and the eastern limit the Śākyan territory.[8] Prof. Rhys Davids also thinks the probability of the Gaṅgā being its southern boundary, the Gaṇḍaka as its eastern extremity and the mountains as its northern limits.[9] According to the *Rāmāyaṇa* the kingdom of Kośala was bounded on the west by the Gomatī, and in the south by the Sarpikā or Syandikā (Sai) river.[10] It included the territory of Kalamas of Kesaputta,[11] possibly on the Gomatī, and that of the Śākyas of Kapilavastu in the Nepalese Tarai, within its jurisdiction.

[4] *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, IV. 1. 17.

[5] See *Cambridge Hist. of India*, Vol. I, pp. 308-9.

[6] *Vedic Index*, Vol. I, p. 190.

[7] Rapson, *Ancient India*, p. 164; *Camb. Hist. of India*, Vol. I, p. 117. See also p. 308.

[8] *Cambridge Hist. of India*, Vol. I, p. 158.

[9] *Buddhist India*, p. 25.

[10] *Rāmāyaṇa*, ii. 49. 11-12; 50. 1; vii. 104—15.

[11] *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, I. 188 (P.T.S.).

Who were the Kośalans?

The Kośalans were undoubtedly the natives inhabiting the entire regions of the kingdom of Kośala. They were entirely the descendants of the Aryan race, and, as suggested some where, belonged to the Āditya (solar) race of Ikṣvāku and descending from Manu.[12] It is further asserted in the later Vedic literature that the Ikṣvākus were originally a branch of the Puru tribe and were the kings of Kośala.[13] The Purāṇas give the etymological derivation of Ikṣvāku who was so-called because he was born from the sneeze of Manu.[14]

History of Kośala.

The earliest Brahmanical text referring to Kośala and its people, the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa,* mentions Kośala with Videha and refers to the river Sadānīrā as the dividing line between these two tribal states.[15] The same text informs that king Para aṭnara Hairaṇyanābha of Kośala performed an Aśvamedha sacrifice.[16] It appears that Brahmanism was by then fully established and the kingdom of Kośala had by this time embarked upon a scheme of gaining political supremacy. It lost no time in making up with Kāśī and Vedeha both,[17] and emerged as a great imperial power in the Epic age. In the *Rāmāyaṇa,* Kośala maintained its friendly relations with the eastern kingdoms of Videha, Aṅga and Magadha, the north-western kingdoms of Kekaya, Sindhu and Sauvīra, the western kingdom of Surāṣṭra and the Dākṣinātya kings.[18]

The *Mahābhārata,* however, throws considerable light on the history of Kośala. In one of its parvas Kauśalya is

[12] *Camb. Hist. of India,* Vol. I, p. 305.
[13] *Ibid.,* p. 308.
[14] *Ibid.,* p. 305.
[15] *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa,* i. 44.
[16] *Ibid.,* xiii. 5. 5. 5.
[17] *Sānkhyāyana Śrauta Sūtra,* XV. 1. 9. 13.
[18] C.f. Pārgiter, *Ancient Indian Historical Tradition,* p. 276.

said to be the mother of Janamejaya, one of the earliest kings of the Paurava family. She was probably the daughter of a king of Kośala.[19] At the time of the battle of Bhārata, Bṛhadbala was the king of Kośala, who is said to have been subjugated by Bhīma in the course of his expedition of conquests by Yudhiṣṭhira for the performance of the Rājasūya sacrifice.[20] Later Kośala was conquered by Karṇa, too, who extracted tributes from the king.[21] Since then the Kośalan king took the side of the Kauravas against the Pāṇḍavas.[22] After the conclusion of the great war, we again notice the Kośalas being attached and conquered by Arjuna before the commencement of the Aśvamedha sacrifice by Yudhiṣṭhira.[23]

Extent of Kośala Kingdom.

Kośala during the age of the epics, must have been a flourishing state and a great centre of all political, economic and social activities. The use of chariot in Ayodhyā, the capital of Kośala, suggests existence of good roads in this country.[24] The *Jātaka* stories refer to merchants going with their merchandise in loaded wagons through Kośala from Magadha up to the western and north-western frontiers of India. In the *Rāmāyaṇa* during his exile when Rāma passed through the Kośala country and crossed the Gomatī and the Syaṇḍikā in the south, he pointed out to Sītā the wide plain given by Manu to the originator of the family, Ikṣvāku. "Proceeding towards the extensive Kośala plains, he left behind him the Kośala region and reached the Gaṅgā upto which river evidently the Kośala dominion extended. Here he arrived at *Śṛṅgaverapura* which was the seat of the Niṣāda

[19] *Mbh.* i. 95.
[20] *Ibid.*, ii. 30.
[21] *Ibid.*, iii. 253.
[22] *Ibid.*, v. 97; vi. 16; vi. 45, etc.
[23] *Ibid.*, xiv. 42.
[24] B. C. Law, *Ancient Indian Tribes*, Ch. II, p. 40.

king Guha."[25] the chief of a non-Aryan settlement. Cunningham identified this Niṣāda land of *Śṛṅgaverapura* with the modern Singror or Singor on the left bank of the Gaṅgā and twenty two miles of the north-west of Prayāga or Allahabād.[26]

In the Buddhist period, Kośala proper contained three great and prosperous cities, Ayodhyā, Sāketa and Śrāvatī, besides a number of minor towns like Setavyā[27] and Ukkaṭṭhā.[28] In the time of Pasenadi, "the Kośalan monarchy had spread its tentacles over a vast area extending perhaps from the Gomatī to the little Gaṇḍaka and from the Nepalese Tarai to the Gaṅgā, possibly even to the eastern part of the Kaimur range."[29]

Ancient Kośalan Kings and Chronology.

The chronology of ancient Kośala is in a state of utmost confusion. According to Purāṇas, Ikṣvāku had a large number of sons ruling in different parts of India. The *Vāyu-Purāṇa* states that it was the children of Ikṣvāku's son Vikukṣi who ruled in Uttarāpatha and Dakṣiṇāpatha.[30] The *Viṣṇu Purāṇa,* however, holds that the sons of Ikṣvāku who were hundred in number became the rulers of India. Fifty sons with Śakunī at their head became the protectors of Uttarāpatha, and forty-eight established themselves as rulers over Dakṣiṇāpatha.[31] The *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* mentions the twenty five sons of Ikṣvāku as kings in the front portion, *i.e.*, in the eastern districts of Āryāvarta and an equal number in the

25 *Ibid.*

26 *Arch. Survey Report*, Vols. XI. 62 and XXI. 11 and see also Pargiter, *J.R.A.S.*, 1894, p. 231 et. seq.

27 *Payāsi Suttanta.*

28 *Ambaṭṭha Sutta.*

29 H. C. Ray Chaudhry, *Pol. Hist. of A. India* 1953 Ed. See iii, p. 199.

30 *Vāyu-Purāṇa,* 88, 8—11.

31 *Viṣṇu-Purāṇa,* iv. 2. 3.

hind portion, *i.e.*, in the west; two settled in the central regions or the Madhya-deśa and the rest in other parts of the country.[32]

The Purāṇas further inform us that Vikukṣi ascended the throne after the death of his father Ikṣvāku and reigned over the country in conformity with the law and custom. The next king after him was Parañjaya who obtained the name of Kakutstha. His supremacy can be well imagined from the fact that even the Devas pressed by the Asuras sought his help. King Śrāvasta was the sixth in descent from Kakutstha who is said to have founded the city of Śrāvastī, the future capital of the northern Kośala.[33] His grandson, Kuvalayāśva became the most powerful ruler who overthrew an Asura, Dhundhu. According to the Purāṇas and the *Mahābhārata*;[34] the son of Śrāvastava was King Bṛhadāśva.

A few generations after Kuvalayāśva, we hear of the great monarch Māndhātā who exercised his imperial sovereignty over the entire earth with seven continents, the dvīpas and came to be known as a Cakravartin.[35] So extensive was his empire that the sun never set in his domains.[36] His son, Purukutsa married a Nāga princess and went to the Nāga land where he defeated and suppressed the Gandharvas who were troubling the Nāgas. The son begotten on this Nāga queen came to be known as Trasadasyu and succeeded to the throne of his father. His son was Anaraṇyu who is said to have been killed by Rāvaṇa—a fact which is more mythical than historical.

It is after a lapse of several generations from the Trasadasyu that we hear of a king of Kośala who was known as Trayyāruṇa and his son Satyavrata also known as Triśaṅku,

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32 Cf. B. C. Law, *Ancient Indian Tribes*, pp. 41-42.
33 *Viṣṇupurāṇa*, iv. 2. 12; *Vāyupurāṇa*, LXXXVIII, XXVII.
34 *Mbh*. iii. 201—203; see *Vāyupurāṇa*, LXXXVIII.
35 *Vāyupurāṇa*, LXXXVIII, LXVIII, *Viṣṇupurāṇa*, V. 2.
36 *Viṣṇupurāṇa*, IV. 2. XVIII.

whose son Hariścandra became a monarch of universal repute. This Kośala king performed a Rājasūya-yajña and became an Emperor.[37] The *Mahābhārata* also makes a glorious reference to the attainments of king Hariścandra of Kośala,[38] and highly commends him as a magnanimous donor.[39]

The Purāṇas record the name of Vahu who came to the throne of Kośala several generations after Hariścandra. The supremacy of Kośalan power suffered a great reverse during his reign. The confederacy of the Haihayas, Tālajaṅghas and other allied Kṣatriya tribes gave him a crushing defeat and compelled him to abdicate his throne. His son, who was born in the forest and was reared and brought up by Ṛṣi Auraṇa, showed symptoms of greatness and wanted to restore the fallen fortunes of his family by reviving the glories of Kośala. This prince was known as Sagara who completely trampled down the Haihayas and was bent upon exterminating the foreign tribes living on the frontiers of India, but desisted to do so at the request of his family preceptor, Vasiṣṭha. Sagara had two wives. From one he had one son Asamañjas and from the other he had sixty thousand sons. King Sagara also performed the Aśvamedha sacrifice. Instead of giving preference to his son Asamañjas, Sagara passed the throne of Kośala to his grand son Aṁśumān.

After Aṁśumān, we hear of his grandson, the great Bhagīratha as the successor to the throne of Kośala who made his powers felt far and wide and came to be known as a Cakravartin.[40] He became famous for his severe penance through which he succeeded in bringing down the divine river Gaṅgā from the Himālayas[41] to the plains.

After Bhagīratha, we are told of a number of kings who

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[37] *Vāyupurāṇa*, LXXXVIII. 118.

[38] *Mbh.* ii. 12.

[39] *Ibid.*, xiii. 65; see also Śāntiparva, chs. 20. 3.

[40] *Ibid.*, iii. 108.

[41] *Rāmāyaṇa*. i. 39–44, *Mbh.* iii. 106–109.

ruled the kingdom of Kośala. In the list of Kośalan rulers we come across Ṛtuparṇa who was a contemporary of the Vidarbhan king Nala.[42] His son was Sudāsa. Sudāsa's son was Mitrasaha Saudāsa later came to be known as Kalmāṣapāda. Saudāsa's grandson was Vālika. About him the Purāṇas inform that he was saved from the wrath of Paraśurāma who was bent upon exterminating the entire Kṣatriya race on the earth as he was always surrounded by a number of naked women. For this reason he was nicknamed also as Nārīkavaca, that is, a person protected by women. He also acquired the designation of Mūlaka for his being the Mūla or source from which future generations of Kṣatriyas sprang.

The fourth king after Mūlaka was Khaṭvāṅga who is very highly spoken of by the Purāṇas for his being an unequalled mighty sovereign on the earth and whose help was sought even by the gods in their fight against the Asuras.[43] His grandson was the great Kośala Raghu who gave his name to the illustrious family of Daśaratha who was the grandson of Raghu. In Rāma, the son of Daśaratha, culminated the glory of the royal Kośalan dynasty. After Rāma, the Kośalan empire was partitioned amongst the sons of the four brothers. The sons of Śatrughna ruled at Mathurā. The sons of Lakṣmaṇa established two kingdoms in far north in the neighbourhood of the Himālayas, while Bharata's sons founded the cities of Takṣaśilā and Puṣkalāvatī in the Gāndhāra country as the *Vāyupurāṇa* informs us.[44] Kośala proper was divided into two parts, Kuśa, the elder son of Rāma became the king of southern Kośala and transferred his capital from Ayodhya to Kuśasthalī which he built at the foot of the Vindhyan range.[45] Rāma's younger son, Lava became the ruler of northern Kośala and set up his capital at the city of Śrāvastī or Śarāvatī.

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[42] *Mbh.* iii. 71 ff.

[43] *Viṣṇupurāṇa*, iv. 4. 39, *Bhāgavatapurāṇa*, ix. 9.

[44] *Vāyupurāṇa*, 88. 189-190. [45] *Ibid.*, 198.

The kings that followed Kuśa in the main line of the Kośalan monarchs were of no great significance until we come to Hiraṇyanābha[46] Kauśalya. Several generations afterwards we come across with Bṛhadbala under whose leadership the Kośalan troops marched to the Bhārata war. He was slain by Abhimanyu, the son of Arjuna. Most of the Purāṇas close their list of Kośalan rulers with Bṛhadbala as the last one, while some add a few more names who are called the future kings of the Ikṣvāku family.[47] The *Bhāgavata-Purāṇa*[48] states that Sumitra would be the last king of

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[46] While it is tempting to establish the identity of Hiraṇyanābha or his son with King Mahākośala, the famed conqueror and father of King Prasenjit, it is difficult to accept them as one. Buddhist records, which stand on a surer footing than the Purāṇic chronology, nowhere mention Hiraṇyanābha. At the most it can be conceded that references in the later Vedic literature allude to some predecessor of Prasenajit, possibly an ancestor of Mahākośala of the Buddhist literature. The synchronism of Hiraṇyanābha and Sukeśā Bharadvāja and Kauśalaya Āśvalāyana may be accepted on the authority of the Praśna Upaniṣad, but Kauśalaya Āsvalāyana and the Assalayan of the Buddhist texts could quite possibly be two different persons. Kauśalya Āśvalāyana was a contemporary of Hiraṇyanābha who (assuming him to be identical with Mahākośala) must have ruled for quite a long time, which is a necessary premise in view of his extensive conquests and performance of an Aśvamedha sacrifice. Prasenajit died at quite an advanced age. Now Aśvalāyana of the Buddhist texts was a contemporary of the Buddha, and as such he could not have been a contemporary of Hiraṇyanābha unless we allow him an exceptionally long life of more than 100 years. Besides there is nothing in the Buddhist traditions to suggest that he pre-deceased the Buddha. At the same time, the Purāṇas do not mention Hiraṇyanābha as a king in their geneological table of the *Iksvākuids*. Consequently, it would be safer not to base the indentity of Hiraṇyanābha with Mahākośala on the slender ground of the similarity of names (Kauśalya Aśvalāyana and Aśvalāyana of the Majjhima Nikāya), for ancient traditions similar names and Aśvalāyana of the Buddhist traditions might have been a descendent of Kauśalaya Aśvalāyana of the later Veidc literature. For another view c.f. Rayachaudhuri—*P.H.A.J.*, pp. 102-3.

[47] Commenting upon the value of the Purāṇic lists of framing the dynastic history of Kośala Dr. H. C. Raychaudhuri rightly remarks: "No doubt they contain names of some real kings and princes. But they have many glaring defects, defects which are apt to be forgotten by writers who make these the basis of early Indian chronology."—*Pol. Hist. of Ant. India*, 1953 ed., Ch. iii, p. 103.

[48] *Bhāgavata-Purāṇa*, ix. 12. 16. See also *Vāyu P.*, Ch. 99.

F. 2

Ikṣvāku line in whose reign there would be the advent of *Kaliyuga*.

Kośala in Buddhist Literature.

Kośala again comes into limelight as the most important and famous kingdom in northern India during the lifetime of the Buddha and Mahāvīra, as evidenced by both the Jain and Buddhist literary texts. At the time of Mahāvīra's death it had probably formed a confederacy with Kāśī,[49] but it is reasonable to infer that Kāśī had already been annexed in and appended to the Kośalan kingdom during the reign of Prasenajit's illustrious father, Mahākośala, who had embarked-ed upon a plan of extensive conquests. In the time of Prasenajit, the contemporary of both Mahāvīra and the Buddha Kāśī was already given away as Bath-money to his sister Kośala Devī. when she was married to King Bimbisāra of Magadha, during the lifetime of his father. On the authority of *Kalpa Sūtra,* Prof. Jacobi observes, "According to the Jains, the Licchavis. and the Mallakis were the chiefs of Kāśī and Kośala. They seem to have succeeded the Aikṣvākas who ruled there in the time of the *Rāmāyaṇa.*"[50] In the time of the Buddha, Kośala undoubtedly occupied a very supreme position. But we learn from the *Mahāvagga* that during the period of the earliest Brahmadattas of Kāśī Kośala was a poor and tiny state with meagre resources.[51] Apart from its being one of the sixteen countries (Janapadas) of India,[52] it also came to be counted amongst the four powerful states. But by the time of King Prasenajit (Pasenadi of Buddhist literature) it was a part and parcel of the Kośalan empire. Pasenadī, who succeeded his father Mahākośala at

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[49] *Kalpa Sūtras*, 128, S.B.E., Vol. xxii, 266.

[50] *Jain Sutra*, Pt. II, p. 321, n. 3.

[51] *Sacred Books of the East*, Vol. xvii, p. 294

[52] *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, iv. 256.

the throne of Kośala,[53] was, as pointed out, a contemporary of the Buddha. He was educated at Takṣaśilā and was the class-fellow of Mahali, a Lichchavi prince, and a Malla prince of Kusīnārā.[54]

Pasenadi's political career is brought to limelight in the Pāli texts for his declaration of war against Ajātaśatru for the village of Kāśī in which he was thrice defeated by his nephew. But, in the end, he succeeded in capturing Ajātaśatru, only to return Kāśī to him once again as bath-money, this time in favour of his daughter.

The Śākyas of Kapilavastu became the vassals of king Pasenadi of Kośala who received homage from them.[55] The political subordination of the Śākyas to the Kośalan King in the latter half of the sixth century B.C. is quite apparent from the evidence of the *Aggañña Suttanta*[56] and the introductory portion of the *Bhaddaśāla Jātaka*.[57]

According to Tibetan Buddhist texts[58] this Kośalan king visited the capital of the Śākyas where he saw the beautiful Mallikā, a slave girl of Mahānāma and enamoured of her beauty, expressed a desire to marry her. Mahānāma agreed to this proposal and the King took her away to Savatthi where she gave birth to a child who came to be known as Viruddhaka. The *Mahāvastu Avadhāna*, however, gives another version of this story. According to it, King Pasenadi had a great admiration for the Buddha owing to which he desired to have a connection with the Buddha's family by matrimonial alliance. He demanded the hands of a Śākayan princess which, however, was not acceptable to the Śākyas as

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[53] *Digha Nikāya*, Vol. I, p. 103. See *Sumaṅgalavilāsinī*, Pt. I, pp. 244-245.

[54] *Dhammapada* commentary, I, pp. 337-338.

[55] *Dialogues of the Buddha*, III, p. 80.

[56] *Digha Nikāya*, III, 33; Dialogues III. 80.

[57] *Bhaddasāla Jātaka*, No. 465; Fausboll, IV. 145.

[58] Rockhill, *Life of the Buddha*, pp. 75—77.

they thought it to be below their dignity.[59] In order to get rid of the wrath of the Kośalan king that might have begotten them, they sent a girl named Vāsabhākhattiyā, born of a slave woman from one of their leading chiefs, Mahānāma. In due course of time she gave birth to a son who was named Viḍūḍabha.

APPENDIX I

When Viḍūḍabha was seven years old, he expressed a desire to visit his maternal grandfather's home and hoped to receive some presents which his companions received by their maternal grand parents. But his mother Vāsabha-Khatiyā prevented him from going there lest he might detect the fraud practised against his father. At his early age of sixteen he, somehow, got his mother's consent and set out for Kapilavastu with a large retinue. No body paid obeisance to him as the young Śākyans had already been sent away at a distance, leaving only the seniors in age to him. This was enough to create some suspicion in his mind about his position. But on the last day of his stay one of his retinue overheard a contemptuous remark passed by a slave woman who was washing, with milk and water, the seat on which Viḍūḍabha had sat. This incident was brought to his notice and he somehow or the other managed to detect deceit practised on his father. Henceforth, he determined to take vengeance on the Śākyans. We are told that Pasenadi cut off all honours from Vāsabha-Khatiyā and her son. But, at the Buddha's advice restored them to their respective positions.

The Buddhist texts inform us that three years after the marriage of his sister Vajirā with Ajātaśatru, Viḍūḍabha revolted against his father with the assistance of Dīrgha-Cārāyaṇa, nephew of Bandhula, the commander-in-chief of the Kośalan army. Once, when Pasenadi was detected by his father was deceived by the Śākayas and henceforth determined

[59] *Buddhist India*, p. 11.

to take revenge. He succeeded in conspiring against his father and with the help of his commander-in-chief Dīrgha-Cārāyaṇa deposed his father and thus became the sovereign of Kośalan empire. After ascending the throne he started his campaign against the Śākyas and ultimately massacared the entire Śākyans without any consideration of age and sex.

APPENDIX II

On a visit to the Buddha at Medatalumpa, leaving the royal insignia with his commander-in-chief Dīrgha-Cārāyaṇa, the latter took advantage of this opportunity and withdrew the king's body-guard leaving behind only one single horse and one female servant. He hurried to the capital and crowned Viḍūḍabha as King. When this news reached the ears of Pasenadi, he proceeded to Rājagṛha to enlist Ajātasttu's support. But as misfortune never comes alone, he found that the city-gates were closed and hence, exhausted by his tiresome journey, he bade farewell to the world outside the city-gates of Rājagṛha.

At the day-break, when news of the death of Pasenadi reached Ajātasattu, he came and performed the funeral-rites of the deceased king with great pomp and show. He wanted to wage war against Viḍūḍabha but on the advice of his ministers he desisted.[60]

APPENDIX III

After the death of Pasenadi, Viḍūḍabha recollected his oath to take revenge from the Śākyans and set out with a large force. Knowing this the Buddha stood under a tree, with scanty shade, just within the boundaries of the Śākyan kingdom where stood a banyan tree giving deep shade. Seeing this, Viḍūḍabha asked him to sit under the shady tree. But the Buddha said: "Be not worried, the shade of my kinsmen

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[60] *Majjhima Nikāya*, II, 118, M.A. II. 753 ff. *Dhammapadaṭṭhakathā*, I, 153 ff. *Jātaka* (Cowell), IV, 150 ff.

keeps me cool." The king understood it well and made a retreat. We are told that he marched against the Śākyans three times but had to come back every time owing to the Buddha. Finally, when the Buddha new that the fate of his kinsmen could not be averted, he kept himself away. This time the Kośalan army reached Kapilavatthu. The Śākyans went armed into the battle, but not wishing to kill, they discharged their arrows without any proper aim into Viḍūḍabha's ranks which resulted into no casuality. Viḍūḍabha ordered his army men to kill all the Śākyans excepting the followers of the Śākyan Mahānāma.

Diplomatic Relations of Kośala with Other States.

According to a Jātaka story the King of Vārāṇasī gave his daughter in marriage to the prince of Kośala named Dīghāyu and established him in the kingdom that belonged to his father.[61] Kośala also established matrimonial alliances with Magadha. We are told that Mahākosala, father of King Pasenadi of Kośala, gave his daughter Kosalā in marriage to King Bimbisāra of Magadha and presented her a village in Kāśī yielding a revenue of a hundred thousand for bath and perfume money.[62] When Ajātaśatru killed his father Bimbisāra, Pasenadi of Kośala waged a war against him and usurped the village of Kāśī. But, after defeating Ajātaśatru he gave him his own daughter Vajirā in marrriage[63] and thus renewed the old friendly ties. He gave the village of Kāśī to her "which was for a long time of bone of contention between the two families."[64]

Expansion of Kośala.

The great kingdom of Kośala was by far the most important state in the northern India in the sixth century B.C. Suc-

[61] *Jātaka* (*Cowell*), III, pp. 139-140.
[62] *Ibid.*, II, p. 164, IV, p. 216.
[63] *Ibid.*, IV, pp. 216-217.
[64] *Carmaichael Lectures*, 1918, p. 77.

cess, however, did not remain long with Kāsīs.[65] In the time of Mahākośala who flourished about the middle of the sixth century B.C. Kāśī formed an integral part of the Kośalan monarchy.[66] We learn from *Mahāvagga*[67] that a brother of Pasenadi acted as a viceroy of Kāśī. Kāśī was the first state to be absorbed by Kośala. The Jātaka refers to the old rivalry between the two states owing to which there had been a constant warfare between these two neighbouring states, with fluctuating fortunes. Once, we are told, the King of Vārāṇasī, marched against Kośala, and killing the king, carried away his queen to his own harem. But the son of the deceased king escaped and shortly afterwards collecting a mighty force, blockaded the city of Banaras and ultimately took possession of the city.[68] Thus, there had been a constant fued between the two neighbouring states of Kāśī and Kośala which ultimately resulted in the extinction of the former and its annexation by the latter. The Jātaka stories preserve various tales to this effect.[69]

Kośala and Magadha.

Bimbisāra, who was a contemporary of the Buddha, was given the hands of the daughter of King Mahakośala, Kośaladevī in marriage and thus obtained a village of the Kāśī-country. This matrimonial alliance strengthened the friendly ties between these two great and powerful states. It must also have favoured peaceful penetration in the east and left the king free to organise his kingdom and deal drastically with robbers and savages who menaced the road from Sāketa to Sāvetthī, and interferred with peaceful life of the monks."[70] But in course of time this relation could not last long when

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[65] *Jātaka* No. 100.

[66] See *Harita Māta Jātaka*, No. 239; *Vaddhaki Sukara Jātaka*, No. 283, *Dialogues of the Buddha*, I, 288—97.

[67] S. B. E., XVII. 195.

[68] *Jātaka* (Cowell) I, 243.

[69] *Ibid.*, I, pp. 128—133; III, pp. 0-10; pp. 76-78; V, pp. 166-167.

[70] H. C. Ray Chaudhuri, *Pol. Hist. of A. India*, 1953 ed., pp. 199-200.

Ajātaśatru put his father Bimbisāra to death and Kośala Devī died of grief in consequence with the loss of her husband. Pasenadi could not see that treacherous Ajātaśatru continuing to enjoy the revenues of that village which was given to his sister, for, he "resolved that no parricide should have a village which was his by right of inheritance". He therefore confiscated it. Since then Kāśī became the bone of contention between these two kings. The war between Pasenadi and Ajātaśatru proved disastrous to both of them. Ajātaśatru became victorious at first but was ultimately taken prisoner by the Kośalan king. He was, however, released after somedays and was given the hands of Vajirā, the daughter of Kośala king in marriage and the village of Kāśī was given back.[71]

Kośala also counted amongst its vassals several rājās, including the rulers of Kāśī, the Śākyas and the Kālāmas. Among its officials were two Mallas, Bandhula and his nephew Dīgha Cārāyana.[72]

Extinction of Kośala.

The flourishing period of the sixteen Mahājanapadas came to an end in the sixth and fifth centuries B.C. Their subsequent history is marked by the growth of the empire of Magadha and their gradual merger into it by a series of conquests.

The Buddhist legends contain an interesting account of the fall of Kośalan power. According to them, Viḍūḍabha after killing the entire Śākyan clan pitched his camp on the dry bed of the Acirāvati where during the night there was a sudden flood and Viḍūḍabha and those of his retinue who slept in the river-bed were washed away into the sea.[73]

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[71] *Carmichael Lectures* of Dr. Bhandarkar, 1918, pp. 76-77. See also Cowell, *Jātaka*, iv, pp. 216-217..

[72] *Majjhima Nikāya*, ii, 118.

[73] *Dhammapadaṭṭhakathā* i. 346—9, 357—61; see also *Jātaka* i. 133 and iv. 146 f; 151 f.

Kośala, once counted as one of the great monarchies of India, showed signs of disruption towards the beginning of the fifth century B.C. Dr. Bhaṇḍārkar points out that some parts of Kośala were annexed to the kingdom of Magadha during the reign of Ajātaśatru.[74] Kośala disappears from the political scene as an independent kingdom and was evidently absorbed by the Magadhan Imperialism.[75]

In the *Nirayāvali Sūtra* we are told that when Ajātaśatru declared war against Cheṭaka of Vaiśālī, the latter called together the eighteen Gaṇarājās of Kāśī and Kośala, together with the Lichchhavis and Mallakis. That Kośala and Vaiśālī maintained friendly relations is not only attested to by the *Nirayāvali Sūtra* but also by the *Majjhima Nikāya.*[76] Dr. Ray Chaudhury aptly points out that "the Kośalan war and the Vajjain war were probably not isolated events but parts of a common movement directed against the establishment of big conflagration."[77] The defeat of the mighty Vajjains thus marks the final extinction of the Kośalan power from the political horizon of the times.

The history of Kośala is shrouded in darkness after its absorption into the vast dominions of Ajātaśatru, the king of Magadha. Since then there are no references to Kośala as an independent or semi-independent state. It is only during the reign of the Puṣyamitra Śuṅga that Kośala seems to have gained the status of a vice-royalty governed by a relative of the emperor Puṣyamitra. The existence of this viceroyalty is confirmed by an inscription discovered at the door of a temple at Ayodhyā recording the erection of a "Ketana" (abode) by a Kiśalādhipa who was the sixth (brother or descendent) of

[74] *Carm. Lectures*, 1918, p. 79.

[75] Smith, *Oxford History of India*, p. 46.

[76] *Majjhima Nikāya*, II, p. 101

[77] Raychaudhri: *Pol. Hist. of Ancient India*, p. 213

Senāpati Puṣyamitra, the performer of two sacrifices.[78] This inscription, in several ways, is unique, as probably being the first inscription in Sanskrit found so far and for retaining the connotation 'Senāpati' to the name of Puṣyamitra, whose rise from that rank to that of an emperor is an established historical fact.

Kośala—the centre of Buddhist activity.

The Kingdom of Kośala was the scene of intense early Buddhistic activities during the lifetime of King Prasenajit, who was an ardent admirer of the Buddha. The latter too reciprocated by favouring his kingdom and capital with frequent visits, as attested by the numerous references and stories in the Buddhist texts. The *Saṁyutta Nikāya* records the conversion of Pasenadi at Jetavana where being impressed by the answers of the Buddha he became his disciple.[79] Since then the Kośalan king received frequent and timely pieces of advice from the Tathā-gata on various aspects of life.[80] The Buddha spent much of his time at Sāvatthī and most of his sermons were delivered there. The *Saṁyutta Nikāya* informs us that Buddha delivered a sermon on self to the Brāhmaṇa householders of the village in Kośla.[81] The *Majjhima Nikāya* preserves an account of the conversion of the Kośala country to the Buddhist faith.[82] The Buddha visited Lālā, a village inhabited by Brāhmaṇas and within the territory of Kośala kingdom, where he gave a discourse to the inhabitants on his principles, nihilism, karma, kāya, etc., whereupon they became his life-long disciples.[83]

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78 *Nāgari Prachāriṇī Patrikā*, Vaiśākha, Samvata, 1981; J.B.O.R.S. X (1924) 203; xiii (1927) facing 247. *Modern Review*, 1924, Oct., p. 431; *I.H.Q.* 1929, 602F, *Epigraphia Indica* XX. 54 ff.

79 *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, Vol. I, pp. 68—70.

80 *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, III, p. 57; pp. 216-217; *Dhammapada* Commentary, I. 64. *Saṁyutta* I, 10—82.

81 *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, p. 352 foll.

82 *Majjhima Nikāya*, I, 285 foll.

There is yet another instance of the Buddha visiting Nagaravinda, a Brāhmaṇa village in Kośala and of converting the householders to his faith through his sermon. The *Majjhima Nikāya* relates many such missionary activities of the Buddha at and within the kingdom of Kośala.[84]

The Buddha had some of his main followers at Kośala. The *Vinaya Piṭaka* states that the Bhikkhus of Kośala used to recite the *Pātimokkha* in an abridged form to avert imminent danger.[85] Udena, a lay-devotee of Kośala, dedicated his vihara to the Bhikkhus for their use.[86] Nanda, a cowherd, obtained the first stage of sanctification.[87] Aggidatta who was the royal chaplain of Pasenadi and his father were also converted by Moggallāna with his disciples.[88]

Administration of Kośala.

The account of the international organisation of the kingdom of Kośala presents some interesting information on this subject. The form of government was monarchical.[89]

The kings of Kośala, during the early days of Buddhist activity in that country, combined in them the highest civil, executive and judicial authorities and were thus both '*de facto*' as well as '*de jure*' heads of the State. A body of Ministers of State did in fact assist them, but the former had little control over the whims, caprices and autocratic tendencies of these kings. Yet the names of some illustrious ministers are preserved in traditions and texts which refer to some import-

[83] *Ibid.*, I, pp. 400 ff.

[84] *Mjjhima N.*, III, 290 Foll; see also *Aṅguttara* N., I, 213; IV. 253, 256, 260, III. 301—303; *Sutta N.* 79—86

[85] *Vinaya Texts*, Pt. I, p. 261.

[86] *Ibid.*, 302.

[87] *Dhammapada commentary*, I, 322-323.

[88] *Ibid.*, III, 241 foll.

[89] Elist, *Hinduism and Buddhism*, Vol. I, p. 131; Cf. Bhandārkar, *Carm. lectures*, 1918, p. 114.

ant state-ministers like Mṛgadhara,[90] Ugga, Siri, Vaḍḍha, Kāla and Junha.

Capital Cities of Kośala.

The kingdom of Kośala owes much of its importance, halo and reverence to its memorable association with its epic capital Ayodhyā, where the line of Ikṣvākuids produced some famous mythical kings including Rāma, whose life and deeds have profoundly influenced and shaped to great extent the later course of Hinduism. The capital city later became famous by the name of Sāketa as shall be presently seen, and had yielded its place of importance to Sāvatthī or Śrāvastī which was the principal city and capital of Kośala during the days of pre-Buddhist and early Buddhist activities.

Sāvatthī.

Thus Sāvatthī and Sāketa were the two capital cities of Kośala. Sāvatthi corresponds to modern Saheṭh-Maheṭh on the banks of the Rapti, which now lies on the borders of the districts of Gonda and Bahraich in the Uttara Pradesh.[91] According to Buddhaghoṣa, it was originally known as Savatthi because it was the dwelling place of sage Savattha. There are various other interpretations with regard to the origin of the word Sāvatthī.

The *Papañcasūdanī* commentator, however, gives a totally different version. According to him the city was so-called because of its flourishing condition as it could meet every possible human requirements (Sabbam-atthi=Sāvatthī).[92] The Purāṇas hold that this city was bult by king Srāvasta.[93]

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[90] Hoernle, *twāsaga-dasao*, II. Appendix, p. 56, and *Dictionary of Pali Proper Names*, I, 332, 572, 960; II, 1146.

[91] *J.R.A.S.*, 1909, p. 1066 q. and Cunningham, *AGI*. 469.

[92] *Papañchasūdanī*, I, pp. 59-60.

[93] *Viṣṇupurāṇa*, Ch. 2, Amśa. 4; see also *Matsyapurāṇa*, XXI, 30; *Kūrmapurāṇa*, Ch. 23, Sl. 19; *Liṅgapurāṇa*, Ch. 95, cf. *Bhāgavatapurāṇa*, 9, 6. 21.

Being the capital of the most eminent of the kings of northern India, Śrāvastī came into still greater prominence in the time of the Buddha and his illustrious contemporaries, who frequently visited the city. There are numerous references to it in the early Buddhist texts, but by far the most important from the geographical point of view is that of the Majjhima which mentions Sāvatthī and Vanasātthī as the two important stopping places on the high road starting from Rājagṛha as far as Aḷaka and Assaka.[94]

Sāvatthī was situated on the bank of the Aciravatī.[95] Besides its stately halls, palaceṣ and pallisades, the city contained two famous Buddhist monastic establishments known as Jetavana and Pubbārāma. Prince Jeta who had laid out. owned and maintained the famous garden of Jetavana was counted among the wealthiest of nobles of Śrāvastī.[96]

Much of the prosperity of the city of Śrāvastī was due to the fact that it was the meeting place of the three most important ancient trade-routes and consequently a great centre of business. Since it is reputed to have housed and accommodated 57,000 families,[97] it must have extended far and wide in all directions save the river side.

The material prosperity of Śrāvastī due to its being the resort of many wealthy nobles, Brāhmaṇas, heads of houses etc.[98] A Jātaka story informs us that there dwelt a rich merchant who was worth eighteen crores.[99] Anāthapiṇḍika was another example of a wealthy man at Śrāvastī. The city housed many merchants who used to go to Videha with cart-loads of merchandise to sell their wares and there they used to take commodities from Videha. Some went to Suvarṇabhūmi in a ship; some went to the northern regions taking with them five hundred cart-loads of merchandise.[100]

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[94] *Majjhima*, I, 473. [95] *Vinaya*; *Mahāvagga*, pp. 190-1, 293.
[96] *Papañchasūdanī*, I, p. 60. [97] *Sāmantapasadikā*, p. 614.
[98] *Buddhist Suttas*, S.B.E. 99. [99] Cowell, *Jātaka*, VI, 38.
[100] *Buddhist conception of Spirits*, p. 26, 38, 76.

Śrāvastī was not only a centre of great commercial activity but was also a great centre of religion and culture. According to the Jains it was the birth place of Sambhavanātha and Candraprabhanātha, the two famous Tīrthaṅkaras.[101] Mahāvīra visited the city many a time and spent one rainy season there.[102] The other religious sects commonly found here were the Tatilas, the Niganthas, the Acelakas, Ekaśatakas and the Paribbajakas.[103]

The Buddhist texts are full of praise and often refer to the glories of the city which was a favourite resort of the Blessed One. As already noted, the Buddha delivered here many discourses. Śrāvastī also contributed a large number of the Bhikkhus and Bhikkhunis[104] who acquired fame and renown in the Buddhist congregation for purity of their lives. He had strict adherence to Vinaya rules. He is also reputed to have spent thirty rainy seasons at Śrāvastī.

Śrāvastī, being a centre of Buddhism was visited by the two famous Chinese pilgrims, Fā-Hien and Hiuen-Tsāng in the fourth and seventh centuries A.D., respectively. The former noticed only a few inhabitants in the other famous city amounting to about a hundred families. He refers to king Pasenadi of Kośala and noticed the place where the old Vihāra of Mahāpajāpati Gotamī was built. He also saw the wells and walls of the house of Anāthapiṇḍika, and the site where Aṅgulimāla attained Arhatship.[105] According to Hiuen-Tsāng, although the city was mostly in ruins, there were some inhabitants. The country used to grow food crops. There were some hundreds of Buddhist monasteries most of which

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[101] Jain *Harivaṁsa-purāṇa*, p. 717, Shah, *Jainism of Northern India*, p. 26.

[102] *Kalpasūtra, Subodhikāṭikā*, 103, 105, 106 *Āvasyaka-sūtra*, 221; Stevenson, *Heart of Jainism*, 42.

[103] *Saṁyutta*, I. 78.

[104] *Dhammapada* Comm. I 3 ff, 37, ff, II 260 ff. *Psalms of the Brethren*, pp. 7, 13, 14, 19, 20, 25.

[105] Legge, *Travels of Fa-hein*, pp. 55-56.

were in ruins. There were some deva temples and non-Buddhist shrines as well in number.[106]

Śrāvastī showed signs of disruption even in the days of the Buddha as it began to decline in wealth, population and political supremacy. The famous capitalist of his time Anāthapindika died penniless after spending crores of coins on the erection of the Jetavana-Vihāra, losing eighteen crores in business and a further eighteen crores were lost presumably due to floods in the river Acirāvatī which washed away his entire hoardings on its bank.[107] Jetavana was the solitary reminiscent of the glorious Śrāvastī which, however, continued to be the centre of Buddhist charm from the days of the Buddha to about the middle of the 12th century A.D.[108]

Sāketa.

Sāketa was another of the important towns of Kośala which was certainly its capital in the pre-Buddhist times.[109] Cunningham has convincingly shown that this Sāketa can be no other than Ayodhyā, in modern Oudh.[110] It was one of the most important towns on the south western territorial jurisdictions of the Kośalan kingdom. In due course it came to be counted amongst the six great cities of India.[111] The *Vinaya Piṭaka* informs us that the road from Sāketa to Sāvatthī was haunted by robbers who were dangerous to passers-by.[112] It was a very important city wherefrom one might travel to Kosambi across the Yamunā. It could be reached from Sāvatthī by a chariot-drive with seven relays of

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106 Watters, *On Yuan Chwang*, I, 377, II, 200.

107 *Dhammapada* Commentary, III, 10.

108 See B. C. Law, *Srāvastī in Indian Literature* (*M.A.S.I.*, No. 50).

109 Cowell—*Jātaka* III. 270. 15. Cf. *The Carmichael Lectures*, 1918, p. 51.

110 *Archaeological Survey Report* I, 320.

111 *Dīgha Nikāya*, II, 146.

112 *Vinaya Text.* I, pp. 220-221.

the best of steeds.[113] It was at this city that the banker Dhanañjaya, the father of Visākhā-Migarahata lived.[114] Sāriputta also once stayed here.[115] Jīvaka also visited this place and cured the ailing wife of a banker.[116] Sāketa still had a halo around its name, as some ten centuries later we find it proclaimed as a part of the Gupta dominions.

Setavyā.

Setavyā was also one of the important towns of Kośala[117] along with Daṇḍakappaka,[118] Naḷakapana,[119] and Ponkadhā and was situated near Ukkaṭṭhā. There was a road from Ukkaṭṭhā to Setavyā.[121]

It is also reputed to have been the birth-place[122] of one of the Pachcheka-Buddhas, Kassapa and according to another commentary Kassapa died in the Seṭārāma of the city of Setavyā.[123]

Jetavana Monastery.

Like other monasteries of India, the Jetavana served the cause of Buddhism well and truly in its period of early activity, and became one of the favourite retreats of the Buddha. It was situated at a distance of one mile towards the south of the city proper of Sāvatthī. The Buddhist texts inform us that it originally belonged to Prince Jeta who laid out the

113 *Majjhima Nikāya*, I, 149. According to *Mahāvagga* (vii. 1. 1, *S.B.E.* xvii), the toron sāketa was six leagues from Sāvatthī. And we also learn from *Visuddhimagga* that the distance from Sāketa to Sāvatthī was seven leagues (p. 390).

114 *Dhammapada* Comm., Vol. I, Pt. 2, pp. 386-7.

115 *Vinaya*, I, 289.

116 *Ibid.*, 170 ff.

117 *Dīgha Nikāya*, II, 316.

118 *Aṅguttra Nikāya*, III, pp. 402 foll.

119 *Ibid.*, IV. pp. 122 foll.

120 *Ibid.*, I, p. 236.

121 *Ibid.*, II, 37.

122 *Ibid.*, 504.

123 *Buddhavaṁsa Comm.* (*S.H.B.*), 223.

Jetavana garden,[124] which was later purchased by the banker Anāthapiṇḍika (Anāthapiṇḍaka or Anāthapiṇḍada) aṭ a fabulous price of as many coins as could cover the ground of the park,—a faithful representation of which is to be found in the Bharahut and Bodha-gayā reliefs.[125] The Vinaya text informs us that the banker caused to be built therein a number of buildings including dwelling rooms, retiring rooms, store-rooms, etc.

The Buddha spent nineteen rainy seasons in Jetavana.[126] According to Fā-Hien[127] the Vihāra mas originally seven storeyed and housed all kinds of offerings to the Blessed One.

Jetavana has been identified with Saheṭa[128] in the extensive ruins of the locality of Saheṭha Maheṭha and is on the southern side.

Acirāvatī.

The river Acirāvatī is known by various names such as Ajirāvatī or Airāvatī [129] and Erāvai[130] Yuan Chwang mentions it as A-Chi-lo, flowing south-east-wards past the city of Śrāvastī.[131] According to I-Tsing, Ajirāvatī derives the name from Aji (a dragon).[132]

The river Acirāvatī has been identified with the modern Rāptī in Uttara-Pradesh, on the western bank of which stood the ancient city of Śrāvastī.[133] According to Pāli commen-

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124 *Dictionary of Pali Proper Names* I, 963.

125 Barua, *Gaya and Bodhagayā*, II, 104-5 and Barua, *Bharhut*, II, 27—31.

126 *Dhammapadaṭṭhakathā* I, 3, *Buddhavaṁsa* Comm. 3; *Manoratthapurnī*, *Aṅguttara* Comm. (*S.H.B.*) I, 314.

127 *Giles*, pp. 31. 33.

128 *Arch. Survey of India*, 1907-8, pp. 81—131.

129 *Avadānaśataka*, I, 63; II. 60; *Pānini*. iv. 3. 119.

130 *Kalpasūtra*, p. 12, *Bṛhat-Kalpasūtra*, 4. 33.

131 Watters, *On Yuan Chwang*, I, 399—99.

132 *Travels of Fā-Hien*, p. 156.

133 Weber, *Daśakumāracaritam* in Indische Srcilen, Berlin, 1868.

taries, it originated from the Anotatta lake,[134] which along with other rivers flowed, glided down and tended towards the east.[135] This river was regarded one of the sacred rivers of the Buddhist Midland.[136]

The river Acirāvatī flows through the districts of Bahrāich, Goṇḍa and Basti and joins the Sarayū or Ghāgharā, west of Barhaj Bazar in the Gorakhpur district. The Chinese traveller Yuan-Chwang mentions it as flowing south-eastwards past the city of Śrāvastī.[137]

Decline of Kośala.

The extinction of Kośala as one of the foremost paramount powers of northern India coincided with the rise of the Haryanka Dynasty in Magadha. But Śrāvastī, the capital of Kośala, continued as a centre of immense Buddhist activity even till the 12th century A.D. Some of the foremost disciples of the Buddha, *viz.*, Ānanda, Kassapa and others continued the pioneer work of spreading Buddhism in that kingdom at important places like Śrāvastī, Tudigāma, Setavya (subsequently known as Payāsī or Bayāsī) and many others. Since the unnaloma of the Buḍdha was enshrined within a stūpa in Kośala,[138] the latter continued as a land of holy pilgrimage for Buddhists from far and wide. Evidently, some parts of Kośala were annexed by Ajātaśatru,[139] which was, economically, a far more flourishing state (one Kośalan pattha, a measure, being equivalent to four Magadhan paṭṭhas),[140] than Magadha itself. Subsequently, Magadha, with its capital at

134 *Papañcasūdanī*, Sinhalese Ed., II, 586, *Manorathapūrani*, Singhalese Ed., II. 759-60; *Sutta Nipat* Comm. P.T.S. 437—439, etc.

135 *Samyutta Nikāya*, V. 31. 134; II. 135.

136 *Vinaya*, II, p. 239.

137 Watters, *On Yuan Chwang*, I, 298-99.

138 *Buddhavaṁsa* (P.T.S.) XXVIII. 9.

139 *Carm. Lectures*, 1918, p. 79.

140 *Sutta Nipāta*, Commentary, II. 476.

Rājagṛha and Pāṭalīputra, under successive imperialist dynasties, absorbed the entire Kośala kingdom within its domain.[141]

One aspect of the hey-days of Kośalan supremacy in northern India is of special notice and importance. Right from the later vedic times Kāśī and Kośala were associated together, as evident from the expression Kāśī—Kośala, occuring very often in the later vedic literature.[142] The Buddhist literature too, has innumerable references to the same effect.

In the *Dīgha Nikāya* we are told that Pasenadi, King of Kāśī-Kośala, collecting taxes from the inhabitants of these two countries and shared his income with his subordinates. The *Mahāvagga*, however, mentions a Kāśika-rāja (King of Kāsī) who sent a robe to Jīvaka.[143] Buddha-ghosha refers to him as a brother of Pasenadi, and son of the same father.[144] He was probably a sub-king under Pasenadi,[145] who with his extensive territories reiganed as a supreme monarch with four sub-kings under him.[146] We have seen how Kośala subsequently formed a part of the great Magadhan Kingdom. There is nothing surprising about this course of events, for, as pointed out by scholars,[147] India in those days appeared as a number of kingdoms and republics with a constant tendency towards amalgamation of one into the other.

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141 Smith, *Oxford History of India*, p. 46.

142 *Vedic Index*.

143 *Vin.*, I, 281.

144 *Vinaya Texts*, II, 195, n. 2.

145 Malālaskeera, *Dictionary of Pāli Proper Names*, S.V. Kasi.

146 See article, '*Kośala*', B. C. Law, *Indian Culture*, Vol. I, No. 3.

147 *Cambridge History of India*, Vol. I, p. 190.

ŚRĪ RĀMA AND THE MORAL IDEAL (DHARMA)

By DR. P. NAGARAJA RAO

I am most grateful to the executive members of the Sanskṛt Academy, Madras, for the honour they have done me in appointing me to be the Śrīnivasa Śāstri lecturer for the current year's Vālmīki day celebrations. I am well aware of the limitations I labour under and I shall not presume to attempt, to do more than essay a few observations on the significance and the splendour of Śrī Rāmachandra's character, based on some little study I have made of this great *ādi kāvya* by Vālmīki—the poet's poet. I think it is only proper for me to pay a tribute, not to the mere statesmanship nor merely to the powers of speech but to the depth of culture and the reverent devotion to the *Rāmāyaṇa* of the distinguished savant to whose memory this lecture is dedicated. I was one of those whom he honoured with his most touching and affectionate friendship. I was one of those privileged listeners to those invaluable discourses of the *Rāmāyaṇa* he delivered shortly before his lamented death, under the auspices of the Sanskṛt Academy.

In my approach to the study of Śrī Rāma's character needless to stay, I shall be treading over again the well trodden ground. Reverent admiration for Śrī Rāma's character is a part of the fundamental faith of every devout Hindu, be he a *Śaivate* or a *Vaiśnava*. Whether we look upon Rāma as an avatāra of Viṣṇu or as a human being who succeeded in being a perfect exemplar of all the human virtues, we shall be compelled to confess ourselves unwearied admirers of Śrī Rama's transcendental excellence. Those who look upon Śrī Rāma as an avatāra seek, indeed to trace his perfection to his being *ad hoc* human manifestation of the divine person; on the other hand, those who regard Śrī Rāma, as a perfect human being.

seem, to my view, as also doing justice to his character. in that the perfection of his character is regarded as the result of his strenuous self-discipline, not the mere gift of the divine. However, it is perhaps fair to say that the difference between the two iews seems narrower than is often thought. Human qualities in such perfection are not indeed anything but a product of the grace of the divine.

The study of Śrī Rāma's character has a terrific topical value to us Indians to day and to humanity at large that lives under the shadow of the alarming nuclear developments. In our world of hectic hurry, and over-organised technocracy. we are ceasing to be human. We have no time or inclination for anything except the pleasure of the passing hour. No ideals attract us except the excitement of the moment. We live intensely in the present, we do not look before or after. We are striken by psychic anxieties, cloven by emotional conflicts, beset by economic insecurities and are above all assailed by political doubts. We want to fly from ourselves. Twentieth century man "encounters half-faiths, fragmentary creeds, unaesthetic arts, and doubtful political nostrums." In the words of T. S. Eliot "the best lack all conviction, and the worst are full of passionate intensity."[1] Men in their quest for false happiness spare no efforts, they count that opposing dangers and suffering, as nothing. Recent psychologists have lamented the modern man's pre-occupation with sex. Men have become extremely sensitive to sex. They go quite mad in its pursuit. Sex is the fire in the blood and burns up the whole personality in man. Society and the new psychology have boosted it up and advertised it a thousand fold.[2]

To us today the *Rāmāyaṇa* has an imperative message. The poet's poet Vālmīki has given us through the medium of great poetry the picture of the great man, growing and mani-

[1] T. S. Eliot: *The Second Coming.*

[2] Sorokin: *Power and Morality* and "*Reconstruction of Humanity.*

festing his greatness. The *Rāmāyaṇa* is neither old nor new. It is eternal. "Modernity is not a matter of date, but of outlook."

The classics have a very important function. It is wrong to regard that the classics are "merely guardians of the past, for they are equally the heralds of the future". They are dead if they are mechanically and unthinkingly read. When we read and ponder over the verses of the *Rāmāyaṇa*, they reemerge in answer to our present problem. They have the power to produce from age to age the necessary correction to men's sense of values and the conduct of life by creating the moral ideal which gives them the vision of truth.

The *Rāmāyaṇa* of Vālmīki is hailed as the first piece of great poetry and Vālmīki as the first great poet. It is the *ādikāvya* and Vālmīki is the *ādikavī*. All the great poets that followed Vālmīki have paid their tribute to his genius with great love and respect. Kālidāsa refers to him with respect in his *Raghuvamśa*. He hails him as the sage of former times and humbly describes his role as one who makes a string of the already perforated and drilled precious stones, made ready by Vālmīki. Vālmīki is described by Professor Hiriyanna as the morning star of Indian classical poetry. The circumstances associated with the birth of *Rāmāyaṇa* are significant "Vālmīki the great sage of Kośala, was thinking of describing in a worthy manner the fortunes of Rāma the divine hero of his country. Resolving this idea in his mind he one day went as usual to the river Tāmasa to perform his mid-day ablutions. But on that day it so happened that he saw in the vicinity of the river a fowler killing one of a pair of lovely birds that were disporting themselves on the branch of a tree. The fowler singled out the male bird and brought it down with his arrow. Seeing the bird lie on the ground, weltering in its blood, its mate began to wail in plaintive tones. The soft hearted sage was moved to intense pity at this sight; and his grief spontaneously burst forth in the form

of a Śloka which according to tradition was the first rhythmic utterance outside the old archaic language of the Vedas. Vālmīki looked upon this śloka as suggesting to him the key note of the contemplated work and under the spell of its inspiration composed his great poem—The *Rāmāyaṇa* and became celebrated as the *ādikavi*."[3]

The great poet Bhavabhūti derived his inspiration for his drama *Uttara Rāma Carita* from Vālmīki. He regards Vālmīki as the essence of poetry. Vālmīki is the sage "who has realised the supreme being in the form of sound. Brahmā exhorts Vālmīki to expound the story of Rāma and crowns him as the first poet. Vālmīki's *Rāmāyaṇa* has made our world beautiful. That is the verdict of Bhavabhūti.

The author of the *Anargha Rāghava*, Murārī raising the question as to why he again chooses to write on the same story of Rāma, answers, that there is no second Rāma than the one created by Vālmīki. He is inexhaustible in his significance. The great Ānanda Vardhana who restricts the list of great poets to three, heads the list with Vālmīki. Further, he declares that Vālmīki is the greatest among the past poets that has realised and produced a great work of poetry whose essence is *dhvani*.

The *Rāmāyaṇa* has inspired a modern scholar in the east and the west. Śrī Aurobinda Gosh writes "Not all perhaps can enter at once into the spirit of this masterpiece, but those who have once done so will never admit any other poem in the world as its superior."

Sir Monier William writes "There are in the whole range of worlds literature few more charming poems than the *Rāmāyaṇa*. The classical purity, the clearness and the simplicity of its style, the exquisite touches of rare poetic feeling with which it abounds, its graphic description of its heroic incidents and of Nature's grandest scenes, the deep acquaintance it displays with the conflicting workings and the most

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[3] See M. Hiriyanna: *Sanskrit Studies*, p. 4.

refined emotions of the human heart—all entitles it to rank among the most beautiful compositions that have appeared at any period in any country."

Although the Hindus, like the Greeks, have only two great Epic poems, namely, the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Mahābhārata*, yet compare these with the *Iliad* or the *Odyessey* is to compare the Indus and the Ganges rising in the snows of the world's most colossal range, swollen by numerous tributaries spreading into vast shallows or travelling into too deep divergent channels with the streams of Attica or the mountainous torrents of Thessealy."[4]

Principal Griffith writes "Nowhere else are poetry and morality so charmingly united, each elevating the other as in this really holy poem."

The immortality of the *Rāmāyaṇa* is proclaimed by Brahmā "As long as the hills endure and rivers flow, till that date *Rāmāyaṇa* will continue to flourish."[5]

The personality of Śrī Rāma is a thoroughly integrated entity. It is a rounded personality. There is no lop-sided development in him. No God is cheated of his due and none is over paid. All the faculties are present in their due proportion and necessary form. He was the ideal man looked on by all alike. Vālmīki has expressed the widespread total influence of Rāma's greatness on all his contemporaries in a memorable verse. "He who has not seen Rāma, nor he who has not been seen by Rāma, stands censured not only by society but is condemned by his own self."[6] Rāma's popularity was immense. All gazed on Him and were gratified.

The most outstanding great quality of Śrī Rāma's character—the quality that compels not admiration alone, but the deepest respect and the most reverent study, the quality that in itself embodies a philosophy of conduct of astounding com-

[4] Sri K. S. Ramaswami Sastri: *Studies in Rāmāyaṇa*, p. 2.

[5] *Rāmāyaṇa*, 1-2, 36, 37.

[6] *Ibid.*, 11—17, 14, 15.

prehensiveness is that Rāma is essentially a *dharmātman*. The term *dharmātman* is all inclusive. If one were to put the question, adopting the language of the *Gītā* 'what is the language of the *Dharmātman*? How does he speak, how does he sit, how does he walk? We have to read Vālmīki's account for the answer. All the qualities of Rāma follow his *dharmaniṣṭhatā*. He is anchored in *Dharma*.

Daśaratha described Rāma as the 'wise elder' in the practice of *Dharma* (*dharmajyeṣṭha*).[7] Rāma subordinated the two values-possessions and passions to the behest of *Dharma*. Rāma declared to the irate Lakṣmaṇa, when he offered martial assistance to put down all opposition to him; "human experience makes clear that the pursuit of dharma alone brings in its trial wealth, pleasures and all else, in the manner one attains all aspirations from the marriage with a beloved that obedient woman.[8] Śrī Rāma's beloved Sītā described Rāma as the very embodiment of perfection to Anusūyā, "How could one like me not bear the great love I have towards a person like Rāma? He is a man of controlled senses and permanent affection and absolutely righteous—one who reveres other women as his mother.[9] Sītā in a mood of appreciation exclaims "the evil born of desires is threefold. They are falsehood, association with other's wives and being harmful to men without any cause of hostility. Falsehood has never been thine, nor can it ever be thine. Thou art never even in fancy guilty of going after others' wives, which sin destroys all religious merit. Thou art always attracted by thy wife alone and by no other woman.[10] Rāma believed in the practice of the concrete dharma. He never merely lectured or talked a lot about Dharma. He first of all practised Dharma in all his activities. He stuck to it in an un-

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[7] *Rāmāyaṇa*, II—12—16.

[8] *Ibid.*, II—21—57.

[9] *Ibid.*, II—118, 3—6.

[10] *Ibid.*, III—9, 3—6.

flinching manner. This attitude induced love of righteousness in his neighbours and thus he extended the rule of *Dharma*.[11]

Kauśalyā, the mother of Rāma, testifies to Rāma's impregnable faith in *Dharma*. In her exhortation to Rāma she says "that *Dhrma* for which you have decided to undergo the task of going to the forest for fourteen years, that very same *Dharma* will protect you." Mārīca describes Rāma as the idol of *Dharma* (rāmo vigrahavān Dharmaḥ).

Though Rāma was anchored in *Dharma*, he did not neglect the other aspects of human life. Vālmīki's presentation gives us the integrated picture of Rāma's character. Rāma had all the excellences that one marks of perfection.

Śrī Rāma's physical personality has exerted on the readers an enduring influence. His is the most "auspicious resplendent form (divya-maṅgala-vigraha). He had imposing lovely and proportionate limbs that attracted all. He is known for his pleasant personality traits. He had self possession above all qualities (niyatātma). This did not make him indifferent to others troubles. He showed sympathy to others with a rare detachment. He loved life and indulged in desires and activities without endangering his firm stand on Dharma. He knew all the fine arts. He was a *viśārada* and *vicakṣaṇa*. He had tastes and powers of discrimination. He had keen perception and correct judgement of men and things. At all times he remained unagitated with perfect poise. He spoke first to strangers and disarmed them. He always maintained an ever pleasant countenance (Sadaika-priya-darśana). He was ever calm and exerted perfect self-discipline. He never insulted or spoke harshly to others. He had no love for gossip, scandal or useless little talk.

His moral qualities have inspired many heroes through all the ages. The foremost among his moral qualities are his

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[11] *Ibid.*, I, I—13—14.

superhuman passion for Dharma, (from which flow all his other qualities); serenity in the most trying circumstances, coupled with his undaunted courage to implement his moral resolve without any fuss or theatricality in the face of all odds. One has to turn to the debate between Bharata and Rāma when the former begged him to go back to Ayodhyā. Several clever men tried their best to confuse the issues adroitly in the mind of Rāma. Some said that he should live the life of a householder and not abandon his āśrama and go to forests. Others pointed out that it is not Kṣatriya-dharma (the duty of king) to go to forests for a long period. He should protect his subjects and carry out the work of his father and complete it. Jābāli the cunning Brāhmaṇa advises Rāma not to give up the pleasant fruits of this world in favour of a doubtful, unreal and unknown fruits in a life hereafter. Vaśiṣṭha asks Rāma on his authority to go back to Ayodhyā. Rāma listens to all and answers each and refutes their arguments. Any man of lesser resolve and lesser devotion to Dharma than Rāma would surely have been confounded and confused and gone mad. Rāma stood like a rock of ages. He did not resort to casuistry or quibbling. He followed the spirit of his fathers words. He stood unassailed by anything. When Rāma was being sent to the forest Daśaratha suggested to the minister that he should furnish Rāma with enough goods and money to enable him to live in ease for a period of fourteen years. Kaikeyi resented it and Rāma said that it is not the spirit of his father's promise. The promise implies that he should live like a poor man. Rāma always stuck to the spirit of a decision and did not swerve from it, under any pretext. He never slackened his resolve. When Rāma was about to leave for the forest Kaikeyi felt that Rāma might not do so, taking advantage of his father's state of health, and banking on the popular support he had. Rāma assured the doubting Kaikeyi, letting her know his strength and stature. He said "Oh queen, I am not a materialistic worlding clinging to pos-

sessions and power. I am the equal of the sages who always uphold nothing but Dharma".[12] The sheet-anchor of Rāma's character is Dharma.

Śrī Rāma had an active love of truth and justice. He had an unconquerable faith in the triumph and ultimate victory of Dharma. He led an unremitting moral life against all odds. His intellectual powers were matched to his moral earnestness. His acuteness of intellect was responsible for the probity of his conduct. He had a rare tenacity in holding on to his convictions. He never went back on his promise. He never spoke twice. His loyalty to his friends is unmatched. He never suffered injustice when he encountered it. He put it down with amazing courage. He had a judicious mind which was not swayed by the impulses of the moment or disturbed by prejudices. He weighed the pros and cons of an issue in an instant. He spoke little but when he did it, it had tremendous force and effect. He had a balanced mind and an intuitive sagacity all his own. He had a profound sense of humour and a capacity for pointed remarks. We see his humour in the way he fooled Sūrpanakhā.

When Vibhīṣaṇa sought refuge with Rāma Sugrīva advised Rāma that he should not be taken as he has deserted his own brother, and, Heaven knows what he would not do. Rāma replies "brothers are much the same everywhere, except in my household". That silenced Sugrīva and put him in his place.

The character of Śrī Rāma was independent, critical but not cynical. He was never down cast or felt helpless. He never exhibited adīnatā. He had a wonderful power of forgiving men of their faults. When any one spoke harshly to him, he did not retort. He expressed his sense of gratefulness even for a single act of kindness done to him by others. He never remembered even if one rendered hundreds of un-

[12] *Rāmāyaṇa*, II—19—20.

kind acts. He was the prince of forgiveness. He always judged himself and his conduct by the strictest standards. He was lenient to others and condoned their lapses. He was never vindictive in his acts. Sītā in a celebrated passage appeals to his sense of compassion and says "Be they good men or bad, be they deserving of death, still they must be pardoned and treated with mercy by one claiming to be Ārya. For no one is above error (na kaścinnāparādhyati). She uses a double negative. Compassion for all, is the general character of Rāma.

Śrī Rāma was of easy access to all. He was a friend to all. All that lived loved to gaze on the ineffable charm the transcendent loveliness of the radiant personality of Śrī Rāma. Each sought him as his ultimate refuge in distress. They saw in his abounding compassion an assurance they will be saved. Rāma never gave sway to any passion that violated Dharma. He was against the exclusive and excessive pursuit of any one value of life. *Dharma* helps us to restore this balance. Rāma spread *Dharma* from personal example and not verbal propagation. He loved truth (satya) and lived dharma in which satya found its fulfilment.

The theistic vedānta of Rāmānuja looks upon the*Rāmāyaṇa* not merely as a great literary classic but as the sacred book of the gospel of *Śaraṇāgati* and *prapatti*. Rāma the divine incarnation is described in the *dhyāna śloka* thus "when the supreme principle which is to be understood by the vedas took shape in the person of Daśaratha's son, the vedas transformed themselves into the words of Vālmīki as the story of the *Rāmāyaṇa*". The *Rāmāyaṇa* is the sacred book of self-surrender. The ideal of God-love is the supreme act of self-surrender which means wearing oneself away from all other worldly ties. Rāma declares in a well-known verse "Whosoever but once in his sincerity of heart confesses 'O Lord, 'I am thine', make him fearless from all. This is my vow to those who unload themselves of all their personal concern in the

matter of their salvation. This is called *prapatti* in the *vaiṣṇava* terminology. The doctrine of self-surrender has a redeeming simplicity, hard to beat. It is superior and more easy than *bhakti*. It is open to all irrespective of their creed, sex, age and merit. The Lord never probes into the merits and demerits of the suppliant. He saves the refugee with his unbounding grace. Grace is no commercial transaction. There is no bargaining here. There is no "give me and I shall give Thee." It is a spontaneous act of the Lord. The Bhakta, like Hanumān must realise his utter nothingness. The Lord responds to it. Rāma is described as the protector of all-*Sarvaloka Śaraṇya*. It is declared, where there is Rāma, there is no fear, there is no defeat. There is victory.

A NEW INTERPRETATION OF THE VEDIC WORD MĀNUṢA

By DR. RAM GOPAL, M.A., PH.D.

Every student of Sanskrit is familiar with the common word *Mānuṣa* which finds frequent occurrence in the entire range of Sanskrit literature from the *Ṛgveda* to the *Pañcatantra* and which is seemingly so simple as to present no formidable problem of interpretation. Accordingly the Vedic exegetes seem to have given no serious consideration to the task of ascertaining all the possible senses conveyed by this word; and most of the Vedic commentators, lexicographers and translators are content with interpreting Mānuṣa as 'human, belonging to mankind, a man, etc.' There is no gainsaying the fact that the above-mentioned interpretation of this word is undoubtedly admissible in a majority of Vedic passages and claims the near unanimity of most authorities on the subject, but in a number of important Vedic passages it does not fit into the context and fails to convey the exact sense of the word; and in the explanation of such passages the exegetes strain their ingenuity to the utmost to hammer the said interpretation of *Mānuṣa* into the context without any appreciable success. It is, therefore, worth while to explore the possibility of ascertaining the exact meaning of *Mānuṣa* in such passages.

The most important Vedic passage which should claim our attention first is *Ṛgveda* III, 3, 4 *cd* where the word *Mānuṣa* occurs in conjunction with the names of the three famous rivers, *Dṛṣadvatī*, *Āpayā*, and *Sarasvatī*.[1] It is interesting to see how various Vedic scholars from Śākalya to Geldner have endeavoured to construe the word *Mānuṣa* of this pas-

[1] दृषद्वंत्यां मानु॑ष आप॒याया॒ं सर॑स्वत्यां रेवद॑ग्ने दिदीहि ॥

sage. According to the *Pada-pāṭha* of Śākalya, the inflicted form of *Mānuṣa* in the above verse is 'Mānuṣe' and almost all the commentators and translators excepting Grassman endorse Śākalya's analysis of the text. But Grassman prefers to construe it as 'Mānuṣas', *i.e.*, a nominative singular of *Mānuṣa* meaning 'Mensch'[2]. Though Grassman's analysis of 'Mānuṣa' may not be dismissed as grammatically unwarranted, the sense of the entire passage, as we shall presently see, favours Śākalya's analysis, and 'Grassman's' bold departure from the traditionally accepted analysis of the text fails to bring out clearly the sense of the passage. In fact Grassman has proposed the new analysis to connect this problematic word in sense with the first half of the verse, as one can clearly see from his German translation of the verse: "Dich setzte ein der Mensch im Kreis der Erde, in Sitz der Andacht, in der Tage Glückszeit; Erstrahle schön, O Agni, an den Flüssen; Dṛṣadvatī, Sarasvatī, Āpayā". Though the transference of 'Mānuṣa' from the second half of the verse to the first one rids us of the difficult task of fitting its interpretation with the sense of the second hemistich, the interpretation of the word as attempted by Grassman does not quite fit in with the sense of the first hemistich either.

Sāyaṇa who regards 'Mānuṣa' of the passage as a form of the locative singular interprets it as an adjective of '*Tīre*' ('the bank of the river'), which he imports into the sentence to support his explanation.[3] But as a matter of fact the word '*Tīre*' imported by Sāyaṇa is quite redundant and syntactical-

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[2] *Ṛgveda* I, (Anmerkungen), p. 571.
Wörüerbuch Zum Ṛgveda, *s.v.*

"उत्तमानि स्थानानि दर्शयति। दृषद्वत्याम्। दृषद्वती नाम काचिन्नदी तस्याम्। मानुषे मनुष्यसंचरणविषये. तीरे। आपयायाम्। आपया नाम काचिन्नदी तस्याम्। सरस्वत्यां नद्याम्। एतेषु उत्तमेषु स्थानेषु त्वं रेवत् धनयुक्तं यथा भवति तथा दिदीहि दीप्यस्व। महर्षयः सरस्वतीतीरे खलु यज्ञादिकर्माण्यकार्षुः। तथा च ब्राह्मणम्—'ऋषयो वै सरस्वत्यां सत्रमासत' (ऐ०ब्रा० २, १९) इति"। Sāyaṇa on *Ṛg*. III. 23, 4 *cd*.

ly unadjusted, for the locative forms of Dṛṣadvatī, Āpayā and Sarasvatī clearly signify the banks of these rivers and leave little scope for importing any word like '*Tīre*' to convey this sense. It must be admitted that so far as the sense of '*Tīre*' is concerned it is unmistakably conveyed by the other locative forms used in the sentence, but the word '*Mānuṣa*' remains obscure in the absence of this imported word. So Sāyaṇa's interpretation merely bypasses the main problem and does not solve it.

Veṅkaṭamādhava's approach to this problem is a bit different. He explains 'Mānuṣe' as '*Yajamānārtham*', but offers no justification.[4] Since there is no trace of another stem *Mānuṣ* which could account for the formation of *Mānuṣe* in the dative singular, *Mānuṣe* must be regarded as a locative singular of *Mānuṣa* and interpreted accordingly. We see no reason why the locative in *Mānuṣe* should be interpreted to stand for a dative.

Most of the modern Vedists concur with Sāyaṇa in accepting *Mānuṣe* as a locative singular of *Mānuṣa* and offer the traditional interpretation such as 'human, belonging to mankind, a man, etc.' As this interpretation is obviously incongruous with the context, they advance various conjectures to supplement it. Ludwig who interprets *Mānuṣe* as "am menschlichen Orte" translates the passage as follows: "am menschlichen Orte, an der Dṛṣadvatī, an der Āpayā, an der Sarasvatī erstrale herrlich, Agni."[5] Griffith gives the following translation of the passage: "On man, on Āpayā, Agni! On the rivers Dṛṣadvatī, Sarasvatī, shine richly."[6] Though Ludwig's conjecture conveys some sense, Griffith's rendering

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[4] "स त्वं दृषद्वत्यां सरस्वत्यां च। धनयुक्तम्। यजमानार्थम्। दीप्यस्व। आपयेत्यापगामाह परोक्षम्। देवश्रवसः स्थानं दृषद्वतीतीरे देववातस्य सरस्वत्यामिति अथवा तयोः कूलेषु सत्रकरणमिति तत्र दीपनमिति॥"

Veṅkaṭamādhava on *ṚV*. III. 23. 4 *cd*.

[5] Ludwig, Der *Ṛgveda*, I, p. 345.

[6] Griffith, *Hymns of the Ṛgveda* I,, p. 339.

of *Mānuṣe* by "on man" is utterly literal and vague. There seems to be no cogent reason in support of Muir's rendering of *Mānuṣe* by "in the assembly of men."[7] Geldner's interpretation of '*Mānuṣe*' as "Unter dem Menschengeschlecht"[8] is based on the analogy of "*Mānuṣe Jane*" occurring in *ṚV*. V. 21. 2. But the adjectival use of '*Mānuṣe*' in *ṚV*. V. 21, 2 does not solve our problem, because the main difficulty in the interpretation of '*Mānuṣe*' occuring in *R.V*. III, 23, 4 arises due to the fact that it does not qualify any noun and thus gives rise to various speculations concerning its exact acceptation.

It is in fact the context of a word that could render maximum help in the elucidation of its meaning. The circumstance that the *Mānuṣe* of *R.V*. III, 23, 4 closely concurs with Dṛṣadvatyām, Āpayāyām and Sarasvatyām in respect of case and number should not be ignored in the interpretation of this word. Since the concurrent words Dṛṣadvatī, Āpayā and Sarasvatī denote the names of certain rivers belonging to the eastern part of the Punjab,[9] it is worth while to ascertain whether *Mānuṣa* also stands for any geographical name in conjunction with the names of these rivers. In this important task of ascertaining the meaning of *Māmuṣa*, the *Mahābhārata* (III, 83) which eulogizes *Kurukṣetra* and the *Tīrthas* situated in it, renders a signal service to Vedic exegesis by throwing a good deal of welcome light on the geographical names mentioned in *R.V*. III, 23, 4. Delimiting the boundaries of *Kurukṣetra*, the *Mahābhārata* refers to the rivers Sarasvatī and Dṛṣadvatī as follows: "Those who live in *Kurukṣetra* to the south of the Sarasvatī and to the north of

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7 *Original Snskrit Texts*, II, p. 346.

8 Geldner, Der *Ṛgveda* I, 357: "Ander Dṛṣadvatī, an der Āpayā, *unter dem Menschengeschlecht*, an der Sarasvatī leuchte prangend, O Agni. "Footnote 4 c:" *mānuṣe* sc. Jane, Vgl. 5, 21, 2, u.ä.'

9 Macdonell and Keith, Vedic Index Part I, pp. 58, 374; Part II, pp. 434-35. Pischel, *Vedische Studien*, II, p. 218: *Manusmṛti* II, 17.

the Dṛṣadvatī live in heaven".[10] Then the Epic gives the following information on *Mānuṣa* and *Āpagā*[11] which is undoubtedly identical with the Āpayā of *R.V.* III, 23, 4: "O Lord of kings, one should then go to the universally renowned *Mānuṣa* where, O King, black antelopes pierced with arrows by a hunter attained manhood, after having plunged into that lake. Having taken ablutions at that Tīrtha, a celibate and devout man is purged of all sins and glorified in heaven. To the east of *Mānuṣa* at a distance of just one krośa, flows, O King, the famous river named *Āpagā* which is frequented by the Siddhas."[12] The testimony of the *Mahābhārata* that the river Āpagā, which is identical with the Āpayā of the *Ṛgveda*, flows in the vicinity of *Mānuṣa* lake makes it almost certain that the word *Mānuṣa* which precedes *Āpayā* in *R.V.* III, 23, 4 stands for the *Mānuṣa* lake described in the Epic.

Allusions to the existence of a *Mānuṣa* lake are met with in certain *Brāhmaṇa*-passages also which have not been clearly understood by the commentators and translators. Narrating the legend of Prajāpati's union with his daughter, the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* remarks: 'that outpoured seed of Prajā-

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[10] दक्षिणेन सरस्वत्या दृषद्वत्युत्तरेण च।
ये वसन्ति कुरुक्षेत्रे ते वसन्ति त्रिविष्टपे ॥

[11] Veṅkaṭamādhava in his commentary on *R.V.* III, 23, 4 says, "आपयेत्यापगामाह परोक्षम्"। Cf. *Vedic Index* I, 158; *Altindisches Leben*, p. 18; *Vedische Studien*, II, p. 218.

[12] ततो गच्छेत राजेन्द्र मानुषं लोकविश्रुतम्।
यत्र कृष्णमृगा राजन् व्याधेन शरपीडिताः ॥६५॥
विगाह्य तस्मिन् सरसि मानुषत्वमुपागताः।
तस्मिंस्तीर्थे नरः स्नात्वा ब्रह्मचारी समाहितः ॥
सर्वपापविशुद्धात्मा स्वर्गलोके महीयते।
मानुषस्य तु पूर्वेण क्रोशमात्रे महीपते ॥६७॥
आपगा नाम विख्याता नदी सिद्धनिषेविता ॥६८॥
Mbh. III. 85, 65–68.

pati flowed down indeed; it became a lake (*Saras*). The gods said, 'Let this seed of Prajāpati not be spoiled'. Since they said, 'Let this seed of Prajāpati not be spoiled' (*mā........ duṣad*), it became *Māduṣa* (not to be spoiled); that accounts for the nomenclature of *Māduṣa*. That which is now *Mānuṣa* is in fact *Māduṣa* by name: They cryptically designate as *Mānuṣa* what is *Māduṣa*, for the gods are fond of the cryptic as it were."[13] Since the commentators and translators of the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* fail to realize the full significance of the nexus between *Saras* and *Mānuṣa* in the above passage, they advance all sorts of conjectures to explain *Mānuṣa*.[14] That the word *Mānuṣa* in this passage refers to the preceding word *Saras* is confirmed by the *Jaim. Brā.* also which narrates the same legend as follows: "The seed of that pierced (Prajāpati) fell down. It came down on the Himalayas (*Himavat*) and became *Mānuṣa*. Having approached it together the gods and seers said, 'Let this not be spoiled'. Since they said, 'Let this not be spoiled,' that accounts for the nomenclature of *Māduṣa*. That which is now called *Māduṣa* is in fact *Mānuṣa* by name. They set it ablaze on all sides and the Maruts blew on it."[15]

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[13] तद्वा इदं प्रजापतेरेतः सिक्तमधावत् तत् सरोऽभवत्। ते देवा अब्रुवन्—'मेदं प्रजापते रेतो दुषद्' इति। यदब्रुवन्—'मेदं प्रजापते रेतो दुषद् इति', तन्मादुषमभवत्। तन्मादुषस्य मादुषत्वम्। मादुषं ह वै नामैतद् यन्मानुषन्। तन्मादुषं सन् मानुषमित्याचक्षते परोक्षेण, परोक्षप्रिया हि देवाः॥ *Ait. Br.* III. 33.

[14] Explaining Mānuṣa Sāyaṇa says; यस्मान्मा दुषदित्यवदंस्तस्माद् दोषरहितस्य रेतसो मादुषमिति नाम संपन्नम्। जनास्तु दकारस्थाने नकारं प्रक्षिप्य मानुषमिति ब्राह्मणक्षत्रियादिशरीरमाचक्षते।"

On this point *Ṣaḍguruśiṣya* remarks:

'मानुषं' त्विति यल्लोके मादुषं तन्निदानतः। कथं दकारस्य नकारेण पारोक्ष्यमिह साध्यते।" *Bhaṭṭabhāskara* says, "अत्र सर्वमानुषकारणत्वादुपचारेण प्राजापत्यं रेतो मानुषमुच्यत इति वेदितव्यम्।"

M. Haug in his English Translation of the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* renders 'Mānuṣa' by "a man", while Keith translates it as "connected with man."

[15] तस्य विद्धस्य रेतः परापतत्। तदधिमवति प्रत्यतिष्ठत्। तन्मानुषमभवत्। तद् देवाश्चर्षयश्चोपसमेत्याब्रुवन्—'मेदं दुषद्' इति। यदब्रुवन्—'मेदं दुषद्' इति,

It follows from the foregoing discussion that the word *Mānuṣa* occurring in the *R.V.* III, 23, 4 in conjunction with the names of the three rivers Dṛṣadvatī, Āpayā and Sarasvatī denotes the name of a lake which finds mention in the *Mahābhārata* as well as in the Brāhmaṇas. In two other Vedic passages also the word *Mānuṣa* seems to denote a locality which is in all probability the same *Mānuṣa* lake as is referred to above. The use of *Mānuṣa in R.V.* VII, 18, 9 is very similar to that in III, 23, 4 discussed above, for in both of these verses *Mānuṣa* has been used in the locative singular and does not qualify any noun.[16] So the commentators and translators who interpret it as 'human, a man, etc.', advance various conjectures to justify this interpretation. Both Sāyaṇa and Veṅkaṭamādhava supply '*Loke*' to complete the sense of *Mānuṣe* in *R.V.* VII, 18, 9; and most of the modern Vedists have also not been able to improve upon the explanation suggested by Sāyaṇa. Ludwig and Grassman interpret '*Mānuṣe*' in *R.V.* VII, 18, 9 as "dem Menschen", whereas Griffith treats it as an adjective of Sudās and gives the following rendering of the verse: "As to their goal they sped to their destruction; they sought Paruṣṇī; even the swift returned not. Indra abandoned to Sudās *the manly*, the swift-flying foes, unmanly babblers."[17] Griffith's rendering of '*Mānuṣe*'

तन्मादुषस्य मादुषत्वम् । मादुषं ह वै नामैतत् तन्मानुषमित्याख्यायते । तदग्निना पर्यैन्धत । मरुतोऽधगन् । *Jaim. Brā.* III, 263. In the English Translation of the *Pañcaviṃśa Brāhmaṇa* (p. 166, footnote 3), Caland refers to this passage of the *Jaim. Br.* and regards the Mānuṣa lake of the *Jaim. Br.* as "the forerunner of the classical *Mānasam Saras*". But the *Mahābhārata* which supplies most copious information on *Mānuṣa Saras* makes a separate mention of *Mānasa Saras* in three verses (II, 28, 4; XIII, 152, 12-13) and thus draws a clear distinction between the two. It is highly unlikely that the later writers of Sanskrit could have confused *Mānuṣa Saras* with *Mānusa Saras*. They are entirely different from each other.

16 ईयुरर्थं न न्यर्थं परुष्णीमाशुश्चनेदभिपित्वं जगाम ।
सुदास इन्द्रः सुतुकाँ अमित्रानरन्धयन्मानुषे वध्रि वाचः ॥
R.V. VII, 18, 9.

17 Griffith, *Hymns of the Ṛgveda*, II, p. 18.

is quite arbitrary and unwarranted. So far as I know, the credit of suggesting the right interpretation of '*Mānuṣe*' in *R.V.* VII, 18, 9 goes to Geldner who renders it as "in Mānuṣa" and remarks in a footnote: '9 d. *mānuṣe*': Mānuṣa war nach *Jaim. Br.* 3, 244 die Örtlichkeit der Zehnkönigsschlacht. Vgl. Caland z.d. St."[18] In spite of all the divergent explanations of the said verse, it is admitted on all hands that the verse in question alludes to the victory of Sudās in the Dāśarājña battle. Therefore, the occurrence of '*Mānuṣe*' in a similar context in the *Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa* renders it highly probable that *Mānuṣa* in *R.V.* VII, 18, 9 denotes a locality. Since the only locality bearing the name of Mānuṣa is, as far as my information goes, the *Mānuṣa Saras* referred to above, it may be reasonably assumed that the word Mānuṣa in *R.V.* VII, 18, 9 stands for the same *Mānuṣa Saras*.

A similar use of the word Mānuṣa is met with in the *Atharvaveda* (VIII, 5, 14 *cd.*) which glorifies an amulet (*Maṇi*) and attributes Indra's victory at Mānuṣa to the wearing of the amulet[19]. . . . Allusion to Indra's famous victory at *Mānuṣà* reminds us of *R.V.* VII, 18, 9 which, as we have seen above, states that Indra won a victory for Sudās in the Dāśarājña battle at Mānuṣa. If the above-mentioned sense of the word *Mānuṣa* is borne in mind, the meaning of the verse is quite clear. But the misinterpretation of this word creates confusion and obscures the sense of the verse. Sāyaṇa explains *Mānuṣe* as "Mānuṣeṣu madhye" and '*Jayati*' as "*Ajayat*" without any justification.[20] Griffith's rendering of Mānuṣa

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[18] Geldner, Der Ṛgveda, II, p. 196. Cf.

क्षत्रं वै प्रातर्दनं दाशराज्ञे दश राजानः पर्ययतन्त मानुषे ।

(*Jaim Br.* III, 245 (Nagpur Edition).

[19] अविभस्त्वेन्द्रो॰ मानुषे बिभ्रत् संश्रेषिणेऽजयत् । *A.V.* VIII, 5, 14 *cd.*

[20] Sāyaṇa on *A.V.* VIII, 5, 14 *cd.*–

"अथ धारयितृगौरवादपि प्राशस्त्यं दर्शयति 'अविभस्त्वेन्द्र' इति । हे प्रशस्तमणे त्वा त्वाम् इन्द्रः सर्वदेवाधिपतिः स्वकीयवृत्रहननादिसिद्धये स्वाराज्यप्राप्तये च

is highly improbable and astounding. He translates this hemistich as follows: "Indra wore thee, and wearing thee, won in the wrestling-match with man."[21] Whitney who entertains a doubt about the right meaning of '*Mānuṣe*' and '*Saṃśreṣiṇe*' gives the following translation of the hemistich with an explanatory note: "Indra bore thee in human (wise,?); bearing [thee], he conquered in the conflict (?).... The obscure *mānuṣe*, in *c*, the comm. explains as [a collective] =*mānuṣeṣu madhye*; he reads in *d saṃśreṣaṇe*, which is much more acceptable: one is inclined also to conjecture *saṃśreṣiṇa* '*jayat*'.[22]

Since the *R.V.* VII, 18, 9 and the *Jaim. Br.* III, 245, as discussed above, locate at *Mānuṣa* Indra's great victory for his worshipper Sudās in the Dāśarājña battle, it is quite reasonable to see an allusion to that celebrated victory in the *A.V.* VIII, 5, 14 *cd* where the use of *Mānuṣe,* is identical with that found is the *R.V.* and the *Jaim. Br.* It follows from this that the word *Mānuṣa* in *A.V.* VIII, 5, 14 signifies the famous Mānuṣa lake described in the *Mahābhārata.* Moreover, the correct interpretation of Mānuṣa also contributes to the interpretation of the obscure word '*Saṃśreṣiṇe*' which is read as *Saṃśreṣaṇe* in Sāyaṇa's commentary on *A.V.* VIII, 5, 14 and which is proposed to be emended as 'Saṃśreṣiṇas' by Whitney in his explanatory note quoted above. In pursuance of our new interpretation of *Mānuṣa, Saṃśreṣine*, may be construed as a dative singular of *Saṃśreṣin*, corresponding with the dative form *Sudāse* occurring in *R.V.* VII, 18, 9. So this correspondence between *Saṃśreṣine* and *Sudāse*, coupled with the identical use of *Mānuṣe*, suggests that '*Saṃśreṣiṇe*' which literally means "for one who is attached, *i.e.*,devoted" stands for Sudās, the devotee of Indra. With the new interpretation

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अबिभ: भरणं कृतवान्। यस्मादेवं तस्मात् त्वां मानुषे। जातावेकवचनम्। मानुषेषु मध्ये बिभ्रत् पुरुष: संश्रेषणे परस्परसंश्लेषसाधने संग्रामे अजयत् जयति॥"

[21] Griffith, *the Hymns of the Atharvaveda I*, p. 402.

[22] Whitney, *Atharvaveda Saṃhitā*, p. 492.

of these two important and obscure words, the *A.V.* VIII, 5, 14 *cd.* may now be translated as follows: "Indra bore thee; bearing (thee) he won a victory for his devotee (Sudās) at Mānuṣa."

It is thus possible to put a new interpretation on the Vedic word *Mānuṣa* which has hitherto been explained merely as 'human, belonging to mankind, a man, etc.' The new interpretation of Mānuṣa as *Mānuṣa Saras* aptly suits the context in all the Vedic passages discussed above and elucidates the sense of other obscure words contained in them. It contributes to our knowledge of Vedic geography and puts the problem of Dāśarājña battle in a new perspective.

THE ṚG-VEDIC DĀNASTUTIS

By Dr. B. H. Kapdia

As is well-known the Ṛg-veda is the oldest and the most important sacred record of the ancient Indians. This literary collection that has come down to us traditionally and is preserved only in the *Śākala* recension consists of 1028 hymns (including the I Vālakhilya hymns) divided into ten books. There are two ways of dividing the Ṛg-veda: (1) Aṣṭaka, Adhyāya, Varga and (2) Maṇḍala, Anūvāka, Sūkta and the Ṛks. The former division is useful from the point of giving instruction to the students while the second is scientific. The one is formal, the other is scientific. A large part of the hymns of the Ṛg-veda is secular in nature and is dedicated to various gods like Indra, Agni, Soma, Varuṇa, Uṣas, Maruts, Vāyu Parjanya, Aśivins, Ādityas, Savitṛ, etc., etc. They are recited at the ceremonious soma-sacrifice. These hymns are invocations, invitations and praises of these gods.

The poets of the *Ṛg-veda* were not merely priests who ruled over the sacrificial technique but were masters of words. Poetry was the pivot of the sacrificial ceremonial. The sacred poetry was bequeathed only in definite limited circles of families. They became the means of their livelihood. Many a famous father took his sons to the country side, to the rich lords, kings, chieftains, offered their services as singers and if received favourably recited their newest compositions at a sacrifice. If the sacrificer was pleased with the performance, the poet obtained his expected reward, the suitable honorarium the so-called Dakṣiṇā.

An important role is played by this Dakṣiṇā in the *Ṛgveda*. Almost all hymns in which there is talk of generosity allude to it. The poet rarely demands his reward; at times he alludes to it through a flower or makes the sacrificer acquainted with his wishes.

The DAKṢIṆĀ is glorified in X. 107 The leading thought of this hymn is that the Dakṣiṇā is the definite gift of gods and it is to be considered as the divine gift. A hymn or a verse which contains direct reference or indirectly conveys his idea is called the DĀNASTUTI.

The expression dānastuti first occurs in the *Bṛhad-devatā* (VI. 45). No work that is earlier than the *Bṛh. D.* knows this word. It does not occur in the *Nirūkta* of Yāska. In the *Bṛh. D.* and the *Anukramaṇī* dānastuti has become a definite term.

Literally the compound-word Dānastuti means stuti (praise) of gift or generosity (dāna). According to Indian tradition every verse in which thanks for donation is expressed is not a dānastuti but one employs this term for a definite form of thanks-giving. Thus, many verses which lay claim to be treated as dānastutis are not so inspite of it. Dānastutis as understood by the *Bṛh. D.* or *Anukr.* either form a conclusion of a hymn[1] or are independent hymns[2].

The account of the *Anukr.* in its introductory ch. (2.23) says rājñām ca dānastutayaḥ. The dānastutis are dedicated to kings. Only a royal donor is the object of a dānastuti and this should not occur inside a peculiar hymn is the explanation of the Indian commentator. According to him, the donor assumes the role of a god, devatā. Those verses which are not taken as dānastutis even though they are such are: (1) they are attributed to a god, (2) the donor is not a royal family, (3) he is not mentioned with his name, *e.g.*, 1. 100. 16-17 clarifies the point. So also 6. 45. 31—33. Here the donor Bṛbu Takṣan is not of royal origin. Dānastuti verses 19. 24 occurring at the end of 4. 32 even though they are closely knit with the hymn proper are not recognised as such as the name of the king is not mentioned in it.

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[1] VIII: 31—33; 2. 41-42; 3. 21--24; 4. 19—21; 5. 35—cd—39; 6. 46—48 etc.

[2] i. 125; 126; VIII. 55. 56 etc.

The compound Dānastuti is derived from dāna+stu. It occurs in the R.V. 5. 33. 6.[3] Raibhis, Nārāśamsis and the Gāṭhās of the later literature are as good as the dānastutis. Raibhis are definite verses in the ritual.[4] The word is derived from rebha. They are verses of bards. . *A.V.* XX. 127. 4–6 are Raibhis. The word Nārāśamsis[5] occurs frequently. Nara and śams occur at 2. 34. 6; 6. 24. 2, śamse naram at 3. 16. 4. *Nirukta* 9. 9. states: Narāmśamsyaḥ yena narāḥ praśamsyante sa narāśamso mantraḥ. A mantra with which the lord is praised is naraśamsa. Nārāśamsis are concerned with the living princes and sing their generosity. *Bṛ. D.* 3. 54 states:

कर्मणि याभिः कथितानि राज्ञां दानानि चोच्चावचमध्यमानि।
नाराशंसीति च ताः प्रतीयाद् याभिः स्तुतिर्दशिनयिषु राज्ञाम् ॥

Those verses in which the deeds of kings and their large, small and middling gifts are recounted are the Nārāśamsis since through these the praise of the kings is expressed in the ten books of the *Ṛg-veda*. Gārgya Nārāyaṇa in his com. on *Āśvālayana Gṛ. S.* III 3. 1 thus differentiates between the Gāthā and the Nārāśamsi:

गाथा नाम ऋग्विशेषा इन्द्रगाथादयः। यदिन्द्रादौ दाशराज्ञा इतीन्द्रगाथा पञ्च ऋचः। नाराशंस्यश्च ऋच एव इदं जना उपश्रुत्वं इत्यादयः।

The gāthās are special verses, *e.g.*, Indragāthā and others. The five verses "Yad Indra", etc.[6] are Indragāthās. Nārāśamsis are the verses "Idam janāḥ upaśṛtah"[7] and others. Sāyaṇa on *Ait. Br.* VI. 32. 3 states:

नाराशंसी इदं जनाः इत्यायोः तिस्रः ऋचो नाराशंस्यः।

According to *Ait. Br.* Vi. 27. 14 Nābhānediṣṭha sūkta (X. 62) is a Nārāśamsi sūkta. Sāyaṇa explains:

नाराशंस . . . . नरा शस्यन्ते = कथ्यन्ते यस्मिन् सूक्ते तन्नाराशंसम्।

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[3] Prārya stuṣe tuvimaghasya dānam.

[4] *T.S.* VII. 5. II. 2; Ait. *Br. Vi.* 32; K. *Br.* XXX. 7).

[6] A. V. XX. 128. 12–16.

[5] cf Avestan Nairyosaṅha.

[7] *A. V.* XX. 127. I–3.

The expression Gāthās in this context is to be comprehended in the latter technical sense. Yajñagāthās have the the same significance. In *Ait. Br.* VIII. 21. 3 verse Āsandīvati dhānyādam, etc., is a yajñagāthā. *Ś. Br.* XIII. 5. 4. 2 takes it as gāthā only. What is said in *Ś. Br.* XIII. 5. 4. 14 as gāthā in *Ait. Br.* VIII. 23. 2 is said as śloko'bhigītaḥ.

Post-vedic Praśastis are a later form of Nārāśamsis and Dāna stutis. These often occur in the inscriptions and have a wide range. They praise princes, their warlike deeds, booty and generosity. The praśastis of the Gupta kings of 400 A.D. can be compared with the nārāśamsis.

Since the composition of the *Bṛhaddevatā* vedic scholars have made an attempt to find out hymns or verses which can be looked upon as dānastutis. Dānastutis are also accounted for even in the Anukramaṇī ascribed to Kātyāyana by tradition. About him we know very little. According to Macdonell the *Anukramaṇī* can be assigned to middle of 400 A.D. These two are the first attempts to fix up the dānastutis. The author of the *Anukr.* to a large extent follows the *Bṛh. D.* and hence the great deal of uniformity between the two. Among Western scholars the following have made an attempt to fix up the Dānastutis:

Max Müller in his Index of Devatas,[8] Grassmann in his supplement (Kommentar) to his translation of the *Ṛg-veda,* (besides all those passages recognised as dānastutis by *Bṛh. D.* and the *Anukr.* has a few more,) Th. Aufrecht (in his indices of pretended authors, gods and metres of *Sarvānukramaṇī,* Vol. I, p. 463), follows the *Anukramaṇī* Ludwig (in his tr. of *R.V.*, Vol. III, pp. 274 ff.), Oldenberg in his "Noten", Geldner (in his *Kommentar, Der Ṛg-veda im auswahl,* Pt. II, Stuttgart, 1909). Dr. Manilal Patel has his own addition.[9]

These scholars have tried to fix up the number of the dānastutis. After having fixed up the number of the dāna-

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[8] Vol. VI. of his large ed. of the R: V.

[9] *Die Dānastutis des Rig-veda pp.* 20–28.

stutis we may try to answer the question as to what is the relation between the dānastutis and the hymns in which they occur. Should we consider like Grassmann and other scholars[10] as later additions? Is Kaegi justified when he writes, that they are interpolated in the peculiar hymns or are supplementary portions wherein the singer of the later time praised the generosity of the donating prince? Here, entire Hymns which are dānastutis are out of question. To this belong (1) 1.125 containing a praise of Dakṣiṇā, (2) 1.126 a dānastuti of the poet Kakṣivat with reference to the king Svanaya Bhāvya for multitude of donations at the end of a big satra, (3) 5.27 a thanks-saying of many kings, (4) and (5) 8.55 and 56 (the two vālakhilya hymns).

All the remaining dānastutis as well as those which occur as constituent parts of big hymns may be divided into two groups: (*a*) hymns whose connection with the corresponding hymns can be proved through internal basis, and (*b*) hymns in which such connection cannot be found out directly. From the thorough investigation of such hymns it cannot be asserted that as they do not suit the context, they are later interpolations[11] as is done by Grassmann. For, the poet of the dānastuti and the poet of the corresponding hymn are one and the same person. In a few cases, the verse preceding the dānastuti builds a bridge for it or at times the persons and the gifts about which the dānastuti is concerned are referred to in one or many verses of the same hymn or in a hymn preceding the dānastuti-hymn. In other hymns, in which there is the talk of the war, we notice that the dānastuti is composed to glorify the king or kings who give a part of their booty to their praisers as gifts. In other cases, a poet recites the hymn before the rich lord on the occasion of a

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[10] Keith in "*History of Sanskrit Literature*", p. 49 considers dānastutis as added verses.

[11] Olderberg (*ZDMG* 39, 83 ff) and Pischel (*Vedische Studien* I. 4) have tried to show that the usual opinion about dānastuti that they are later additions is wrong.

sacrifice. The poet donated, adds a few stanzas as thanks in order to praise the king who is the donor.

Particularly remarkable is the usage of the aorist in the dānastutis, *e.g.*, 5. 30. 12. 15. In these verses the use of the aorist shows that the poet Babhṛ thanks king Ṛṇamcaya for the gift given on that occasion.

The names of the kings referred to in the dānastutis are:—Nahuṣ, Somaka, Sahadeva, Tryaruṇa, Tradsadasyu, Prayiyu, Vayiyu, Purumilha, Abhyavartin, Turvaśa, Bṛbu, Divodāsa, Sudās, Svanadratha, Tirindira, Parśu, Pṛthuśravas, Manu Sāvarni or Sāvarṇya. About the following persons we know nothing more than their names:—Svanaya Bhāvya, Ṛṇamcaya, Śatri, Śṛtaratha, Rathaviti, Dārbhya, Puraya, Sumilha, Peruka, Śanda, Purupanthāna, Ninditāśva, Prapathin, Paramajya, Vibhindu, Pākasthāman, Kuruṅga, Kaśu, Citra, Varo Susāman Ūkṣahyayana, Harayana, Vasurocis, Dasavyo Vṛka, Indrota, Śara, Sṛtarvan, Duhsima, Pṛthavana, Vena, Rāma, Tānva, Māyava.

We thus see that the dānastutis throw little light on the historical form of the Ṛg-vedic time. No sufficient hsitorical evidence is obtained from the hymns. Only here and there we find reference to the Aryan folk wandering or advancing through the land of the five rivers.

As the rivers are mentioned their account is clear. The rivers that are mentioned are:—Sarasvatī (8. 21. 17-18), Paruṣṇī (8. 74. 15), Gomatī (8. 24. 30), Suvāstu (8. 19. 37), Yamunā (5. 52. 17), Gaṅgā (6. 45. 31) and the Sindhu (X. 62. 9). This shows that the poet had proclaimed the gift to homely rivers. From the mention of the names of the rivers we get the idea of rivers on whose banks the sacrifices were performed. Counting from the West to the East they are: Suvāstu, Gomatī, Sindhu, Paruṣṇī, Sarasvatī, Yamunā and the Gaṅgā. The region of these rivers is really the home of the Ṛg-veda.

As regards the authors of the dānastutis no more account

besides their names can be had. Only occasionally we come across a detail here or there.

The poets naming themselves in the dānastuti-hymns are: Ṛjraśva, Ambariṣa, Surādhas, Sahadeva, Bhayamana, Kakṣivat, Dvita, Mṛktavahas, Babhru, Samvaraṇa, Medhyātithi, Medhātithi, Sobhari, Nābhānediṣṭha.

The following names are not mentioned in the dānastutis but from the context it is probable that they are the authors of the dānastutis. They are:— Vāmadeva, Viśvamanas, Bharadvāja, Pāyu, Parasa, Satayātu, and Vaisiṣṭha.

The following names are given by the *Anukr.*:—Prabhuvasu, Angirasa, Bharadvāja, Samyu, Bārhaspatya, Devatithi, Brahmatithi, Kaṇva, Vatsa, Nipātithi, Pragātha Kaṇva, Priyamedhas. Round the persons of these authors a web of myths and legends has been woven which was handed down to us by the later Vedic literature and behind that much may lie that is historical.

The Dakṣiṇās of the dānastutis consist of domestic animals, cows and horses of all colours, rarely camels, sheep, asses and dogs. Besides the usual sense the word, Dāna is employed in the *Ṛg-veda* in the sense of the animal that was donated, *e.g.*, in passages like: 5. 27. 5; 7. 18. 23; 8. 46. 24.

Let us cast a glance over the dakṣiṇās that were given: Ṛjrāśva and his colleagues received a chariot yoked with cows and red-brown mare (1. 100. 16). Pṛkṣayama got hundred cows (1. 122. 7), Kakṣivat got hundred dark-brown horses (1. 126. 2-3) that pulled ten chariots (v. 4) and a herd of sixty-thousand cows (v. 3). The poet of 4. 32 received ten jars with golden articles (v. 19) and two brown mares (v. 22—24). Dvita Mṛktavara received a chariot and fifty horses (v. 3 and 5). Babhru received four thousand cows from Ṛṇamcaya (5. 30. 12). Śyāvāśva received hundred cows from each of his patrons on the bank of the river Yamunā (5. 52. 17). Atharvan and Pāyu got ten chariots with double horses and hundred cows (6. 47. 24). Bharadvāja of 6. 63 received

two quick-running mares from Puraya and hundred cows from Sumilha (v. 9). The poet of 8. 4 got hundred horses of Kuranga (v. 19), and drove home a herd of sixty thousand cows (v. 20). The poet of 8. 5 received from king Kaśu Caidya hundred camels and ten thousand cows (v. 37). The poet of 8. 6 received hundred cows from Tirindira, thousand from Parśu (v. 46) three hundred race horses and ten thousand cows (v. 47) and even camels (v. 47). Vaśa Aśvya received from Pṛthuśravas sixty thousand horses (8. 46. 29), a myraid of cows (8. 46. 30), two thousand camels (8. 46. 31), one thousand dark-brown mares and thousand mares with three red spots (8. 46. 32) ten Mathra horses (8. 46. 23) a golden chariot (8. 46. 24), thrice seven times seven cows (8. 46. 26). Further he received sixty thousand strong horses (v. 29), hundred camels (v. 31), and two thousand cows (31). Daśavye Vṛkas gift amounted to hundred white bulls (8. 55. 2) hundred dogs (v. 3), hundred sheep, four hundred red cows (v. 3), and a black-brown mare (v. 5).

Besides animals they were also given women, useful articles, clothes, sacrificial apparatus (5. 30. 15 *cd.*), the skin on which the Soma was pressed. Probably the large number of animals that are mentioned, *e.g.*, 60,000 horses, myriads of cows, 2,000 camels, 1,000 dark-brown horses, mares, 1,000 with three red spots. 10,000 cows (8. 46. 22) belong to the realm of phantasy. In many a case they were exaggerated. It may be as a result of self-indulgence or boast.

The dānastutis have developed a peculiar style. Only in a few instances the dānastutis have the tone and the characteristic of the preceding hymns, *e.g.*, 7. 18. Mostly through their peculiar language and metre they differ from the others. The dānastuti verses are not so clear as the remaining verses. They are rich in ellipses, *e.g.*, in X. 83. 14*c*. one should take the verb from v. 15. Often the sentence construction is difficult, the position of words is very free, *e.g.*, in 8. 1. 30*d*. (Maghasya is wide apart from Manhiṣṭhaso. 8. 4. 19).

Dānstuti poets loved definite words or usages, *e.g.*, cit "to catch the eye, to become characteristic" in 1. 100. 16 (ciketa), 1. 125. (cikitvān), 5. 27. 1. (cetiṣṭha and ciketa), 8. 1. 31*c*. (ciketatti), 8. 68. 18 (cetat), 8. 56. 5*a* (cikituḥ). √san with sacā in 1. 122. 8; 8. 25. 24, and 68. 17. asura in 1. 126. 2; 5. 27. 1; X. 93. 14*b*. samaha in 8. 70. 14; I. 120. 10, sadyaḥ in 1. 122. 7; 126. 2; X. 62. 8; 6. 45. 32; X. 93, 15 *cd*. 62. 10 (smaddiṣṭi in 6. 63. 9, 8. 18. 23; X. 62 10. It is at times ironical in tone. Many a time the recipients were not satisfied with what they got. Puruhanman and two others recite an ironical dānastuti of Śara (8. 70. 13—15) who gave a calf only in common to all the three (v. 14). When women are donated the tone is different. 1. 126. 6. 7 are erotic, also in 8. 1. 34.[12]

The dānastutis are praises for gifts received from the donors. Still the poets take it that they were received through the gods; the donors are the intermediaries. Thus, the gods mentioned in the dānastutis are: Indra, Agni, Maruts, Aśvins, Vāyu, Uṣas. In the first instance, the dānastutis turn to the same god as is the case in the preceding verses, *e.g.*, Aśvins in 63. 9-10; 8. 5. 37, Agni in 5. 18. 3; 5. 27. 1. ff. to Indra in 1. 100. 16 and 17. It is striking that occasionally the poet of the dānastuti turns to a god different from the god of the hymn, *e.g.*, in 5. 30 verses i—II praise Indra; from 12*ab* the dānastuti begins, the poet turns to Agni the real tutelary deity of the poet and the priest. Likewise Indra in 5. 34. i—8 and Agni in 9. In 6. 27. 1—7 Indra and in the dānastuti v. 8 Agni, in 8. 1. i—29 Indra, in v. 33 Agni. In 7. 18 the first 21 verses are to Indra; in 22 Agni, and in 25 the Maruts. Similarly, the Maruts in 5. 36. 6 although in the preceding verse the god is Indra. In 4. 15. 9-10 the poet

[12] Sāyaṇa gives the full itihāsa. King Asanga became impotent through some curse of god. His wife Sasavatī was pining for it. She performed expiation and through this he got back his manhood. One night to her utter surprise she saw that he had received back his manhood. cf. Bṛh. D. 6. 40, *Sank*. *Śr*. *S*. 16. II. 17.

addresses to the Aśvins whereas in the previous verse the god is Agni. Why the poet suddenly turns to another god is not clear.

Other gods occuring in the dānastutis are Mitrāvaruṇa (1. 122. 7—9, 15), Uṣas (1. 122. 14), Indra and Agni (5. 27. 6.) Even the Goddess night is invoked by Śyāvāśva in 5. 61. 17. 18. The invocation to the night may suggest that the singer expects the gift on the next morning with eagerness.

In 5. 7. 10; 6. 37. 4; 4. 32. 19; 1. 120. 20 the poet speaks of the gifts as if they are received from the gods.

The above brief discussion shows, that the duty of the dānastutis is interesting and instructive. It is educative from many sides. They give us an insight into the relation of Vedic poets and their patrons. The donation was indeed a ceremonious act. The poet of 1. 126 gives a lively description of the ceremonious procession of the donated animals. At the head of the procession were the dark-brown horses then followed ten chariots with women (v. 3). Stanza 4 describes further. Forty red horses decorated with pearls yoked to ten chariots led a row of 1000 cows. The first donation is followed by the second, consisting of three yoked chariots, eight cows[13] for the relatives of the poets (V. 5). The entire courtyard was full of ladies who were present at the time of the donation. 8. 1. 34 refers to the wife of the sacrificer and 8. 56. 4 informs that even the mother of Dasavye Vṛka, the wife of Putakratu were present in their best decorations.

Many singers conjointly sang the generosity of many princes assembled, *e.g.*, 8. 1. 16 expressly states that it is a so-called Sadhastuti (a joint song of praise). The praised ones

[13] The cows given in dakṣinā were blessed while they entered the house of the singers, the new possessors. Perhaps with hymn 6. 28. In the later ritual, it was employed for the blessing of the cow that was returning home. e.g. Kaus. 21. 8, *Śānkh G. S.* 3. 9.; *A. V.* 4. 21 i.e. *R.* V. 6. 28. I—7. The sacrificer expects the cows meant for the dakṣiṇā see *Vait. S.* 21 24.

were Asanga, Svanadratha, Ninditāśva, Prapathin and Paramajya (8. 1. 30. 32. 33).

The main singer with his family (1. 126. 4 *cd.*) was present at the sacrifice. 7. 18, v. 21, leads to the conjecture that the singer accompanied the patron to the battle-field. The sacrifice took place after the victory (7. 18) and the reward was distributed from the war-booty (6. 27. 22).

The singers praised the donors in the highest tone. For them he was the noblest man of the world (8. 5.39; 21. 17; 46. 24; 6. 27. 8; X. 62. 8), the most beautiful of all (8. 3. 21), the most manly of men (5. 30. 12). The singer of 1. 125. 7 says: The donor should not fall in sin and debt. The patron, true to duty, should not be weak on account of old age. Someone should relieve his miseries. The sorrows should visit the greedy. The generous should not come to shame. (8. 65. 10). By Dakṣīṇā one gets fame (X. 62. 7 *cd*). They not only praise the patron in terms of flattery but are not tired of singing the praise of their generosity (X. 107). The donation as it were competes with the rays of the sun (X. 62. 11*b*). The joy regarding the gift assumes a poetic expression (8. 4. 21).

The self-consciousness of the poet is always occupying the forefront. The poet prays the gods to grant protection (5. 27. 2) and long life (X. 62. 11, etc.) to his patron.[14] Thus in the dānastutis the poet expresses his thanks directly to the patron and indirectly to the gods.

As regards the Vedic poet one can say that two souls lived in him. On one side, he tries to describe the most honest respect that he pays to the gods and thereby to get honour through his poetic faculty. On the other hand, the Vedic poet prepared the patron for good humour to realise that one can compose good poetry only when one is well paid.

[14] The wishes and the prayers which the poets express for their patrons are of wide variety e.g. I. 123. 13; 79. 6—7; 8. 20, 24; 3. 8; 5. 9; 16. 7—9; 32. 7—15; 34. 18; 90. 9 etc. etc.

This is true, so far as all the poets of the past, the present and the future and of all climes are concerned. There were poets who composed poetry as a means to earn their livelihood. Besides poets who composed through inner urge, there were poets who implored the rich patrons to give good reward.

From the above survey we can safely infer that we come across large number of dānastutis in the 8th Maṇḍala of the *Ṛg-veda* and there too in the first prt of it, *viz.*, hymns 1. 66. This part can be called as the family book of the Kaṇvides. As a result of this we can infer that the Kaṇvides specially liked the dānastutis.

The dānastuti-verses and hymns occuring in the ten Maṇḍalas of the *Ṛg-veda* recognised by the *Bṛhaddevatā,* the *Anukramaṇī*, Dr. Manilal Patel, Max Müller, Grassmann, Th. Aufrecht, Ludwig, Geldnerś, Kommentar, Maṇḍala-wise are:—

Maṇḍala	Hymn	Total
1	100, 122, 125, 126	4
2	30	1
3	nil	0
4	15, 32	2
5	18, 27, 30, 33, 34, 36, 52, 61	8
6	27, 45, 47, 63	4
7	18, 30, 32	3
8	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 19, 21, 24, 25, 34, 46, 54, 55, 56, 57, 59, 63, 65, 68, 70, 74	22
9	53, 58	2
10	32, 33, 62, 93, 107	5

The above analysis of the verses or the hymns in which the dānastutis occur shows that statistically the eighth Maṇḍala has a large number of them and that too in the first

part of it which belongs to the Kaṇvides. In the third Maṇḍala surprisingly there is not a single one.

The above discussion shows, that there is a whole class of hymns commonly known as the Dānastutis or praises of gifts. They are the thanksgivings of certain priests for presents received from their royal patrons. All of these, like the Latin panegyrics, betray a modern character and must be referred to as belonging to the Matnra period. In the Brāhmaṇa period, however, not only are these panegyrics known but the liberality of these royal patrons is held up to the admiration and imitation of later generations by stories which had to be repeated at the sacrifices. In the Śāṅkhāyana-sūtras (XVI. II) the following stories known as the Nārāśamsa (neuter) are mentioned as fit for such occasions. The story of Śunahśepa; of Kakṣivat Auśija who received gifts from Svanaya Bhāvyaya; of Śyāvāśva Ārcanānasa who received gifts from Vaidadaśvi; of Bharadvāja who received gifts from Bṛbu, the carpenter, and Prastoka Sārnjava; of Vasiṣṭha who was the purohita of king Sudās Paijavana; of Medhātithi; and of Āsanga Plāyogi having been a woman became a man; of Vatsa Kāṇva who received gifts from Tirindara Parāśvyaya; of Vaśa Aśvya who received gifts from Pṛthuśravas Kānīna; of Praskaṇva who received gits from Pṛṣadhra Medhya Mātariśva, of Nābhānediṣṭha Mānava who received gifts from the Angiras. All these acts of royal liberality are recorded in the hymns of the Ṛg-veda but the hymns may safely be referred to as those hymns which can be considered as having modern trait. They cannot be classed as earlier hymns but as later hymns. In the Ṛg-veda there are certain signs to judge earlier and later hymns. The Dānastutis can fall under the second category of hymns.

CONCEPTION OF GOD IN THE MUṆḌAKOPANIṢAD

By RAMESHCHANDRA S. BETAI

"These are really the thoughts of all men in all ages and lands; they are not original with me. If they are not yours as much as mine, they are nothing or next to nothing." Walt Whitman.

"At the core of all historical religions there are fundamental types of spiritual experience though they are expressed with different degrees of clarity. The Upaniṣads illustrate and illuminate these primary experiences." Radhakrishnan.

Of all the Upaniṣads, the *Muṇḍaka* and the *Māṇḍūkya* have created so many controversies. It is known that the *Kāṭhakopaniṣad* has in it, so many ideas, similar to those found in the *Muṇḍakopaniṣad*. Again, it is *Muṇḍaka,* together with the *Kāṭhaka,* that has left a permanent influence on the *Gītā*. Besides the *Br. Up.,* and partly *Ch. Up.,* it is the *Mu. Up.* in particular, that discusses multifarious probelms associated with the rise of man towards enlightenment and the ultimate dissolution in the Divine after His realisation. With all this, singular credit goes to this Upaniṣad for showing how a man, desiring Mokṣa, rises and develops and progresses by slow but sure steps and how, at every step, his vision of God becomes more clear. Belvalkar and Ranade find several contradictions in this fine systematic Upaniṣad.[1] But, as we

[1] As to whether there is in this Upaniṣad an artistic design and a coherence in the development of thought, or whether it is merely a congeries of dispersed fragments and occasional meditations; opinions differ. The Upaniṣad seems to justify neither of these extreme views, though it is somewhat hard philosophically to reconcile the various statements scattered through the text, some favouring the monistic (III. ii. 8) others the qualified monistic (III. i. 3) and yet others the dualistic conception of metaphysics." CREATIVE PERIOD p. 278. Also vide p. 94 and 278.

F. 9

will presently discuss and decisively prove, these are contradictions only superficial, while internally, there runs a consistant systematic thread of thought that knits together all the principal ideas as also the theories of almost all the Upaniṣads, the principal ones in particular. It is rightly observed that the general tendency of the Upaniṣads is to discuss the various approaches of man towards the philosophical vision of life in this and the other world.[2] In fact, the spiritualists see a continuation between life in this world and the life hereafter. What is Man? What his relation to the world? Who created Man? What is birth and death? Is there anything like life before and after death? What is Life? These are some of the problems that have struck the minds of our old enlightened sages and they have given their solutions as they experienced them in their life. To the sages of the Upaniṣads, philosophical problems and their solution was not a matter of theory but of practice, not of mere belief but of experience. It is not therefore a surprise when we find several such contradictions in the Mu. Up. and at the same time a systematic development of thought as we find it in the Br. Up. and Kā. Up. In the present article, an attempt is made to show and reconcile all the contradictory statements with regard to BRAHMA, and also to prove how, the same idea of God runs and develops throughout the work.

It would, first of all, be proper to examine in brief the main ideas developing in all the six Khaṇḍas of the three Muṇḍakas into which the work is divided.

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[2] "The ideal which haunted the thinkers of the Upaniṣads, the ideal of man's ultimate beatitude, the perfection of knowledge, the vision of the Real in which the religious hunger of the mystic for divine vision and the philosopher's ceaseless quest for truth are both satisfied is still our ideal." Radhakrishnan in THE PRINCIPAL UPANISHADS p. 18 Introduction. Also Vide Deussen and Whitehead, in 'The Upanishads' and 'Science and the Modern World,' p. 238.

First Khaṇḍa of the First Muṇḍaka.

In this section, a great householder[3] approaches a teacher and asks a fundamental question touching the very core of the Hindu philosophy. "What is that, by the realisation of which all else is realised?"[4] The teacher divides the Vidyās into two, the higher and the lower.[5] The lower is Vedas, etc.,[6] and the higher is that by which the Akṣara is realised.[7] This *AKṢARA* is described in negative aspects in 1.1.6,[8] and again in 1.1.7,[9] the same *AKṢARA* is said to be creating the Universe, without any effort as it were on His part and without being affected by His creation.[10] Thus, the Ultimate that is to be attained and realised by a Sādhaka is laid down. It is NIRGUṆĀKĀRA-BRAHMA to be realised by self-control, enlightenment and austerities.[11]

Second Khaṇḍa of First Muṇḍaka.

We have a description of APARĀ VIDYĀ and the consequent Karma. This Vidya is not bad, Karma is not bad, the

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3 महाशालः This proves that when the pupil approached the teacher, he was more than conversant with the ways of the world and the futility of this life and works with reference to God had become known to him.

4 कस्मिन्नु भगवो विज्ञाते सर्वमिदं विज्ञातं भवति ?

5 द्वे विद्ये वेदितव्ये, परा अपरा च।

6 1. 1. 5.

7 अथ परा यया तदक्षरमधिगम्यते।

8 यत्तदद्रेश्यमग्राह्यमगोत्रमवर्णमचक्षुःश्रोत्रं तदपाणिपादम ।

नित्यं विभुं सर्वगतं सुसूक्ष्मं तदव्ययं यद्भूतयोनिं परिपश्यन्ति धीराः ॥

That which is unperceivable, ungraspable, without family, without caste, without vision or hearing, without hands or feet, eternal, all-pervading, omnipresent, utterly subtle, and the undecaying, perceived by the wise as the very source of beings.

9 यथोर्णनाभिः सृजते गृह्णते च यथा पृथिव्यामोषधयः संभवन्ति।

यथा सतः पुरुषात्केशलोमानि तथाक्षरात्संभवतीह विश्वम् ॥

10 Also Br. Up. 2. 1. 20—

यथाग्नेः क्षुद्रा विस्फुलिंगाः व्युच्चरन्ति एवमेवास्मातात्मनः सर्वे प्राणाः सर्वे लोकाः सर्वेदेवाः सर्वाणि भूतानि व्युच्चरन्ति ।

11 2. 2. 7; 3. 1. 5.; 3. 1. 8.

fruit of good deeds in this world in the form of Svarga is worth desiring.[12] But this is not *Śreyas*,[13] it is not highest knowledge and it does not lead to the highest, though no doubt, it prepares man for higher enlightenment. This requires JÑĀNA plus ŚRADDHĀ plus Brahmacarya plus service at the feet of a teacher.

First Khaṇḍa of the Second Muṇḍaka.

Man next naturally thinks of the relation between ĀTMA and PARAMĀTMA. It is emphasised again in 2.1.2 that God is ultimately NIRGUṆA-NIRĀKĀRA.[14] But it is from Him that all Souls naturally come out.[15] God, in His SAGUṆA aspect is the creator of the Universe. He creates all, maintains all, pervades all;[16] it seems that He is just another personality or aspect of the Ultimate Reality. From Him, the Universe, with all its aspects is born.[17]

Second Khaṇḍa of the Second Muṇḍaka.

Once this is experienced and understood, the double personality of God is clear before the inner eyes of the Sādhaka. Once this is known, man concentrates on Him, and by knowledge, austerities, etc., tries to realise Him fully. Here he realises the fact that all other things, concrete and abstract, are engrossed in Him and only He deserves to be known.[18] The Ṛṣi here refers to Him also as ŚABDA-

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[12] 1. 2. 1; 1. 2. 3. [13] 1. 2. 7 to 1. 2. 10.

[14] Compare 1. 1. 6 with 2. 1. 2. Vide Śankara on 2. 1. 2.

[15] 1. 1. 7 to be read with 2. 1. 1. In the latter verse, Śaṅkara should have emphasised that the mantra shows the relation between Ātma and Paramātma, with the fine exposition that he gives.

[16] 2. 1. 3. By 'एतस्मात्' ' in this mantra, Hume understands "From Him". This is better than Śankara's interpretation that it refers to the पुरुषान्नामरूपजीवोपाधि' because in the context, it should better refer to 'परतः पर अक्षर' of the previous mantra. The Upanisad therefore does not look upon SĀKĀRA BRAHMA as different or lower. The same NIRĀKĀRA BRAHMA is, as the creator of the Universe SAGUNA and SĀKĀRA.

[17] 2. 1. 4 to 2. 1. 10. [18] 2. 2. 1.

BRAHMA and JYOTISVARŪPA,[19] and comes to the conclusion that God is all-pervading (SARVAVYĀPAKA) and of the nature of all (SARVASVARŪPA).[20]

First Khaṇḍa of the Third Muṇḍaka.

The *Sāmkhya* has conceived of and explained fully the macrocosm of the Universe on the basis of the microcosm of the human body. The relation of ĀTMA and Paramātma as also PARAMĀTMA and the Universe is based on the relation of JĪVA and ŚIVA or ĀTMA[21] in the mortal body. It is also emphasised here that God is of the nature of SATYA and, DHYĀNA, JÑĀNA and PRASĀDA plus his favour lead to His realisation.[22] For that the first step is the realisation of ĀTMA.[23]

Second Khaṇḍa of the third Muṇḍaka.

This Khaṇḍa gives us the conclusion, in which it is laid down that with all the necessities, His favour to the deserving and strong-willed is the main necessity.[24] It is stated that NĀMA-RŪPA-NĀŚA is the highest state[25] and also that the knower of Brahman is Brahman.[26]

After this brief narration of ideas in each Khaṇḍa it would now become fairly easy to prove that God, as conceived of in the Upaniṣad, is of the nature of NIRGUṆA-

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[19] 2. 2. 2.

[20] 2. 2. 11 emphasising that Brahma is SARVAVYĀPAKA and also SARVASVAŪPA.

[21] 3.1. 1द्वा सुपर्णा सयुजा सखाया समानं वृक्ष परिषस्वजाते ।
तयोरन्यः पिप्पलं स्वाद्वत्त्यनश्नन्नन्यो अभिचाकशीति ।।

[22] 3. 1. 3 and 3. 1. 4.

[23] 3. 1. 5 and 3. 1. 7.

[24] 3. 2. 3 and 3. 2. 5 emphasising that above all, god's favour is necessary for his realisation. Also 3. 1.8. Also that the highest state is that of engrossment in Bramhan. Śankara harping on his own theory interprets the word 'एष' as 'यमेव परमात्मानमेवैष विद्वान'

[25] 3. 2. 5, 3. 2. 6, 3. 2. 8.

[26] 3. 2. 9.

NIRĀKĀRA-BRAHMA, though of course, Śaṅkara's interpretation and reading of his own philosophical theories will not be justified by the work as it is. The following facts should be noted in the matter:

(1) After mentioning that Vidyas are two,[27] the teacher describes God in all negative and absolute aspects[28] and thus establishes that NIRGUṆA-NIRĀKĀRA-BRAHMA is the highest state, the topmost ideal to be attained, by the man who has entered the life of SĀDHANĀ at the initiation of a teacher,[29] after of course the rise of JIJÑĀSA in the pupil's mind [illegible]

(2) The author hurries to add that, from this Akṣara, the Universe has its birth in its natural course, as if without any effort on His part.[31] This lack of effort and natural course suggest that, while God creates the Universe, He is in no way affected by His creation.

(3) In 2. 1. 2. again, God is described in His NIRGUṆA aspects, as higher than *AKṢARA*, which, in the present context, means SAGUṆA-BRAHMA. The same NIRGUṆA-BRAHMA is described as the highest in 2.1.10, 3. 1.2 and 3.2.8 adds that the end of NĀMA-RŪPA is the highest state for any Sādhaka.

(4) It is also stated that this absolute reality is of the nature of OMKĀRA[32] and is JYOTISVARŪPA.[33] This

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[27] 1. 1. 4.

[28] 1. 1. 6.

[29] 1. 2. 12.

[30] 1. 1. 3. It should not be forgotten that the normal course accepted is that the desire to know Brahma arises after the Karma etc. are known. That also explains why the author has described Karma first.

[31] 1. 1. 7. Vide Radhakrishnan There is no suggestion here that the world is an illusory appearance of Brahman. The illustrations are intended to convey that Brahma is the sole cause and there is no second to Brahman which can be used by Brahman.

[32] 2. 2. 4. [33] 2. 2. 9.

shows the attempt of the poet to establish that God is far above the Universe and the limitations of the world cannot apply to Him. It also shows that He is far above the Universe and yet the creator of the Universe.[34] The world, nay, the whole Universe is dependent on Him.

(5) It is again interesting to note that the Ṛsi refers to the double-fold nature of God in 2.1.3, 2.1.4, 2.2.1 and the double-fold nature is carefully emphasised in 2.2.7 and 3.1.7. All these, read with the mantras referred to in (3) would go to prove that, in the opinion of this writer:

(*a*) NIRGUṆA NIRĀKĀRA-BRAHMA is the highest reality.

(*b*) The same God, in His capacity as the creator of the Universe is SAGUṆA and SĀKĀRA.

(*c*) According to this Upaniṣad, these two aspects of of God are almost like the two sides of a rupee.

(*d*) Even the symbolical narration of two birds on the same tree[35] goes a long way in proving this theory, though establishing at the same time that the highest state in which we conceive of God is His NIRGUṆA-NIRĀKĀRA state. It is a state in which He is not affected by His creation and Himself remains the supreme lord of the Universe.

Thus, Śankara will not find full justification for his theory in this Upaniṣad, because,

(1) The SAGUṆA-SĀKĀRA aspect of God is referred to as His creative aspect and not as lower Brahma, as Śaṅkara conceives.

(2) It is not stated that the NIRGUṆA-BRAHMA does nothing, though it is emphasised that whatever He does is in its natural course.

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[34] 2. 2. 11 describes the BRAHMAMAYATVA of the Unierse and it should be read with 3. 1. 3. as also 1. 1. 7.

[35] 3. 1. 1.

(3) He is referred to as the source of HIRAṆYA-GARBHA, as also of the Universe. His will creates all.[36]

(4) The Upaniṣad thus wants to suggest that the real nature of God can be understood only when both the negative and positive aspects of God are emphasised.

(5) 2.2.7 continued in 2.2.8 and fully exposed in 2.2.9 shows that God is the lustre of all lustres. This would mean that,

(*a*) God, who is of the nature of the lustre of knowledge, is the highest knowledge.

(*b*) All other knowledge is inferior to and merged in this knowledge.

(*c*) Once God is known, nothing else remains to be known.

This too would refer to God as the highest and of the nature of NIRGUṆA-NIRĀKĀRA, while the Universe is His manifestation.

When, in the same verse, it is stated that the knowers of Ātmā know Him, it supports and finalises the view of the Upaniṣad that the knowledge of Ātmā leads to the higher knowledge of Brahma.

(6) 2.2.4 states that "Man takes hold of the bow in the form of OMKĀRA, the arrow in the form of Ātmā and his aim is Brahma. Man should strike at it with full alertness, and, like the arrow, become engrossed in Him." This clearly indicates that OM is the external manifestation of God, is SAGUṆĀ-BRAHMA, whereby the final reality is to be attained. This final reality is NIRGUṆA-NIRĀKĀRA-BRAHMA.

Ātmā and Paramātmā.

It is the general view of all the Upaniṣads that ĀTMĀ is BRAHMA. It is also stated that the realisation of ĀTMĀ is the first step to the realisation of BRAHMA. The relation

[36] Vide also Manusmṛti 1. 8 and 9.

between ĀTMĀ and PARAMĀTMĀ is explained in the symbolical illustrations of a bucket full of salty water, the object in the middle of several mirrors reflecting innumerable images and so on. The views of this Upaniṣad on the topics of ĀTMĀ and PARAMĀTMĀ are the same as those found in most of the other Upaniṣads. In the third Muṇḍaka, we have the symbolical narration of two birds sitting on the same tree. The two birds are JĪVA and ŚIVA according to Śankara, who wants to establish thereby that PARAMĀTMĀ guides the JĪVA in his onward march. The tree is the body. In a broader sense, if we were to state that the tree is the SAMSĀRAVṚKṢA, and then add that the two birds are ĀTMĀ and JĪVA or PRĀNA, we will come to the final conclusion that JĪVA or PRĀNA is, after all, the active aspect of the same ĀTMĀ that lords over the body. For a while, the JĪVA becomes attracted by the mortal creation and suffers pangs,[37] but his original nature ultimately guides him on the right path. This original nature is ĀTMĀ. The teacher wants to stress that (*i*) the realisation of ĀTMĀ, together with a full knowledge of the functioning of the whole body, is the first step to the realisation of God and His functioning in the Universe. (*ii*) It is mainly on the basis of ĀTMĀ that the conception of PARAMĀTMĀ can be understood. In a wider sense, we can state that the same is the case with NIRGUṆA and SAGUṆA Brahma and the SAGUṆA-SĀKĀRATVA of God is only this creating will. No creation is possible without will and its decision, and this will is ultimately to merge in the original nature of God, the NIRGUṆA-NIRĀKĀRATVA. It is here that the interpretation and theory of Śankara are nearest to truth with regard to God and His relation to ĀTMĀ in the UPANIṢAD, though of course his interpretation is not absolutely correct. As we

[37] 3. 1. 2. समाने वृक्षे पुरुषो निमग्नोऽनीशया शोचति मुह्यमानः ।
जुष्टं यदा पश्यत्यन्यमीशमस्य महिमानमिति वीतशोकः ।।

have referred to above, the full exposition of the Nature of God is made on the basis of the relation between ĀTMĀ and JĪVA, and the same relation as between the ĀTMĀ and JĪVA is expected to persist between SAGUṆA and NIRGUṆA Brahman. There are several verses referring to SAGUṆA BRAHMA and that is the main reason why it is accepted as a great authority by the ŚUDDHĀDVAITA scholars. But, the fact remains that NIRGUṆA BRAHMA is accepted as the final reality by this Upaniṣad and SAGUṆA BRAHMA is only the other side of the same, just as is the case with ĀTMĀ and JĪVA.

Is Aparā Vidyā Avidyā?

This is again an important question to be discussed and without that, it would not be possible to understand the conception of God that this fine Upaniṣad wants to lay down. Verse 1.1.4 lays down that 'Two Vidyās deserve to be known; they are the higher and the lower.'[38] Śankara specifically states that this APARĀ VIDYĀ means AVIDYĀ. Radhakrishnan notes that 'It is a kind of knowledge, not BHRAMA or MITHYĀ JNĀNA, error or falsehood. It also aims at knowledge of the highest reality even though in a partial or imperfect manner.[39] We should try to establish the view of the Ṛṣi with regard to this. The following points should be noted:—

(*i*) With PARĀ VIDYĀ, APARĀ is also stated to be that which deserves to be known.[40]

(*ii*) It is said to consist of the Vedas and all other literature except possibly the Upaniṣads.[41]

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38 द्वे विद्ये वेदितव्ये परा अपरा च।

39 Vide 'The Principal Upanishad' p. 612.

40 द्वे विद्ये वेदितव्ये परा अपरा च।

41 1. 1. 5, तत्रापराऋग्वेदो यजुर्वेदः समावेदोऽथर्ववेदः शिक्षा कल्पो व्याकरणं निरुक्तं छन्दो ज्योतिषमिति।

(*iii*) The second Khaṇḍa of the first Muṇḍaka establishes that the Vedas, etc., *i.e.*, the APARĀ VIDYĀ leads man to (*a*) success in this life and world and also (*b*) to Svarga, the blessed world that many aspire after.[42]

(*iv*) It also makes man's character and personality develop. Actually it seems to make man ready for the higher Sādhanā. When Śaunaka, the great householder approached the teacher, he was well prepared in the same manner.

(*v*) The study and practice of this is said to be very much necessary and that is the reason why APARĀ VIDYĀ is important in its own way.[43]

(*vi*) APARĀVIDYĀ leads to the knowledge and study of Karma and this is in no way less important.

(*vii*) Those who do not practice AVIDYĀ are expected to be cursed and condemned.

(*viii*) The APARĀ VIDYĀ and the actions that it teaches should not be known as the highest and should not be totally relied upon with reference to God's realisation.[44]

All this would establish that

(1) APARĀ VIDYĀ is lower knowledge and not AVIDYĀ. Śankara's famous theory that the Vedas are the outcome of man's ignorance, will not find support here.

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[42] 1. 2. 1. Laying down that the Karma in the Vedas must be performed. It is great, noble and useful in its own limits.

[43] 1. 2. 3, the necessity for sacrifice has the limited success in this world and the attainment to Svarga.

[44] 1. 2. 8 to 1. 2. 10 Śaṅkara insists that the three verses refer to Karma devoid of Jñāna. The real fact is that they refer to Jñāna but not of the Ultimate Reality. They refer to Jñāna of the world and Svarga. Śankara does not emphasise here that even this is necessary though of course not the final thing to be had in life.

(2) Yet APARĀ VIDYĀ is not expected to lead to the knowledge of God even in a limited sense as Radhakrishnan contends.

(4) Both with reference to this world and with reference to Svarga, this APARĀ VIDYĀ is not AVIDYĀ.

(5) It is ignorance only if man solely depends upon it for the highest realisation just like Virocana in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad.*[45]

View on Karma.

This naturally leads us to the next question. What is the view of this Upaniṣad about KARMA? Is a state of AKARMA agreed to by this Upaniṣad? Is KARMA opposed with reference to God-realisation? Does a man realise God by mere JÑĀNA? There are several verses referring to this problem. If we read them all together, the whole question will be solved. The verses are these:

1.2.1—It is the truth that the actions that the sages visioned in the mantras of the Vedas were greatly prevalent in the Tretā Yuga. If you desire the truth, regularly perform these; in this world, it is this that is the path of good deeds.

1.2.7—These (actions) of the form of sacrifice are boats that are not firm, though in these, eighteen types of lower Karma is spoken. Those fools who welcome this as blessedness, experience old age and death again (and again).[46]

1.2.8—Those who remain in Avidya and yet believe that they are wise and learned, are ignorant men who move on (in this world) like blind men led by the blind.[47]

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[45] Vide *Chāndogypoanisad,* 8. 7. 2 on wards.

[46] Śaṅkara is here of the opinion that the sage is critical of Karma without Jñāna. Vide.

[47] Also vide *Kaṭha* 1. 2. 5 and Maitri 7. 9.

1.2.9—Those who remain in the midst of Avidya constantly and yet assume that "we have our aims fulfilled, "are only ignorant like little children. Through attachment, these followers of Karma do not know (truth); they are therefore extremely unhappy.[48]

1.2.10—Those who look upon sacrifices and utilitarian works as the best, are fools that are not destined to realise any blessedness. They enjoy the fruits of good deeds in Svarga and then enter this or some other lower world.

2.2.9—When that Supreme One is realised, all the knots of the heart break down, all doubts disappear and all the actions of such a man are destroyed.[49]

3.1.10—A man with his pure character and self attains to that blessed world by the mind for which he had a genuine desire. He wins over that world and those desires, and therefore one who desires Divinity, should pray a knower of the Self.[50]

3.2.2—Thinking over them, one who nourishes desires is born by the same desires wherever he should. The desires, however, of a man, whose actions are fully satisfied and whose Self is fully satisfied, come to an end in this world itself.

These are the verses that discuss more or less the same subject. When they are read together, when we read in particular 1.2.7, 1.2.8 and 1.2.9, the 1.2.10 and 3.1.10, and 1.2.1 and 2.2.8 together, we come to the following important conclusions:

(1) Actions, as we conceive of them in the world,

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[48] The word रागात् in the mantra is explained as कर्मफलरागाभिभवनिमित्तम् by Śankara.

[49] Vide also *Kaṭha*. 6. 15.

[50] Vide Radhakrishnan "See B.U. 1. 4. 15. 'The knower of the self has all his desires fulfilled and can obtain any world he may seek,' " p. 689.

through our mortal senses, lead to Svarga at the most with all their nobility and greatness.

(2) This fruit of these actions is only temporal, and, there is nothing short of rebirth and for that, return to this world when once the stock of PUṆYA is exhausted.[51]

(3) Yet, actions are not bad and are not to be abandoned, in so far as they serve their limited purpose and lead man to the development of his Personality and to the noble state of entering into Sādhanā that is destined to lead man finally to the realisation of God, to MOKṢA.

(4) The desire for the knowledge of God and the consequent actions of the higher order as described in 3.2.2 are very happy and fully welcome. Karma in this sense, *i.e.*, ennobled Karma, is not therefore bad, though Karma, as described in 1.1.12[52] must of necessity lead man to detachment, *i.e.*, a state in which man will not be bound down by the actions that he performs.

(5) In the realisation of God, knowledge, austerities, faith plus the favour of God, all combined in one are necessary. The author describes higher Vidyā and yet is not a mere JNĀNAVĀDIN as Śankara would have us believe. The favour of God comes again to a Sādhaka, who is devotedly attached to God and concentrates on Him.

(6) All the four paths proclaimed as those that are likely to lead to the realisation of God are here combined as follows:—

The highest is the state of the knowledge of God. For this knowledge, JNĀNA-JIJÑĀSĀ is necessary and this

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51 Vide also 'क्षीणे पुण्ये मर्त्यलोकं विशन्ति ।'

52 परीक्ष्य लोकान्कर्मचितान्ब्राह्मणो निर्वेदमायान्नास्त्यकृतः कृतेन ।

comes through detachment from worldly Karma and and attachment to higher Karma. All this requires alertness, awakened consciousness and fullest concentration. Thus, Karma and Dhyāna are combined with Jñāna. The poet has not again failed to stress that with all this, His favour is absolutely necessary, and this favour will be available only to a man who is devoted to Him. This naturally combines Bhakti with the other three paths.

Life and Philosophical Vision.

It should be noted that Śaunaka, the great householder, comes to the teacher with the main question on which the preaching and instruction of the Upaniṣad are based. The very fact that he comes, inspite of all the happiness that he must have enjoyed in life and all the great actions that he must have performed in life, shows that he is not satisfied even with the best that the mortal world of living beings has given to him. Some inner thirst of the Soul urges him and he approaches his great teacher. The teacher accepts him and replies to all his queries. The path that is shown to him is the path that a Sādhaka is expected to traverse. The visioning of God, now one and then another is the visioning that a Sādhaka will have, as he comes nearer and nearer to God. It should also be noted that this Upaniṣad is known as the Upaniṣad of the shaveling. The first meaning of 'MUṆḌAKA' that will strike to us is 'a Samnyasin who has renounced the world'. But Radhakrishnan explains this better when he states that "The name is derived from the root 'MUṆḌ', to shave", as he that comprehends the teaching of the Upaniṣad is shaved or liberated from error and ignorance.[53] Hume in fact takes it too literally when he states that "But it is more likely to be 'shaving the nead' as

[53] Vide Supra. p. 669.

Buddhist monks did later. This preliminary requisite to the study of the Upaniṣad doubtless gave it the title. The Shaveling Upaniṣad', or, the Upaniṣad of the tonsured'.[54] Śankara believes that this is the vow of carrying fire on the head.[55] All this should bring us to the following conclusion about life and philosophical vision that this Upaniṣad is expected to give to us.

(1) Life as it is, is not likely in any way to satisfy a man whose soul has its thirst awakened. Even the best that life gives, is not likely to satisfy man and his inner urge.

(2) Yet, it is necessary that man passes through the ordeals of life and does all his duties and works. It is necessary that he tries to perform sacrifices and takes his Self to the higher world of the Gods. But it should be borne in mind that this is not the final thing, not the ultimate aim of man's struggles.

(3) It is necessary for man to pass through life so that he realises the futility of life, not as life or because it is mortal, but as the end. Life is only a means to the end that is nobler. This nobler end is the realisation of the Self and God.

(4) As it is the world not Māyā; it is Māyā only when we look upon it as an end to be had and refuse to aspire for higher. Māyā lies not in the world but in our false notion of the world; Māyā lies in our own mind, in our own heart.

(5) The Upaniṣad is that of the shaveling, not in the sense that it gives solace only to a man who actually renounces the world. It is an Upaniṣad for the shaveling in the sense that man may even live in the world, perform utilitarian works and yet

[54] Vide 'Thirteen Principal Upanisads', p. 377.

undertake all these without any attachment. He is then a real shaveling.

(6) The Upaniṣad thus asks us not to give up life, but the false notion of it, the attachment to it. It asks us to aspire for that knowledge which will lead us to the knowledge of God, after which nothing will remain unknown to us. A Sādhaka need not necessarily renounce the world, and Śaunaka has not renounced the world when he approached the teacher for the highest knowledge. It is here exactly that this Upaniṣad becomes an authority for the later preaching of the Gītā.

Conclusions.

This brings us to important conclusions, and we feel that we come nearer to the views of the sage when we refuse to believe that there are contradictions in this Upaniṣad. This Upaniṣad is systematic in its own peculiar way. The Upaniṣad has discussed all the important problems that an Upaniṣad is expected to discuss. These are its conclusions:—

(1) God is NIRGUṆA BRAHMA in His original nature and SAGUṆA BRAHMA is His aspect, in no way inferior to the NIRGUṆA.

(2) NIRGUṆA BRAHMA in His capacity as the creator of the Universe is SAGUṆA SĀKĀRA BRAHMA. That explains why the author describes the Ultimate Reality in all negative qualities and hurries to add that this God is the creator of the Universe and there are mantras that state that the whole Universe is of the nature of Brahma.

(3) The destruction of name and form are stated to be the final stages of man's realisation of God.

(4) The Upaniṣad shows no partiality towards any

particular path for the realisation of God, in fact, all the paths are combined into one.

(5) The knowledge of ĀTMĀ in full is the first requisite to the knowledge of BRAHMA.

(6) In the opinion of this Upaniṣad, KARMA is not bad, it is not MĀYĀ, it is not to be disliked or discarded. Upto a certain stage, KARMA is necessary. But, it cannot help man beyond a certain stage. Philosophy begins where the highest bliss that mortal deeds can offer ends. The highest state to which KARMA can lead man is the stage of the attainment of Svarga.

(7) The visioning of God on the part of the Sādhaka has a definite evolution. His views on God differ at every stage. But, at any stage, his view of God is not to be stated to be faulty.

(8) This Upaniṣad refuses to look upon this life as an illusion. Illusion lies in man's mind. The world is MĀYĀ for a man if he looks upon it as an end.

(9) The Upaniṣad is not sectarian in character. It is not theoretical. It shows all the practical experiences of a Sādhaka who aspires for the highest.

THE THEORY OF ŚABDA BRAHMA AND SPHOṬA

By SHRI KALIKA CHARAN PANDEYA

The holy scriptures have boldly declared that the Brahma or God was the word and the word was God. They did not only profess such identification but they also preached that the whole world was the outcome of "Śabda". Before citing the instances from our own 'Śāstras' let us first direct our attention towards the Holy Bible. In "The *New Testament* of Jesus Christ" in the very beginning of the first chapter of "The Gospel According to St. John" we come across the following sacred-lines:

"In the beginning was the word, and the word was with God and the word was God. The same was in the beginning with God. All things were made by him and without him was not anything made that was made. In him was life; and the life was the light of men." Let us now examine the 'Vedas', the oldest records of the human beings. Ṛgveda says:

"वागेव विश्वा भुवनानि जज्ञे वाच इत सर्वमभूत् यच्च मर्त्यम ।"[1]

Aitereya Brāhmaṇa says "वाग्वै ब्रह्म" —The speech itself is Brahman. The other scripture observes वाग्वै विराट[2] The letter "Oṃ" has been identified with the Supreme being (Brahma). In *Bhāgavata* Lord Śrī Kṛṣṇa has plainly declared himself as Śabda Brahma.

अहं वै सर्वभूतानि भूतात्माभूतभावनः ।
शब्दब्रह्म परं ब्रह्म ममोभे शाश्वती तनू ॥[3]

As the speech is identified with Brahman and the Brahman itself is everything in its multifarious forms, so the

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[1] Aitareya-Brāhmaṇa 6—3.

[2] M.S.—2. 2. 10.

[3] Śrimad Bhāgavata Skandha-6th Adhyāya 16th Śloka 51.

speech has been also thought and identified with various things.

The Tantric texts also corroborate the Śabda Brahma theory. In "Ṣaṭ-Cakra-Vivṛti" we find the following lines which go to support the theory:

[4] तन्मध्ये वाणलिंगन्तु सूर्य्ययुतसमप्रभम् ।
शब्द ब्रह्ममयः शब्दो न हेतुस्तदहेतुकः ।।
अनाहताख्यं तत्पद्मं पुरुषाधिष्ठितं परम् ।

Śrīmad-Bhāgavata observes that Śabda Brahma is difficult to be understood and it is of three types, namely—Prāṇamaya (parā), Manomaya (Paśyantī), and Indriyamaya (Madhyamā) and it is unfathomed deep like the sea and it is very difficult to be crossed (through wisdom).[5]

Śrī Kṛṣṇa says—"I (whose power is unlimited and who is all pervading Brahma) have spread it like a fibre of the lotus stalk and it first of all manifests in the form of sound in the mind of the living beings. Just as a spider oozes its web from its heart through mouth so also the God whose forms are the Vedas, and who is immortal, creates the *Bṛhatī* (Vaikharī speech), which is of such a type that one cannot reach to its end, and which has various forms (*i.e.*, the languages) expanded through metres, which are embellished with the Sparśa, Svara, Ūṣma, and Antaḥstha letters which become manifest through the letter "Om" from the heart by the mind, and which is considered to be only an auxiliary cause of it (nimitta-kāraṇa).[6]

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[4] P. 132 of Vol. II. of the "Tantrik Texts" with Ṣātcakra-Nirūpaṇa and *Pādukā Pañcaka*—edited by Arthur Avalon, publishers Ganesh & Co. Madras in 1924.

[5] शब्द-ब्रह्म सुदुर्बोधं प्राणेन्द्रियमनोमयम् ।
अनन्तपारं गम्भीरं दुर्विगाह्यं समुद्रवत् ।।
श्रीमद्भागवत, एकादशस्कन्ध, अध्या० २१ श्लो० ३६ ।

[6] मयोपबृंहितं भूम्ना ब्रह्मणाऽनन्तशक्तिना ।
भूतेषु घोषरूपेण बिसेषूर्णेव लक्ष्यते ।।

With regard to the process of the manifestation of Śabda Brahma *Śrīmad-Bhāgavata* observes that the God who becomes manifest in the Ādhāra Cakra, etc., first being accompanied by Prāṇa together with Parāvāṇī having entered the cave (*i.e.*, manomaya named as Paśyantī) and afterwards (being transformed into the form of Madhyamā in the Viśuddhi-Cakra by the mouth) becomes manifest (*i.e.*, comes out) in the form of speech (known as Vaikharī) in the form of Mātrā, Svara and Varṇa. Just as a fire which is in the sky in the form of heat and is not manifest becomes slightly apparent throuh the rubbing of the woods and afterwards becomes powerful; in the same manner is the form of speech (Parā, Paśyantī, Madhyamā, and Vaikharī); it is my own manifestation which thus becomes apparent.[7]

Now the question which occurs is whether the Universe is considered to be the "Pariṇāma" or "Vivartta" of the Śabda Brahma. In other words whether the Śabda-Brahma-Vādins are the adherents of "Pariṇāma Vāda" or Vivartta Vāda. Vācaspati Miśra I mentions both the theories in his *Nyāya-Kaṇikā*. In the Vākya-padīya even the Pariṇāma-Vāda as

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यथोर्णनाभि हृदयादूर्णामुद्वमते मुखात् ।
आकाशाद् घोषवान्प्राणो मनसा स्पर्शरूपिणो ।।
छन्दोमयो मृतमयः सहस्रपदवीं प्रभुः ।
ओंकाराद् व्यंजितस्पर्श स्वरोष्मान्तःस्थभूषिताम् ।।
विचित्रभाषा विततां छन्दोभिश्चतुरुत्तरैः ।
अनन्तपारां बृहतीं सृजत्याक्षिपते स्वयम् ।।

——श्रीमद्भागवत, एकादश स्कन्ध, अध्या० २१ श्लो० ३७-४०। कादयो मावसानाः स्पर्शाः, अचः स्वराः, शषसह ऊष्माणः यणोऽन्तस्थाः" सि० कौमुदी, संज्ञा प्रकरणम् ।

[7] स एष जीवो विवरप्रसूतिः प्राणेन घोषेण गुहां प्रविष्टः ।
मनोमयं सूक्ष्ममुपेत्य रूपं मात्रा स्वरो वर्ण इति स्थविष्ठः ।।
यथाऽनलः खेंनिलबन्धुरूष्मा बलेन दारूण्यधिमथ्यमानः ।
अणु प्रजातो हविषा समिध्यते तथैव मे व्यक्तिरियं हि वाणी ।।
श्रीमद्भागवत, स्कन्ध ११, अध्या० १२ श्लो० १७-१८।

well as the Vivartta Vāda have been mentioned. The author of the *Vaiyākaraṇa-Bhūṣaṇa* seems to believe in Vivartta-Vāda. *Tattva Saṅgraha* declares Pariṇāma Vāda.[8]

Introduction to Sphoṭa:

There are ample stanzas in the Vedic Literature which go to corroborate the Śabda Brahma theory and the doctrine of Sphoṭa. Bharata Miśra has quoted a stanza of the type in his remarkable work Sphoṭa-Siddhi which runs thus—

उतत्वः पश्यन्न ददर्श वाचम् उतत्वः शृण्वन्न शृणोत्येनाम् ।
उतो त्वस्यै तन्वं विसस्रे जायेव पत्युरुशती सुवासाः ।।

The meaning of the first line is that one does not see the speech though he does see it. As a result of our ordinary and every-day experience we have concluded and supposed that the word is only the object of ears (*i.e.,* audible), and it is not the object of eye-sight (*i.e.,* it is not visible). But in spite of this supposition we have before our eyes the words of an omniscient sage who boldly declares the speech to be visible. In the opinion of the sage there is no difference between the speech and the objects which we perceive with our own eyes and he says that one does not see it (the speech) though he

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[8] ये पुनरभिन्नस्य शब्दब्रह्मणो विवर्त्तं वा परिणामं वार्थमाचक्षते इत्युक्तम्—
न्यायकणिका, पृ० २९३ ।

शब्दस्य परिणामोयमित्याम्नायविदो विदुः ।
वाक्यपदीय, कां० १ का १२०

अनादिनिधनं ब्रह्म शब्दतत्त्वं यदक्षरम् ।
विवर्ततेऽर्थभावेन प्रक्रिया जगतो यतः ।।
वाक्यपदीय, कां० १ का० १

श्रीलक्ष्मीरमणं नौमि गौरीरमणरूपिणम् ।
स्फोटरूपं यतः सर्वं जगदेतद्विवर्त्तते ।।
वैयाकरणभूषण, धात्वर्थनिर्णय का० १

नाशोत्पादसमालीढं ब्रह्मशब्दमयं परम् ।
यत्तस्य परिणामोयं भावग्रामः प्रतीयते ।।
तत्त्वसंग्रह, पृ० ६२८

(actually) does see it. It becomes quite evident from the example that when one looks towards an object with doubtful eyes to know whether it is a serpent or a string, or a garland, he can never be sure and even cannot be aware of the fact that he is seeing a string. In the same manner one sees the speech as exposed in various forms[9], yet on account of the doubt which is lingering in his mind he does not realise that he sees the speech. In the second line the Ṛisī says that one does not listen to it though he listens to it. He means to say that a person understands that very thing which he hears. One hears a word which becomes evident from the knowledge of the sound (Dhvani) of its component parts along with the revival of the already existent past memory of an unnoticed knowledge which is the outcome of the cognition of the former parts of it. But when somebody asks him about the thing which made him to understand that sense, he at once replies in the same manner as in the case of गौः. One says that it was गकार, औकार and विसर्ग which made him understand the sense and quotes the words of Upavarṣa as a testimony for it. Upavarṣācārya should not be blamed for it and he cannot be alleged to have committed a mistake. He was a 'Ṛṣi' and so it is not proper to imagine that he was in doubts and was thus mistaken. It is sure that whatever such high minded author would say he would say it with a view to make himself intelligible to his readers. Such is the case with our

[9] The fact of the speech being an object of eyes-is-being supposed by the experiments of the scientists. The scientists have verified that sound is reflected in a manner analogous to the reflection of light. When it is reflected from a plain surface the reflected sound comes as if it was propagated from a point beyond the surface at a distance equal to the distance of the real point of propagation from the surface. Sounds produced in one focus of a hollow ellipsoid are reflected to the other focus. Whispering galleries are instances of the reflection of sound to a focus, or to form sound caustics. Echoes are familier instances of reflection of sound. Lenses have been formed of collodion filled with different gases and by means of these sound has been reflected in a manner analogous to the refraction of light by glass lenses (*The New Popular Encycloedia* p. 34).

illustrious writer, Upavarṣa who did not think it proper to reflect upon his Sphoṭa theory. Upavaraṣācārya had to deal with such a voluminous work of Mīmāṅsā which contained twelve chapters and there he had only to deal with the Vyāvahārika-Śabda. So it ought not to be said that Upavarṣa was against the Sphoṭa theory. In order to remove the doubt (which one has by the words of the second line of the above cited *mantra*) as to how can a person see the speech, the third line has been mentioned. It means that to such persons whose hearts have become pure through the practices of Yoga and who have acquired the knowledge of Vyākaraṇa, the speech goes to show its actual form. Certain writers while commenting upon the above stanza have used such words which show that the relation of the first line is with the object which is in the form of the sense (*artha*). Though we really do not want to criticise them yet that much is necessary to be told that the word does not actually mean sense (Artha). Next to Samhitā are the *Brāhmaṇas*. So if we look towards the Brāhmaṇas we would find the following Mantras:—

रौतं मन्त्रमपश्यत् ।
ते देवा एतद् यजुरपश्यन् ।
एतद्वै ब्राह्मणं पुरा वाजयवसां विदामकन् ।

In all the above instances we find that the mantras (which are nothing else than the speech) have been told to have been seen, and these Mantras would have no sense unless the Sphoṭa theory is accepted. The mantras can be told to have been seen under the circumstance when we accept the real nature (Tattva) of words to be quite different from its mere letters. There are divergent views with regard to the conception of *Sphoṭa*.

From the manner in which Kauṇḍa-Bhaṭṭa treats the subject it becomes evident that his Sphoṭa is not at all concerned with *Parā*, *Paśyantī*, and *Madhyamā*, but he accepts the sound of *Vaikharī* to be the Sphoṭa. Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa

seems to recognise the sound of *Madhyamā* to be the Sphoṭa[10] and he appears to be of opinion that the apprehension of difference is possible therein on account of the reflection of the sound of Vaikharī just as the 'Ākāśa' differs with the difference of *'Upādhi'* and thus it is distinguished as 'Ghaṭākāśa' and 'Maṭhākāśa', etc. But Bhartṛharī seems to accept the sound of *Paśyantī* itself to be the Sphoṭa. The writers on Tāntric works have clearly stated on the ground of Bhartṛhari's opinion that the Vaiyākaraṇas regard Sphoṭā to be the sound of *Paśyantī* (which has been accepted to be the Śabda-Brahma). Bhartṛharī has recogni:ed only three types of sound:—(1) *Vaikhari*,[11] (2) *Madhyamā* and (3) *Paśyantī*. Patañjali has only hinted at the theory of the four types of sound (or speech), but Nāgeśa has clearly accepted the four types of it.[12]

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[10] तत्र मध्यमाया यो नादांशस्तस्यैवं स्फोटात्मनो वाचकत्वेनाक्षतेः ।

—मञ्जूषा, पृ० १८३

[11] तत्र वैखरीनादो वह्नेः फूत्कारादिव न्मध्यमानादोत्साहकः, मध्यमनादः स्फोटे व्यञ्जयतीति शीघ्रमेव ततोऽर्थबोधः । स च प्रयोगेण वैखरी रूपेणाभिज्वलितः स्वरूप-रूषितः कृत इति तदर्थः ।

...यथा चैकस्याकाशस्य घटाकाशो मठाकाश इत्यौ पाधिको भेद....एवं स्फोटेव्यंजक ध्वनिगत..भेद व्यवहारः"

परम लघुमंजूषा पृ० २९—३२

वैखर्या मध्यमायाश्च पश्यन्त्याश्चैतदद‌भुतम ।
अनेक तीर्थ भेदायास्त्रय्या वाचः परं पदम ॥

वाक्यापदीय कां० १ का० १४३

चत्वारि वाक परिमिता पदानि तानि विदु ब्राह्मणा ये मनीषिणः ।
गुहा त्रीणि निहिता नेंगयन्ति तुरीयं वाचो मनुष्या वदन्ति ॥

बैयाकरण महाभाष्य आन्हिको

[12] Parā is the sound which has its seat in Mūlādhāra cakra. The sound of the navel is distinguished as *'Paśyanti'*. The sound of the heart is nown as *'Madhyamā'*, while the sound which remains in the throat is called as *Vaikharī*.

[12] परा वाङ्मूलचक्रस्था पश्यन्ती नाभिसंस्थिता ।
हृदिस्था मध्यमा ज्ञेया वैखरी कण्ठदेशगा ॥

—परमलघुमञ्जूषा—स्फोटविचारः पृ० २७

The sense of the word Sphoṭa:

The word Sphoṭa comes from the verbal root. स्फुट विकसने and thus it means 'Sphoṭa is that from which the sense is known'. It may even be derived as स्फुटयते वर्णादिभिरभिव्यज्यते इति स्फोट: and thus it means 'Sphoṭa is that which is expressed by the letters, words, and sentences, etc.' Sphoṭa has also been called as Vācaka.[13]

Eight types of Sphoṭa:

The following eight types of Sphoṭa have been accepted— (1) Varṇa-Sphoṭa, (2) Pada-Sphoṭa, (3) Vākya-Sphoṭa, (4) Akhaṇḍa-Pada-Sphoṭa, (5) Akhaṇḍa-Vākya-Sphoṭa, (6) Várṇa-Jāti-Sphoṭa, (7) Pada-Jāti-Sphoṭa and (8) Vākya-jāti-Sphoṭa.[14]

Varṇa-Sphoṭa:

The Sphoṭa which is suggested by a letter is called as 'Varṇa-Sphoṭa'. It means that the letter iteslf is considered to be the denotative of a sense. Varṇa-Sphoṭa is to be pointed out in such instances where Prakṛti and Pratyaya denote their senses separately. Varṇa-Sphoṭa has been recognised by the Naiyāyikas.[15]

Pada-Sophoṭa:

Pada-Sphoṭa is discerned in such places where there is no knowledge of Prakṛti and Pratyaya. For instance we may have वस् and नस् (which are 'Ādeśas') instead of युष्माकम्

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[13] स्फुटत्यर्थो यस्मादिति स्फोट: वाचक इति यावत्—वृत्तिदीपिका, पृ० ५०

[14] वर्णस्फोट:, पदस्फोट:, वाक्यस्फोट:, अखण्डपदस्फोट:, अखण्डवाक्यस्फोट: इत्थं पञ्च व्यक्तिस्फोटा:। वर्णपदवाक्यभेदेन त्रिविधो जातिस्फोट:। इत्यमष्टौ स्फोटा: वृत्तिदीपिका, पृ० ५०

[15] तत्र प्रकृति प्रत्यययो: पृथगर्थोपस्थापकत्वे तु वर्णस्फोट:। अयं तु नैयायिकानामपि सम्मत:—वृत्तिदीपिका, पृ० ५०

and अस्माकम् Similarly the Sphoṭa of the word घट would be called as Pada-Sphoṭa.[16]

Vākya Sphoṭa:

Vākya-Sphoṭa is to be found in such an instance where the division of its Padas cannot be made out. The instances of Vākya-Sphoṭa is to be had in हरेऽव Because one rightly apprehends the fact of the existence of 'a sentence' and 'a word' (as distinct from the words and letters), so the Pada (word) and Vakyā (sentence) which are distinct from the Varṇas (letters) should be surely accepted. Bhartṛhari has clearly recognised the divisions of Padas in a Vākya, and the divisions of Prakṛti and Pratyaya in a pada. But the view of the Vaiyākaraṇas is that the most important and main Sphoṭa is the Vakya-Jāti-Sphoṭa, for, in the ordinary life the sense is apprehended from this very type of Sphoṭa[18] The Vākya-Sphoṭa vadins are of opinion that in a sentence the words as well as the Prakṛti and Pratyaya are unreal and only imaginary, for in reality the sense is apprehended from a complete sentence and not from its parts.[19] The Varṇa and Pada Sphoṭas are only the means to apprehend the Vākya-Sphoṭa, and therefore, they have been taken to be rather insignificant.

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[16] यत्र तु वस् नसादौ प्रकृति प्रत्ययाज्ञानं तत्र पदस्फोटः ।

—वृत्तिदीपिका, पृ० ५०

[17] एवं हरेऽवेत्यादौ पदयोर्विभागेनाज्ञानं तत्र वाक्यस्फोटः । वृत्तिदी० पृ० ५०
"सिद्धान्ते वाक्यजातिस्फोटः"

—वृत्तिदी०, पृ० ५०

[18] "तत्र वाक्यस्फोटो मुख्यः, लोके तस्यैवार्थबोधकत्वात् तेनैवार्थसमाप्तेश्च", वै० सि० ल० मञ्जूषा (रत्नप्रभासहिता), पृ० १३८

[19] पदे न वर्णा विद्यन्ते वर्णेष्ववयवा न च ।
वाक्यात् पदानामत्यन्तं प्रविवेको न कश्चन ।।

—वाक्यपदीय, का० १ का० ७३

The above statements are fully in consistency with Bhartṛhari's remarks.[20]

Mīmāṁsaka's view:

The Mīmāṁsakas accept the Varṇas alone to be the resort of Śakti. But on account of the following reasons Śakti cannot be taken to be subsistent in the Varṇas (letters) only.

Mīmāṁsaka's view criticised:

If one goes to accept the above view a question attracts his attention. This question would be that whether the Śakti would be accepted in each and every letter or in the combination of the letters? If Śakti is accepted in each and every letter then the apprehension of the sense of राम should be possible from the mere letter र and consequently the other letters would become altogether useless. If the Śakti is recognised in the combination of letters then it is not possible, for, the letters are only transient. The fact that the Varṇas are transient has been recognised even by Patañjati.[21]. Patañjali has clearly observed that the speech consists in every Varṇa. In speech two Varṇas can never be pronounced at the same time. A Varṇa is annihilated as soon as it is

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[20] ब्राह्मणार्थो यथा नास्ति कश्चिद् ब्राह्मणकम्बले ।
देवदत्तादयो वाक्ये तथैव स्युरनर्थकाः ।।
यथा सावयवा वर्णा विना वाच्येन केनचित् ।
अर्थवन्तः समुदिता वाक्यमप्येवमिष्यते ।

—वाक्यपदीय, कां० २

[21] ननु को ऽसौ शक्तयाश्रयः शब्दः । न च वर्णाः प्रत्येकं तथा द्वितीयादिवर्णोच्चारणवैयर्थ्यापत्तेः । नापि संहताः उच्चरित-प्रध्वंसित्वेन यौगपद्यासम्भवात् । एकैकवर्णवर्तिनीवाक्, न द्वौ युगपदुच्चारयति गौरिति गकारे यावद् वाग् वर्तते नौकारे न विसर्जनीये । . . . उच्चरित प्रध्वंसित्वात् । उच्चरितप्रध्वंसिनः खल्वपि वर्णाः;

—वैयाकरणमहाभाष्य—अ० १ पा० ४ आ० ४

uttered. Therefore in case of the word गौ when ग is uttered then at that moment there is neither औ nor विसर्ग, and when औ is uttered, there is neither ग nor विसर्ग Similarly when विसर्ग is uttered there is neither ग nor औ. Secondly if Varṇas alone are taken to be the resort of Śakti then the same senses would be apprehended from नदी, दीन, राज, जरा and सर, रस for the above pairs of the words contain the same letters.

Argument in support of the Mīmāṁsaka's theory:

It may be so answered that even at the time of the apprehension of the letters which come after the preceding letters there is the possibility of the apprehension of the preceding letters also in the apprehension of the sense of a word through the relation of coming just after it (technically called as 'Avyavahitottaratva Sambandha). Thus in the word नदी at first there is न, then comes अ, and then afterwards comes द् and finally occurs ई. But in the word दीन we would have द्, first then इ and then we would have न् and lastly अ. On account of these differences there would be the possibility of difference between the sense of नदी and दीन[22]

The above argument put forward in support of Mīmāṁsaka's theory shown to be invalid:

But the above arguments would seem to be rather baseless if attention is paid towards the fact that the Varṇas (letters) are considered to be transient. So at the time of the apprehension of the second letter of a word, there would be no possibility of the subsistence of the first letter, for, the preceding letter would be then found to be already annihilat-

[22] न चोत्तरवर्णप्रत्यक्षकाले संस्कार-वशाद् व्यवहितोत्तरत्वसम्बन्धेन पूर्व-वर्णवत्वं तदुत्तरवर्णे गृह्यते, एवं तदुत्तर-वर्ण-प्रत्यक्ष-काले उपस्थित-विशिष्ट-तत्तद्वर्णवत्वं तत्तदुत्तरवर्णे गृह्यत इति तज्ज्ञानं सुलभम् 'सरो रसः' इत्यादौ विशेषश्च—वै० सि० ल० मञ्जूषा, पृ० २३४

ed (on account of the reason that the Varṇas are thought to be Uccarita Pradhavamsī). So in order to avoid the above difficulties one ought to accept Sphoṭa to be the resort of Śakti instead of accepting the Varṇas (which are Uccarita Pradhvamsi) to be the resort of Śakti. Because Sphoṭa has been considered to be Akhaṇḍa (indivisible), Nityas (eternal or ever lasting), Niravayava (without component parts) and Krama Rahita (without any regular order) and so there would be no fear of its being annihilated.[23]

Jāti Varṇa-Sphoṭa:

The Varṇa (letter) which is pronounced by one, if pronounced by others would remain the same and would have no difference.

Jāti-Pada-Sphoṭa:

The Pada (word) which is pronounced by others if pronounced by us would be altogether the same and will make no difference.

Jāti-Vākya-Sphoṭa:

If a Vākya (sentence), which is pronounced by one, when pronounced by others would remain the same. This very Sphoṭa has been considered to be the most essential and real one.

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[23] पदे न वर्णा विद्यन्ते वर्णेष्ववयवा इव ।
वाक्यात्पदानामत्यन्तं प्रविवेको न कश्चन ।।
स्वभावभेदान्नित्यत्वे ह्रस्वदीर्घप्लुतादिषु ।
प्राकृतस्य ध्वनेः कालः शब्दस्यैत्युपचर्य्यंते ।।
वर्णस्य ग्रहणे हेतुः प्राकृतो ध्वनिरिष्यते ।
वृत्तिभेदे निमित्तत्वं वैकृतः प्रतिपद्यते ।।
नादैराहितबीजायामन्त्येन ध्वनिना सह ।
आवृत्तपरिपाकायां बुद्धौ शब्दोऽवधार्यंते ।।
—वाक्यपदीय, कां० १ श्लो० ७३, ७६, ७७, ८५

Distinction of Sakhaṇḍa and Akhaṇḍa:

Division is possible with regard to *Padas* (words) and Vākyas (sentences) and so the Padas and Vākyas have been accepted as Sakhaṇḍa too. But because a division is not possible in the case of the Varṇas (letters) they have not been regarded as Sakhaṇḍa and Akhaṇḍa.[24]

In order to establish an Abheda, Jāti-Sphoṭa has been propounded. The Jāti-Sphoṭa-Vadins have clearly hinted at the fact that every object has got two phases— (1) real and (2) unreal. The real phase is the Jāti (class) while the unreal is Vyakti (individual). The same fact has been emphasised by Bhartṛhari while he observes:

सत्यासत्यौ तु यौ भागौ प्रतिभावं व्यवस्थितौ।
सत्यं यत्तत्र सा जातिरसत्या व्यक्तयः स्मृताः ॥

Only thee types of Sphoṭa recognised:

Mauni Śrī Kṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa adds that Bopadeva has accepted only three types of Sphoṭa (1) Varṇa-Jāti-Sphoṭa (2) Pada-Jāti-Sphoṭa and (3) Vākya-Jāti-Sphoṭa, for, he recognises the Jāti alone to be denotative (Vācaka).[25]

Variation of Sphoṭa due to the transposition of letters:

The Sphoṭa varies owing to the transposition of the letters. It has been already referred to that if Varṇa (letter)

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[24] 'अनन्ता वर्णा उत्पादविनाशशालिनः, तत्समूहश्च पदं बोधकम्' इति क्षप्तु पदानामानन्त्याच्छक्ति-ग्रहासम्भवेनानुगताकारप्रतीत्या सिद्धायास्तत्तत्पदगत घटपदत्वादिजातेर्वाचिकत्वम् अर्थगतजातेः शक्यत्ववत्। यथा च भ्रमणत्वादि-जातिश्चरमक्रिया-प्रत्यक्ष-व्यंग्या, एवमेषाऽपि चरमवर्णप्रत्यक्षव्यंगया। क्रिया-समुदाये बौद्धे भ्रणत्ववत्,एषाऽपि तादृशेवर्ण समुदाये व्यासज्यवृत्तिः तदुक्तम्— अनेकव्यक्त्यभिव्यंग्या जातिः स्फोट इति स्मृता।

—वाक्यपदीय, कां० १ का० ९४; वै० सि० ल० मञ्जूषा, स्फोट-निरूपणम् पृ० ४८

[25] बोपदेवेन तु शक्यतावच्छेदिका जातिरेव वाचिकेत्युक्तम्....तथा च वर्ण-जातिस्फोटः, पदजातिस्फोटः, वाक्यजातिस्फोट इति तन्मते स्फोटत्रयम्।

—वृत्तिदीपिका, पृ० ४२

would be taken to be the resort of Śakti, there would be the possibility of the apprehension of the same sense from the words which have the same letters. This difficulty might easily be removed if we accept the Sphoṭa theory because the Sphoṭa is Akhaṇḍa and Niravayava. But what is the reason of the variance of Sphoṭa with the transposition of the letters?

The answer is that Sphoṭa is like a crystal and it reflects a word as Dhvani presents it. To be more clear if Dhvani would differ, the Sphoṭa would also differ. In order to understand it let us have the instance of the reflection of moon in the water. In a moonlit night the moon seems to be moving in the water. But really speaking the moon does not swing in the water for, it is only the water which moves. The moon is reflected in the water which is moving and because the reflection of the moon seems to be moving with water so the children think that the moon itself is moving in the water. Similarly, the Sphoṭa seems to differ in nature. The Dhvani gets reflected in Sphoṭa and on account of the difference in Dhvani the Sphoṭa seems to be different, just as when a flower is reflected in a crystal, it is on account of the redness of the flower that the crystal appears to be red.[26]

When Sphoṭa has the reflection of Dhvani and there is no order of this reflection, then the same sense would be apprehended from the words नदी and दीन etc.

To this the answer would be that the Sphota is revealed to be of that very form of which the Dhvani is and consequently the order in which the impression of Dhvani is left, the Sphoṭa is apprehended. Thus the impression of Dhvani of the word नदी is not the same as the impression of दीन on one's mind. Therefore the Sphoṭa of नदी varies with the Sphota of दीन and their senses also differ from one another.

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[26] तस्मादभिन्नकालेषु वर्णवाक्यपदादिषु ।
वृत्तिकालः स्वकालश्च नामभेदाद्विभाव्यते ॥
—वाक्यपदीय, कां० १, का० १०१

Relation between Dhvani and Sphoṭa according to the Grammarians:

Now, one may be in doubt with regard to the fact that there must be some phenomenon responsible for the revealment of this Sphoṭa. This phenomenon is nothing else than the Dhvani of Grammarians. The Grammarians are of opinion that Dhvani suggests the Sphoṭa. Thus according to them there subsists a relation of 'Vyaṅgya' and 'Vyañjaka' between the Sphoṭa and Dhvani.

Patañjali while describing the form of Śabda has called Dhvani to be a Śabda. He clearly defines Śabda to be that type of Dhvani by which the sense of a word is apprehended.

By the way Dhvani described:

Dhvani has been conceived to be of two types (1) Prākṛta and (2) Vaikṛta. The former (Prākṛta Dhvani) is the cause of the apprehension of Śabda Sphoṭa and the latter (Vaikṛta Dhvani) is the cause of the difference of Vṛttis.[27]

In order to understand the above types of Dhvani we ought to first understand the Vṛttis which have been referred to above. The Vṛttis are threefold (1) Drutā (2) Madhyamā and (3) Vilambitā. Drutā Vṛtti is for the practice, (i.e. for repeated readings or for learning by heart). Madhyamā is utilised for general use or recitation. But the Vilambitā Vṛtti is utilised for teaching the pupils.[28] The difference of Vṛttis is due to the difference in Dhvani but it makes no difference in Sphoṭa.[29]

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27 स्फोटस्य ग्रहणे हेतुः प्राकृतो ध्वनिरिष्यते ।
स्थितिभेदे निमित्तत्वं वैकृतः प्रतिपद्यते ॥

28 अभ्यासार्थे द्रुता वृत्तिः प्रयोगार्थे तु मध्यमा ।
शिष्याणामुपदेशार्थं वृत्तिरिष्टा विलम्बिता ॥

—वाक्यपदीय, भावप्रदीपव्याख्यानम्, पृ० ६६

29 शब्दस्योर्ध्वमभिव्यक्तेर्वृत्तिभेदे तु वैकृताः ।
ध्वनयः समुपोहन्ते स्फोटात्मा तैर्न भिद्यते ॥

—वाक्यपदीय, कां० १, का० ७७

The three theories of the Abhivyaktivādins:

There are three theories with regard to the manifestation of 'Śabda' through the *Dhvani*.

(1) Some scholars have been of opinion that only the sense organ is purified by Dhvani. The sense organ is purified by the concentration of mind, but the objects of senses are not purified. So also the sense organ is purified by Dhvani but the 'Śabda' which is the object of the sense organ (*i.e.*, ear) is not purified. Dhvani being produced purifies the ear and the ear being thus purified becomes the cause of hearing the 'Śabda'.

(2) But the others are of opinion that 'Śabda' itself is purified by the Dhvani but the ear is not purified. Just as the object namely the earth, is purified by the water and thereby its smell is to be had by the nose so also the 'Śabda' which is the object of sense -organ is purified by Dhvani. The Śabda being purified by Dhvani becomes the object of the ear.

(3) There are still others who believe that the sense organ as well as the 'Śabda' are purified by Dhvani.[30] The organ of vision (*i.e.*, the eye) is called as 'Prāpyakāri' for, it observes its objects having approached them; just as a person who stands in dark is able to see an object (which is illuminated by light) when the eyes as well as the object are purified (*i.e.*, illumined) by the light, so also the auditory organ (*i.e.*, the ear) as well as the Śabda are purified by Dhvani.[31]

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[30] इन्द्रियस्यैव संस्कारः शब्दस्यैवोभयस्य वा ।
क्रियते ध्वनिभिर्वादास्त्रयोऽभिव्यक्तिवादिनाम ॥
—वाक्यपदीयम् (भावप्रदीपव्याख्यासहितम्), कां० १, का० ७८

[31] चक्षुषः प्राप्यकारित्वे तेजसा तु द्वयोरपि ।
विषयेन्द्रिययोरिष्टः संस्कारः स क्रमोध्वनेः ॥
—वाक्यपदीयम् कां० १, का० ८०

Theories about the apprehension of Dhvani and Sphoṭa:

(1) The first theory is that the Sphoṭa is apprehended along with Dhvani.

(2) The second theory is that only the Sphoṭa is apprehended (without the apprehension of. Dhvani).

(3) The third theory is that Dhvani alone is apprehended without the apprehension of Sphoṭa).[32]

A doubt:

Now a doubt arises that when it has been accepted on all hands that the Sphoṭa is Nitya and that there can be no difference in it, then how the difference of Hrasva, Dīrgha and Pluta is possible in it? But this doubt is at once removed when we consider that this difference is only due to the difference in Dhvani, which is its Abhivyañjaka. To be more clear the difference of Hrasva, Dīrgha and Pluta is apparent on account of the difference of Prākṛta Dhvani.[33] The fact that the Sphoṭa never varies but it is the Dhvani which really differs has been clearly expressed by Patañjali in his Bhāṣya on the Sūtra तपरस्तत्कालस्य He says that having beat a drum with a stick somebody is able to go twenty paces while the sound remains to resound there, the others can go thirty paces, while another person can go forty paces. The increment (of sound) is due to Dhvani but the Sphoṭa remains the same.[34]

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32 स्फोटरूपविभागेन ध्वनेर्ग्रहणमिष्यते ।
कैश्चिद्ध्वनिरसंवेद्यः स्वतन्त्रोऽन्यैः प्रकल्पितः ॥
—वाक्यपदीयम्, कां० १, का० ८१

33 स्फोटस्याभिन्नकालस्य ध्वनिकालानुपातिनः ।
ग्रहणोपाधिभेदेन वृत्तिभेदं प्रचक्षते ॥
—वाक्यपदीय, कां० १, का० ७५

34 शब्दस्योर्ध्वमभिव्यक्तेर्वृत्तिभेदे तु वैकृताः ।
ध्वनयः समुपोहन्ते स्फोटात्मा तैर्न भिद्यते ॥
—वाक्यपदीय, कां० १, का० ७७

Dhvani-Vāda of the poeticians:

Thus it becomes quite evident that Dhvani was conceived of by the Grammarians as a means for the manifestation of Sphoṭa. So it appears that Sphoṭa has been taken to be more important than Dhvani. In other words the Vaiyākaraṇas used the word Dhvani in the sense of a particular type of sound (*i.e.*, an indistinct sound) which is thought to be the Vyañjaka (suggestive) of Sphoṭa.[35] Having the same fact in their minds the poeticians began to use Dhvani in sense for such words or sense which is suggestive of a sense which is more important than that by which it is suggested. The Sphoṭa, which is suggested according to the Vaiyākaraṇas by Dhvani has been accepted to be subsistent in Varṇas, Padas, and Vākyas, so also the suggested sense which has been supposed to be the outcome of Dhvani has been accepted in Varṇa, Pada and Vākya, etc.

Are the propounders of Dhvani theory really indebted to the Grammarians?

The poeticians are really indebted to the Grammarians for their conception of Dhvani. They were inspired by the Dhvani theory of the Grammarians. The Dhvani of the Grammarians was suggestive (of Sphoṭa) so also the Dhvani of the poeticians was imagined to be suggestive of Rasa.[36] The Vaiyākaraṇas have clearly accepted the relation of Vyangya and Vyañjaka between the Sphoṭa and Dhvani, and without

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35 बुधैर्वैयाकरणैः प्रधानीभूतस्फोटरूपव्यंग्य-व्यञ्जकस्य शब्दस्यध्वनिरिति व्यवहारः कृतः"—

—काव्यप्रकाश

36 प्रथमे हि विद्वांसो वैयाकरणाः व्याकरणमूलत्वात् सर्वविद्यानाम्। ते च श्रूयमाणेषु वर्णेषु ध्वनिरिति व्यवहरन्ति। तथैवान्यैस्तन्मतानुसारिभिः सूरिभिः काव्यतत्त्वार्थदर्शिभिर्वाच्यवाचकसम्मिश्रः शब्दात्मा काव्यमिति व्यपदेश्यो व्यञ्जकत्व-साम्याद् ध्वनिरित्युक्तः।"—

—ध्वन्यालोकः, प्रथमोद्योतः

the acceptance of this relation of Vyaṅgya and Vyañjaka, words (Sphoṭa) can never be suggested.

Similarly, according to the poeticians without the acceptance of the relation of Vyaṅgya and Vyañjaka, Rasa (a sentiment) can never be suggested through a poetic piece. Thus, on the ground of the similarity of Vyañjaka, the Dhvani theory was imagined by the poeticians. To be more clear the poeticians, having seen that the Vaiyākaraṇas called Dhvani to be the Śabda which was Vyañjaka of Sphoṭa, began to call that type of Śabda and Artha, which were Vyañjaka of sense, as Dhvani. Vaiyākaraṇas have accepted Dhvani in the case of Śabda only but the poeticians have accepted Dhvani in 'Śabda' as well as in 'Artha'.

Vaiyākaraṇas have recognised Dhvani to be the cause of the manifestation of Sphoṭa which has been identified with Brahma. Similarly the poeticians have accepted Dhvani to be the cause of manifestation of Rasa which has been shown to be identical with Brahma.[37] Ananda-Vardhana first of all propounded the Dhvani theory in systematic form and he has clearly admitted the fact that the poeticians were only the followers of grammarians and they were indebted to grammarians for their idea of Dhvani.[38] Mammaṭa has also expressed his gratitude towards the Vaiyākaraṇas.[39]

Necessity of Vṛtti from the standpoint of the Sphoṭa theory:

The Sanskrit poeticians are the followers of the Vaiyā-

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37 "रसो वै सः"
"रसं ह्येवायं लब्ध्वाऽऽनन्दी भवति"।

38 प्रथमे हि विद्वांसो वैयाकरणाः व्याकरणमूलत्वात्सर्वविद्यानाम्..... वाच्य-वाचकमिश्रः शब्दात्मा काव्यमितिव्यपदेश्योव्यञ्जकत्वसाम्याद्ध्वनिरित्युक्तः।
—ध्वन्यालोकः, प्रथमोद्योतः

39 इदमिति काव्यं बुधैर्वैयाकरणैः प्रधानभूतस्फोटरूपव्यंग्य व्यंजकस्य शब्दस्य ध्वनिरिति व्यवहारः कृतः ततस्तन्मतानुसारिभिरन्यैरपि न्यग्भावितवाच्य-व्यंग्य व्यंजन क्षमस्य शब्दार्थ युगलस्य" —काव्यप्रकाश

karaṇas. The Vaiyākaranas are the exponents of the Sphoṭa theory and so the poeticians also evidently appear to be the adherents of the Sphoṭa theory. Now, a question arises which deserves special notice. We have seen that the poeticians have faith in the Sphoṭa theory and Sphoṭa has been defined as that "through which the sense becomes evident."[40] When the sense becomes evident from Sphoṭa itself then what is the necessity of accepting the doctrine of Vṛtti which also serves the same purpose. A minute's observation will make it clear. Sphoṭa is Śabda. Śabda is of two kinds, one is inarticulate or indiscriminate as that of bamboos, air and drum, etc. (Anabhivyakta) and the other is discriminate (abhivyakta). There are various grades of it, for instance the Śabda of musical instruments, birds शुकसारिका etc.), and of men, which are more distinct respectively.

The Śabda of a young man is no doubt the most distinct and being a word, it is Śabda in its restricted sense.[41] This Śabda which is the latest type of it and is most distinct, is called Sphoṭa. Through Sphoṭa undoubtedly the sense becomes evident, for it is the source of sense.[42] Without it (Sphoṭa) the sense can never exist. Vṛtti is the relation (sambandha) of word with its sense and so the knowledge of it is necessary with regard to the cognition of sense. Thus it is quite evident that the Sphoṭa is the cause or instrument of the cognition of sense, while the Vṛtti is the means of it. So the Vṛtti is necessary to be recognised, for, the Sphoṭa can never serve its purpose.

Śakti shown to be necessary even from the Standpoint of Sphoṭa theory:

Now a question arises that when Sphoṭa theory has been already accepted then where remains the need for accepting

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40 "शब्यते प्रकाश्यतेऽनेनेति शब्दः"।

41 शब्यते प्रकाश्यतेऽनेनेति शब्दः।

42 स्फुटत्यर्थो यस्मादिति स्फोटः" —वृत्तिदीपिका

the Śakti or Abhidhā, for, it is clear from the etymological sense of the word Sphoṭa that from it the sense becomes clear.

To this it may be said that just as a stick without rotation etc., cannot produce the earthen wares, so also the Sphoṭa without the help of the Śakti (*i.e.*, Abhidhā) will not be able to make its sense apprehended. In other words the word itself cannot reveal its sense but it is revealed through its potency. This potency (of words) is determined by the following:—

शक्तिग्रहं व्याकरणोपमानकोषाप्तवाक्याद् व्यवहारतश्च।
वाक्यस्य शेषाद् विवृतेर्वदन्ति सान्निध्यतः सिद्धपदस्य वृद्धाः॥

To be still more clear the Sphoṭa is the word itself and the Abhidhā or Śakti is the means or process through which its sense becomes clear. The above example of a potter's stick and its rotation may be quite appropriate and applicable here. A word may be taken to be similar to a potter's stick which can never produce an earthen-ware unless there is the process of rotation. Thus, it becomes quite evident that a word can never denote its sense without the help of the process of Abhidhā.

THE MĀDHVA CONCEPTION OF AUTHORITY (ĀGAMA)

By Dr. Kailash Narain

The importance of testimony in Indian Philosophy can be realised from the fact that with the single exception of Vaiśesikas all the systems of Hindu thought are unanimous in recognising the function and validity of verbal cognition (Śabda) as a means of correct knowledge. This pramāṇa distinguishes itself from the other means of cognition, *e.g.*, perception and inference by virtue of the fact that in this we get the knowledge of things from relevant sentences uttered by reliable persons and by undrstanding the meaning of their constituent clauses and words. The validity of knowledge cognised through the Śabda-pramāṇa, therefore, depends, firstly, on the right understanding of the meaning of words and sentences and, secondly, on the infallibility of persons who utter them. Though evidences of much heated controversy over the structure of 'sentence' and its interpretation are available in the works of the different systems of Indian Philosophy yet because they are hardly of any philosophical value their discussion at this place may not be of any useful purpose. The next question of the infallibility of persons or āptatva, as it is called, on which the validity of testimony or authority ultimately depends is of considerable philosophical importance because of the supremacy which it has rightly deserved at the hands of certain schools of Indian Philosophy considering it as the only means of comprehending the true nature of the ultimate Reality and, therefore, demands our special attention.

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[1] The denial of testimony in the Vaiśeṣika System is probably a later development which is hardly corroborated by the Vaiśeṣika-Sūtras which tacitly admit the validity of scriptures on its own authority. Dasgupta—History of Indian Philosophy Vol. I. p. 355.

Before actually undertaking a discussion on the nature of Āptatva and the conditions determining it, it may be expedient to mention here that Śabda-pramāṇa (and consequently Āptatva also) may be categorised on the lines indicated by Kumārila and dittoed by the followers of Madhva, into two classes, *viz.*, (*i*) Pauruṣeya[2] or Personal and (*ii*) Apauruṣeya[3] or Impersonal. In the former case, *viz.*, Pauruṣeya are included all words spoken by trustworthy personal beings and in the latter, *viz.*, Apauruṣeya only the words of Veda or Revelation, whose authority is not drawn from any human being, are to be counted. As the testimony of Vedas either flows out of the omniscience of their Divine Creator, as in Nyāya, or from the eternality of the Vedas themselves as upheld by the Mīmāṁsakas the problem of Āptatva pertains chiefly to the class of Śabda-pramāṇa known as Pauruṣeya or what is called as 'personal authority'.

Personal Authority.

In this connection two questions are, however, pressing and important; firstly, what are the grounds on which the validity of testimony as a source of knowledge is to be established and, secondly, what are the conditions that warrant the infallibility of 'Authority'. The reply to both of them from the various systems of Indian thought has been more or less similar in as much as they assert that the very nature of the infallibility of 'testimony' carries with it the validity of the 'cognition' produced by it. As a matter of fact the knowledge generated through testimony in an ignorant person is always acquired by the 'authority' either through perception or inference and, hence, the validity of testiony as a pramāṇa is to be guaranteed on the strength of the validity of perception

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[2] आगमो द्विविधः। अपौरुषेयः पौरुषेयश्च । तत्रापौरुषेयः ऋगादिमदागमः। पौरुषेयो भारतादिसदागमः

(Pramāṇa Candrikā in Mādhva Logic p. 161).

[3] Madhva Siddhānta-Sāra, Āgama Prakaraṇa.

and inference. The same idea is expressed in Yoga-bhāṣya[4] when it defines 'Āgama-pramāṇa' as a function of mind which is produced when a trusted person who has either perceived or inferred something speaks it out to another person for the purpose of communicating 'knowledge' to him. Thus the validity of testimony really depends on the infallibility of the 'authority' either in the acquisition of correct knowledge or in imparting it to a second person which is indicative of the importance of the other question regarding the conditions that warrant the certitude of 'authority'.

To begin with the Mādhva analysis of the conditions governing the certitude and infallibility of 'authority' we may mention that Jayatirtha in his *Nyāya Sudhā*[5] defines "authority" as one who has the correct knowledge of the topic in question, has no intension to deceive, has a desire to speak out the truth and has sense organs in perfect order. Therefore according to Madhvaits, possession of the above four requisites is really what constitutes the essential and unavoidable condition for the infallibility of "authority". Vijñāna-Bhikṣu[6] too in his *Yoga-Vārttika* defines Āptatva as the absence of 'defects', *viz.*, delusion, inattentiveness, the intention of deceiving and the want of the proper functioning of sense-organs which bear a close resemblance to the Mādhva constituents of Āptatva. It is an interesting point worthy of our consideration here that the conditions regarded as essential for a person in becoming an 'authority' are more or less similar in all the systems of Hindu Thought and as such they do not involve any controversy. The presence of these conditions in any individual and the absence of attachment and hatred in worldly affairs (rāga) certify to his authority as

[4] Yoga-bhāsya, p. 31-32.

[5] यत्र विषये निर्दोषः तत्राप्तः। विवक्षितार्थतत्त्वज्ञानमविप्रलिप्साकरणपाटवं विवक्षा चेतीयमाप्तिः।

(*Nyāqa Sudhā* p. 5).

[6] भ्रमप्रमादविप्रलिप्साकरणपाटवादिदोषरहितेन।

(*Yoga-Vārttika*, p. 31.

regards matters divine and spiritual and only by observing these signs one can easily rely, without any mental reservation, on the validity of his testimony.

But we may ask here: What is the proof that a man is really free from the various defects of attachment, hatred, perversion, etc., and that he invariably possesses the correct knowledge of spiritual principles in whose absence the reliance on his 'authority' will be open to doubt and subject to revision? We may suggest here in order to remove this doubt that in every system of Indian Philosophy and especially in Sāṁkhya-Yoga and Vedānta, the freedom from attachment, etc., that are the products of rajas, is associated with the corresponding increase of the sattva attribute which invariably produces the true knowledge of Reality The absence of 'defects', *viz.*, attachment, delusion, etc., is, therefore, invariably connected with the true knowledge of spiritual principles and, hence the authority of the person free from all such defects is indubitable and inevitably certain.

Impersonal Authority (*Apauruṣeyatva of Veda*).

Till now we have expressed our deliberations on the uestion of the authenticity of Personal Authority and now e next point worthy of our consideration is the authority of Vedas to whom all the systems of Hindu Thought invariably owe their allegiance. The absolute validity of Vedic Injunctions and Knowledge imparted by them has been variously explained by the different thinkers of Hindu Thought. The Naiyāyikas[7] uphold the view that because the Vedic sentences, though spoken by an infallible-authority, are as much sentences as uttered by Kālidāsa or any other personality they should be considered as due to some person who creates and utters them. Moreover, as the Nyāya philosopher would argue, the destructive character of all words and sounds would lead to the assumption that the Vedas too are the creations

[7] *Nyāya-Kusumānjali,* Stabaka V, p. 104 to 107.

of some personality and are therefore, called 'Pauruṣeya'. The testimony of Vedas has been ascertained in the Nyāya system by contending that they have been created by the Omniscient Lord who by assuming a phantasmal body (nirmāṇa-kāya[8]) revealed the Veda for the benefit of His devotees.

The Mīmāṁsakas on the other hand have challenged the Nyāya standpoint as reckless imaginings that are dangerous to the very cause of the unblemished authority of the Vedas, a point which has got an able support and exposition later on in the philosophers of the Mādhva School; the Vedas according to them are eternal[9] in themselves and have not been created by any agency either human or Divine. The 'Word' along with its denotation is never subject to any destruction and, hence, requires an agency only for its manifestation and not 'Creation'. Thus the Mīmāṁsakas who are unable to find any satisfactory reason for admitting the existence of a Divine Personality, or God expound the validity of the Vedas by advocating the doctrine of Its eternality and immutability. The Vedas according to this system are Apauruṣeya or Impersonal and not Pauruṣeya as in Nyāya.

The Madhvaites who too recognise the superior validity of testimony and its sole importance as a means of knowledge of transcendent realities are unanimous and unflinching in their belief that the apauruṣeyatva of Vedas is a precedent condition of their Self-validity. Vādiraja, the author of *Yuktimallikā* while denouncing the idea of 'personal authority' contends that even the Nyāya concept of the Omniscient Lord[10] as the creator of Vedas and the instructor of true knowledge is not free from doubts regarding its validity because there is no certainty that He may not deceive mankind by false statements. Buddha himself was an incarnation of God and yet he deceived the people by his false

[8] The Conception of Matter p. 389.

[9] Pūrva Mīnāṁsā and its sources p. 143 and p. 150 to 153.

[10] *Yuktimallikā*, p. 7.

teachings. Moreover, if we ask the Nyāya philosopher as to how Īśvara who is without any body can create the Veda he may reply that just as the paramāṇus of water create dvyaṇukas the Lord too creates the Vedas and speaks it out in the beginning of Creation. But the Mādhva philosopher would ask that when it is essential that words should be ejaculated by the movement of lips which in its turn presupposes the existence of physical organism[11] of the speaker how is it that Īśvara who has no physical organism,—because prior to creation there was complete absence of physical elements—can instruct the Veda; according to him it would be illogical on the part of Naiyāyikas to uphold the doctrine of the instruction of Veda by Īśvara while actually disregarding the concept of His possessing a body. Further, tradition too does not ascribe any author to the Vedas. Hence 'Vedas', according to Madhvaites, are independent and eternal and are not the creations of any personality either human or divine.

Though, in the Mādhva philosophy Īśvara is neither the Creator nor the Speaker of Veda—Speaker in the sense that the Vedas derive their existence from the speech of Īśvara yet He is the first exponent of the Śrutis who gives to words which originally were in a confused and hotch-potch state wihtout any system, an order in succession alloting[12] them priority and posteriority through the order of His own Buddhi. Just as the ghaṭa and maṭha through their limitations or upādhis create ghaṭākāśa and maṭhākāśa in the eternal ākāśa (ether) the eternal Buddhi of Īśvara creates order in eternal though disordered words of 'Veda'.

Another important and interesting feature of the Mādhva philisophy of Veda and Its vaidity is the theory of the eternal order of the words[13] of Veda or Varṇakrama as it is called. But how can the Mādhva philosophers really explain the eternal character of the Word-order which, not-

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 8.

[12] स वक्ताऽनादिनित्यसिद्धबुद्धिक्रमात्क्रमं । (*Yuktimallikā*, p. 9).

[13] *Yuktimallikā*, p. 11.

withstanding the eternal nature of the 'Words' themselves, claims a beginning in time on account of the system that is given to them by Īśvara? To this Vādirāja the author of *Yuktimallikā* replies that just as on account of the eternal (nitya) nature of Īśvara the Jīvātman which is His reflection is also eternal (nitya), similarly by virtue of the eternal nature of Lord's Buddhi we can establish the eternal character of Word-order or Varṇakrama. The priority of words is determined by the priority of their acquisition by the Divine Mind. The word which occurs first to Īśvara's Mind obtains priority whereas that which occurs later on becomes posterior. Thus the succession and order of words which in their own nature are eternal (nitya) and without any relationship or system is governed by the order of their presentation to Īśvara's Mind. According to the Mādhva philosopher there is definitely a succession in Lord's cognition, affection and volition and this becomes upādhi for determining the order of Vedic-words. To Vādirāja, the author of *Yuktimallikā*, the Vedic-word which has a prior revelation to Lord's knowledge acquires a prior position whereas that which occurs to Him later on becomes posterior. Just as in the Nyāya System the order of Vedic-words in one particular aeon (kalpa) is determined by the Lord's Buddhi, similarly in the Mādhva system also the Varṇakrama in the beginning of each aeon is determined by the eternal Intellect of Īśvara. In this way the followers of Mādhva have endeavoured to defend the eternal character of Veda or Śruti which, as they think, has flown down to this age through the old traditional[14] schools The Śruti never fails to demonstrate its object correctly and in doing so it is free from the defects of individual personalities.

Validity of Smṛtis.

Generally amongst the orthodox thinkers there is no uncertainty regarding the validity of Smṛtis though there is

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 7.

much heated discussion as to which of the Smṛtis should be considered valid. Mādhva[15] too like Śaṁkara contends that the Smṛtis derive their validity from the Śrutis whose contents they explain and elaborate. But all Smṛtis are not valid and correct representations of the teachings of Vedas because besides their apparent antagonism, for example, as in the case of the Vaiṣṇava and Pāśupata Smṛtis, they being composed and dependent on the memories of their human authors are likely to be affected by the defects of false knowledge and misrepresentations that are not unlikely for persons of limited intelligence. Therefore, it has been contended by Mādhva, like Śaṁkara, that only those Smṛtis should be regarded as valid and infallible authorities which are in consonance with the teachings of Śrutis. This principle has been the basis for Mādhva in his denunciation[16] of the Pāśupata Smṛtis and acceptance of Mahābhārata as a valid Smṛti.

In this connection we may make a mention of an interesting aspect of the Mādhva conception of Smṛtis. While referring to the testimony of *Pāñcarātra-Smṛtis* both Jaya[17] Tīrtha and Vādirāja[18] have upheld that they are the creations of God. Though the nature of Smṛtis according to Mādhva philosopher is non-eternal yet because the Pāñcarātra is a work of Viṣṇu it is no inferior in testimony to Veda.

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[15] Tattvaprakāśikā, p. 79.

[16] श्रुतिविरोधेन स्मृतीनां एव अप्रामाण्याख्य दोषप्रसंगात ।

(Tattvaprakāśikā, p. 79).

[17] Tattvaprakāśikā, p. 79.

[18] Yuktimallikā, p. 14.

NOTE ON THE PRĀMĀṆYAVĀDA OF THE NYĀYA SCHOOL

By DR. V. VARADACHARI

The question of the validity of the means of proof lies at the root of the whole theory of the means of proof. When one sees an object, *e.g.*, jar, the cognition is produced in him in the form 'this is a jar', and in the next moment he gets the apperception (*anuvyavasāya*) in the form 'I see the jar'. When a cognition like this arises, the means of proof (*pramāṇa*), which produces this cognition shall be held to be valid, if it does not fail to produce the correct cognition, even in a single case. When a cognition rises, it is cognised only as a cognition, and not as valid or otherwise.

Vide:—तंस्माज्ज्ञानं गृह्यत तवेत्येत्र न यदि तु दैवादृगृदते तदा जानामीत्येव, न तु प्रमाणमप्रमाणं वेत्यर्थः।[1]

In the majority of cases, the correct cognition will be produced but there is no certainty that there will not be a case where the correct knowledge is not produced. For instance, a man may see from a distance a shining thing on the ground. He may get the cognition of silver from it, may get near that and take it up. Then the thing would be found to be nacre. Here the first cognition 'this is silver' is not proved to be correct. Hence the need to find whether a means of proof is correct or not.

There is divergence of opinion among the different systems of Indian philosophy as to how this validity of the means of proof is ascertained. Both validity and invalidity of a means of proof are made out intrinsically according to the Sānkhya system, extrinsically according to the Nyāya system, validity is made out intrinsically and invalidity extrinsically according to the Mīmāmsaka system and validity is made out

[1] *Tātparyapariśuddhi*, p. 49.

extrinsictlly and invalidity intrinsically according to the Buddhists. Extrinsic validity of a cognition consists in the operation of factors external to the cognition in the declaration of it. The reverse is the case with intrinsic validity. The same explanation holds good for invalidity. The *Nyāya* approach to this can be set forth thus. When a cognition is produced about an object, a desire is aroused in the knower for the object. He then strives to get it and in this attempt, if he succeeds, then the means of proof, which produced the cognition of this object, is held to be valid, otherwise it is held invalid. As successful activity and unsuccessful activity, which are external to the cognition, are responsible for the declaration of validity and invalidity respectively of the cognition, it is held that validity and invalidity of a means of proof are made out extrinsically. In this connection, the writers on the *Nyāya* cite the following passage of the Nyāyabhāṣya. प्रमाणतोऽर्थप्रतिपत्तौ प्रवृत्तिसामर्थ्यादर्थवत्प्रमाणम् ।[2]

This is taken to be in defence of the concept of extrinsic validity of the *Nyāya* system, though there is nothing in the passage to support this. While commenting on this passage Uddyotakara[3] offers the following three remarks:—1. The word *pramāṇa* may be used with reference to a valid means of proof as well as with reference to an invalid one. What appears like a means of proof may be taken for a valid one. The passage in the Bhāṣya means that in order to distinguish the valid means of proof from the invalid one, one has to take note of the successful activity arising from the knowledge got from it. 2. Both the knowledge of the thing and activity are effective and serve the purpose by being successful due to the valid means of proof. 3. Among the knowable — (object), agent, result and means of proof, the means of proof is a dominant factor, as no knowledge would rise without it. The basis for the concept of extrinsic validity is hinted in the first

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[2] *Nyāyavhāṣya,* Pp. 1 and 2.

[3] *Nyāyavārhikā,* Pp. 3 and 4.

two remarks made by Uddyotakara but these remarks including the third one are no better than the passage in the Bhāṣya in giving information about extrinsic validity.

It is Vācaspatimiśra who was the earliest among the commentators on the Nyāyavārtika and *Sūtra* to begin a discussion on the topic of validity as extrinsic or intrinsic. Udayana followed Vācaspatimiśra by lending support to his views. Jayantabhaṭṭa, who was earlier to Vācaspatimiśra, discusses this topic in his Nyāyamañjarī.

Though the Naiyāyikas admitted only extrinsic validity for the means of proof, they had to recognise validity of the intrinsic kind in the cases of appreception (*anuvyavasāya*) and *dharmīgrāhakapramāṇa*. If validity in these two cases is also to be ascertained extrinsically, then those factors which determine their validity would in themselves require something else to have their validity declared. The admission of such a position would lead to infinite regress. The Naiyāyikas are therefore constrained to stop at these stages and recognise intrinsic validity. One who gets the apperception 'I see this' cannot be wrong in having this apprehension.

Vide:—न ह्यजानन्नपि कश्चिज्जानामीत्यनुव्यवस्येत्, न च शुक्तिकाकारं ज्ञानं रजतं जानामीति स्यादिति।[4]

So also, the cognition arising about a *dharmin* cannot be wrong, as it rises from the features possessed by the *dharmin*. If this were to be suspected and extraneous factors are to be employed for testing its validity, then even this suspicion cannot stand. Erroneous cognition must rise only on the basis of a *dharmin*. When the features (dharma) are non-erroneous, the dharmin cannot be presented as erroneous.

Vide:—बाह्याभ्यन्तरं धर्मिमात्रगोचरमपि प्रत्यक्षं स्वत एव प्रमाणं विभ्रमस्यापि निरालम्बनस्य कचिदनुपपत्तेरिति।[5]

One important feature that is noticeable while ascertaining the validity or otherwise of the means of proof is that the

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[4] *Tātparyapariśuddhi*, p. 117.
[5] *Tātparyapariśuddhi*, p. 118.

inferential mode is adopted for the purpose. It is in this connection that one comes across the statement of Vācaspatimiśra in the Tātparyaṭīkā to the effect that validity of inference and analogy (*upamāna*) is ascertained intrinsically. This sounds strange, since according to *Nyāya* tradition, validity and invalidity are made out extrinsically. If the inferential process is to have its validity declared extrinsically, then it could not be of any use for establishing validity of other means of proof. The means, which has to make out inference as valid, would in itself require another's aid. This would result in infinite regress. Hence Vācaspatimiśra holds that inference has its validity declared intrinsically.

When the question of validity is discussed, what is required to be found out at the outset is whether there is no absence of deviation (*avyabhicāra*). Once this is ascertained, it is easy to conclude that validity is made out. In the case of inference, there rises no room for the doubt regarding the middle term having no absence of deviation. The inferential cognition rises determining the exact nature of the object. The middle term is found to belong to a species of middle terms which have not produced erroneous results.

Vide:—अत एव गृहीताव्यभिचारलिंगसमुत्थं निष्कम्पमुत्पद्यते ज्ञानम् ।[6]

Inference, as a means of proof, has to serve two purposes, namely, invariable concomitance and production of valid knowledge. It requires only the determination of invariable concomitance when its object is to be determined. Here its validity is not required to be determined. When the inferential process is adopted to determine the validity of other means of proof, invariable concomitance in the process is to be declared valid. As the middle term is valid in itself, doubt does not rise then and so the inferential process, being in itself valid, declares the validity of other means of proof.[7] Sometimes doubt may rise even in the case of inference regarding constancy of the nature of invariable concomitance. It

[6] *Tātparyaṭīkā*, p. 9.

[7] *Tātparyapariśuddhi*, p. 58.

is removed by those means of proof which apprehend invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) and the nature of the subject (*pakṣadharmatā*). The means of proof meant here is apperception (*anuvyavasāya*).

Vide:—द्विविधा हि व्यभिचारशंका कारणतः स्वरूपतश्च । सा च व्याप्तिपक्षधर्मत्वग्राहकैरेव प्रमाणैरपनीयते इति भवति निरस्तसमस्तव्यभिचारशंकमनुमितिज्ञानं तस्यैवम्भूतस्य स्वत एव प्रामाण्यं निश्चीयत इति शेषः।[8]

On this, Vardhamāna remarks:—स्वत एवेति। स्वग्राहकानुव्यवसायादेवेत्यर्थः। नहि सल्लिंगपरामर्शजानुमितिराभासी भवतीत्यर्थ।[9]

Once this doubt is removed, nothing shall prevent inference from becoming valid. In the cases of other means of proof, successful activity, which is to declare their validity, becomes the middle term in the inferential process which is adopted to prove their validity. This middle term is valid in itself and hence inference is intrinsically valid.

Vide:— अनुमानस्य तु प्रवृत्तिसामर्थ्यलिंगजन्मनाऽन्यस्य वा निरस्तसमस्तव्यभिचारशंकस्य स्वत एव प्रामाण्यमनुमेयाव्यभिचारिलिंगसमुत्थत्वात्।[10]

Udayana refers to this difference of opinion held by the writers on Nyāya regarding validity.

Vide:— प्रामाण्यनिश्चयस्तु तस्यापि परत एवेति न्यायसंप्रदायः। इत एव विशेषात्तादृशस्य स्वत एवेति तात्पर्याचार्याः।[11]

Apperception is valid in itself. If its validity is questioned, then it has to be decided only extrinsically. This is what the Nyāya writers have been recognising as their tradition. Vācaspatimiśra however holds that even apperception has its validity determined intrinsically, because the process of this determination is inference. Inference has got the distinctive mark which other means of proof do not possess. It consists in apperception declaring inference to be valid, in as much as the knowledge of the pervader is invariably associated with the subject which has the pervaded.[12]

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[8] *Tātparyapariśuddhi*, p. 112.
[9] *Nyāyanibandhaprakāśa*, p. 112.
[10] *Tatparyaṭīkā*, p. 9.
[11] *Ātmatattvaviveka*, pp. 697—698.
[11] *Ātmatattvaviveka*, pp. 697—698.
[12] Bhagīratha Ṭhakkura's commentary on the *Ātmatattvaviveka*.

Vāçaspatimiśra adds that analogy also has its validity determined intrinsically. *Vide*:— एतेनोपमानं°याख्यातम्।[13]. When the cognition of the meaning of the assimilative proposition and the cognition of similarity are declared to be valid, analogy cannot become erroneous. Hence, analogy must be considered to be intrinsically valid.[14]

Udayana defends Vācaspatimiśra's view and shows that the extrinsic method can also be adopted but the intrisic one is easier for application.

Vide:—यद्यपि चानुमानोपमानानुव्यवसायधर्मिज्ञानानामपि प्रामाण्यं परतोऽपि शक्यग्रहमेव, सन्ति हि तत्र यथायोगं लिंगसादृश्यज्ञानसमुत्थत्वादीनि तज्जातीयत्व-लिंगानि, तथापि कोष्ठगत्या स्वत एव प्रामाण्यग्रहोऽत्र सुकर इति स एव दर्शितः।[15]

However, when the validity of these is questioned, the extrinsic method will have to be adopted.

Vide:—विप्रतिपन्नं तु परत एव साधनीयं तदिति परमार्थं।[16]

In the case of perception, it is not known whether the particular sense organ has operated correctly or not and whether the object is corectly presented in the cognition or not. The cognition is produced from the object which merely exists. Its correct presentation is to be ascertained by some other factor and so extrinsic validity is to be adopted here.

Vide:—प्रत्यक्षज्ञानमर्थादुत्पद्यमानमपि न गृहीताव्यभिचारादपि तु सत्तामात्रेणावस्थितात्। न च कारणान्तराण्यपीन्द्रियादीनि अस्यार्थेन गृहीताव्यभिचाराणि न वार्थेनाव्यभिचाराणि।[17]

Similarly, the verbal cognition, which rises in the absence of the object, cannot have its validity declared intrinsically. Here there is no constancy of the relation between a word and its sense, which is required for the intrinsic mode of

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[13] *Tātparyaṭikā*, p. 9.

[14] *Tātparyapariśuddhi*, p. 119.

[15] *Tātparyapariśuddhi*, pp. 119-120.

[16] *Tātparyapariśuddhi*, pp. 119-120.

[17] *Tātparyaṭikā*, p. 9.

declaring validity. The sense of the passage is made known merely through the knowledge of convention.

Vide:—शाब्दं तु ज्ञानं नार्थादुत्पद्यते तदभावे सति शब्दे भावात्। नापि लिंगस्येव शब्दस्यार्थाव्यभिचारः किंतु संकेतग्रहणमात्रात्पदार्थप्रत्यायनेन वाक्यार्थमवगमयति शब्दः। [18]

Hence, validity in the case of verbal testimony is made out extrinsically.

This differential treatment given by Vācaspatimiśra to the means of proof in regard to their validity and invalidity was known to all later writers on Nyāya like Gaṅgeśa, Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, Bhagīratha Ṭhakkura and others. This is explained away by them on the ground that no suspicion rises in these cases regarding invalidity, as their validity is invariably ascertained through apperception. In fact, even in such cases where extrinsic validity is to be recognised, it is necessary to find out whether there is no deviation and this is done by extraneous factors is these cases.[19] It seems therefore that while all the writers both early and late, maintained extrinsic validity even for apperception and so for inference as well, Vācaspatimiśra, intending to avoid infinite regress in the cases of apperception inference and others, maintained that validity is to be made out intrinsically in these cases. Udayana has explained this in the *Ātmatattvaviveka*.[20]

Vedāntadeśika makes a reference to Vācaspatimiśra's treatment of validity and the remark of Udayana on it. As a true follower of Vācaspatimiśra, as is evident from the benedictory stanza to his Tātparyapariśuddhi,

मातः सरस्वति पुनः पुनरेष नत्वा
बद्धाञ्जलिः किमपि विज्ञपयाम्यवेहि।
वाक्यनसोर्मम तथा भव सावधाना
वाचस्पतेर्वचसि न स्खलतो यथैते॥[21]

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[18] *Tātparyaṭīkā*, p. 9.

[19] *Tattvacintāmaṇi*—Pratyakṣa, pp. 383-384.

[20] *Nyāyamuktāvali* of Aparārka, a commentary on Bhāsarvajña's *Nyāyasāra*. MS. of Madras Govt. oriental MSS. Library R. No. 3262, p. 99.

[21] *Vedāntadeśika* reads the last line alone.

he must therefore admit only intrinsic validity.[22] Vedāntadeśika has interpreted very ably the intention of Udayana's arguments in favour of extrinsic validity. Udayana's intention is to establish God's existence basing his arguments on the authority of the Vedas which are shown to be God's composition.

Vide:—ईश्वरानुमानानन्यथासिद्धिपरिहाराय च परतः प्रामाण्यं न्यायकुसुमांजलौ समर्थ्यते।[23]

In his Tattvapradīpikā, Citsukha makes a reference to Vācaspatimiśra's treatment of validity. He quotes the passage from the Tātparyaṭīkā and argues that the Naiyāyikas have no alternative but to admit intrinsic validity for the means of proof.[24]

Notwithstanding Vācaspatimiśra's attempt to admit the intrinsic mode in some cases, the writers of Nyāya chose to stick to the traditional view of the system in favour of the extrinsic mode for all means of proof. The stubborn attitude of the later writers in maintaining the extrinsic method shows only their apathy to admit even partially what the Mīmāmsakas have been holding. Their willingness to agree to the adoption of the extrinsic method even in the case of apperception, if it becomes necessary, is a weak point in their argument. The saving clause which Vācaspatimiśra supplied to avert defeat at the hands of the opponents has been thrown away by the later writers to the winds and the defect of infinite regress which the Mīmāmsakas and the Vedāntins point out militates against their theory of extrinsic validity. Not only have these writers ignored Vācaspatimiśra's help in this direction but have been blindly following the path of tradition even after the defects are pointed out therein by their opponents.

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[22] *Seśvaramīmāmsā,* 1—1—5.

[23] *Nyāyapariśuddhi,* p. 380.

[24] *Tattvapradīpika,* pp. 125-126.

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A CRITICAL SURVEY OF INDIAN AESTHETICS

By Shri H. L. Sharma

(*Continued from* Vol. XVII—Pts. 1-2)

VIII. The Nature of Ugly

The Nature of the Ugly

What is 'ugly' in art? and what interest does it serve in our experience of 'Beauty'? are two questions which we seek to answer.

Vāmana[1] defines 'Ugly' as the perversion of excellences. An excellence (guṇa) is a device for heightening the aesthetic effect of a work of art. Ugliness results from a failure of the art-creation in shooting at the mark. Vāmana represents the negative approach to the problem of ugly, and he has been criticized unsparingly by several authors.[2] It is said, for instance, that a poetic piece may have all the excellences and yet it may be ugly.[3] Mammaṭa and his commentators, therefore, insist on the positive nature of it. Mammaṭa defines it: "Ugly is destruction of the central meaning in a work of art. The central meaning is Rasa. The material constituent of art in so far as it is the substratum of central meaning can also be ugly."[4] This definition is positive error of commission. Beauty in art is a unique experience in which the inner life of spirit flows rhythmically. The rhythmic flow of life accentuated with emotion is Rasa. Whenever there are some positive hindrances in the realization of a Rasa-state we have an experience of ugly.

Mammaṭa uses the word 'hati', meaning 'destruction' in defining ugly. This has given rise to a lively discussion, because it is capable of conveying a negative sense also. If destruction of Rasa means ugly, we find that sometimes an ugly piece may contain Rasa.[5] 'Hati' therefore should mean

Apakarṣa (regression). The meanings of the word 'Apakarṣa' are two: 1. There are two forms of experiences[6]: One is first-hand and direct (Pratyakṣa) and the other second-hand, indirect and mediate (Parokṣa). The verbal experience is generally mediate and second-hand. In poetic art, we should go beyond the words to the realization of aesthetic import. But the aesthetic meaning should be immediately grasped, so that the words in literary art are charged with a special commission: They are not only not to destroy the immediacy and intimacy of aesthetic effect, but must positively enhance it. Wherever the material constituents—the words in a literary art—do not discharge their function of initiating and intensifying Rasa experience we have an experience of ugliness. In fine, ugliness is regarded as anything which hinders the process of Rasa realization.[7]

Mammaṭa has elaborated on the hinderances to beauty-experience. They are primarily applicable to literary forms of art, yet, *mutatis mutandis*, they characterize every art. These hindrances are, firstly, those that concern the media of arts, the words in literary arts. Secondly, they belong to the primary meanings of the words, and, thirdly to the development of Rasa-experience. We consider below some of them in order.

The first great hindrance to beauty-experience is called Śrutikaṭu by Mammaṭa. Its literal meaning is 'bitter to hear'. A literary art like poetry has roots in words.[8] If words are to serve the office of medium of poetic emotion, they must be free from jar or jolt. This is true of arts. In a musical symphony, no note should, by overemphasis, break the steadily growing harmony. In the same way, colour-harmony should be carefully preserved in painting and so on. The total harmonious effect depends on each individual constituent, which should, therefore, be blended with the whole under the law of harmony. The second hindrance is deviation from proper grammatical form (च्युत-संस्कृति)

Grammar is the body of rules governing the syntax in a language, be it the language of words, colours or movements. The rules have to be conscientiously observed, keeping in view the artistic traditions. The other typical obstructions in the way of harmonious growth are weakness (असमर्थ) archaism (निहतार्थ) unbecomingness (अनुचितार्थ) indecency (अश्लील) doubtful (संदिग्ध)technical(अप्रतीत) vulgar (ग्राम्य) etc. The others are 'too difficult' (कष्ट) subordination of the central meaning(अविमृष्टविधेयांश) suggestive of an inimical sense विरुद्ध मतिकृत A survey of these hindrances reveals that beauty-experience is completely harmonious—completely, in the sense that any kind of jarring from any side will not be conducive to it. Beauty-sense is perfect when our sense of moral qualities, sense of social decency etc. are satisfied. The obstructive conditions laid down above are social, moral as well as psycho-aesthetic, thus indicating that beauty-experience is not complete in itself.

Mammaṭa regards 'composition' to be of great importance to art. Every small departure from the rules of composition gives rise to some form of ugliness. Some of these departures which he has detailed are such as improper metre हतवृत्त use of discordant words etc. (प्रतिकूल वर्ण) irregularity of composition (पतत्प्रकर्ष) interruption (भग्न प्रक्रम)etc. The rules of composition which these hindrances indicate are the conditions of external harmony.

The second series of obstructions to beauty-experience concerns the primary meaning (Artha), which serves as the basis of aesthetic experience. The meaning may be undeveloped अपुष्ट difficult (कष्ट) contradictory (व्याहत) repeated (पुनरुक्त) vulgar (ग्राम्य doubtful (संदिग्ध) unreasonable (निर्हेतु) stale (अनवीकृत) etc. Besides these there are forms of ugliness which relate to Rasa-experience itself. Ānanda has given their exposition under six laws: (1) The first relates to Aesthetic causation. If in the sum-total of Rasa excitants, there are included those which really belong to the hostile emotion, then some sort of

ugliness results. (2) Emotion of beauty being delicate cannot bear to be overlaid with long descriptions however relevant may they be to it. (3) Cutting short of an emotion before it reaches the climax, or, (4) its emergence at a time when it is not called for, are also hindrances to Rasa development. (5) Ānanda gives us the fifth law which means 'kindling of the emotion repeatedly when the climax has been reached'. This overdoing with an emotion has a marring effect on beauty-sense. (6) The last one he mentions as 'the unsuitability of composition'.

Nearly all authors have mentioned these forms of ugliness. Whenever there is jarring or jolting of any kind of the emotional development, there is ugliness. Jagannātha mentions one form of it, not dealt with by others. This relates to the principle of Sonus (Dhvani) and the mode of artistic expression. The natural idiom is Dhvani or expression in Art. If the aesthetic meaning of a work is too simple to require any exercise of imagination so that there is no chance left for 'chewing' (carvaṇa), it has no charm for us. It is known as Vācyikaraṇa or oversimplication. Jagannātha has coined for it a new term 'Vamana',[10] meaning 'Vomitting'. If the entire meaning of a work of art lies on the surface, it is as disgusting as to see a man vomit. The artistic meaning is 'anagogic' and its charm increases as it is concealed from the vulgar view. The greatness of artistic creation lies in discovering the point at which revealment of beauty and its concealment behind the symbols and material constituents can balance each other. Ānanda[11] points out two sources of ugliness in Art. One is lack of proper technique and apperceptive mass (अव्युत्पत्ति)and the other is lack of poetic energy अशक्ति Though not learning, yet a large amount of rich and varied experiences, big reserves of relevant knowledge are needed to form a background for subconscious creative activity. The creative energy, we call genius, works out new patterns and rhythms from the preserves of past experiences and our living

impacts on the environments. Vyutpatti[12] means the large organized experience which the artist capitalizes for creative work. But the main factor which is responsible for creation of beauty in Art is Śakti or the poetic energy. The transformation of knowledge-funds into rich creative symbols depends upon expressive energy which is the point of difference between the artist and the non-artist. Therefore, Ānanda says that ugliness in art due to lack of relevant knowledge may be remedied by virtue of creative energy, yet the ugliness caused by the lack of energy cannot be overcome at all.[13]

We close this account by asking one question. What is the function of ugliness as a form of value? The same question is asked in Ethics and Logic where we have to discuss the role of 'evil' and 'false' in the systems of moral and rational values. No answer can be regarded adequate which does not assign a functional role to these 'negative' values. If virtue does not consist in acts or intentions, but in a total active attitude of human personality to its surroundings, then 'vice', and then alone, can be regarded as a value on par with virtue In an ever-expanding scale of moral values, the stage gone by is vicious. Vice functionally means the tendency to go to the level that has been past. The positive function of 'vice' is to spur on the efforts for evolution of the human personality. This is exactly so with 'Ugly' as an aesthetic value. It is disharmony of certain elements, which goads the evolutionary process on to create greater harmony of elements. This functional[14] approach to the problem of values is important to understand the exact status and role of such 'negative' conceptions as 'ugly', 'false' and 'evil'.

IX. Summary and Conclusions

We lay no claim to a systematic and self-conscious Aesthetic Philosophy in India. There is, however a sure evidence

of large-scale thinking on aesthtic problems, scattered over the vast Sanskrit literature. Thinking has been both profound and extensive, sometimes with such clear flashes that the very springs of creative delight stand out in bright illumination. In the foregoing pages, we have tried to cull the scattered thought and give it the connected form of Philosophy. Though most of it centres round Literary Art, yet its conclusions have a wide field of application, based as they are on deep introspective analysis of beauty-experience. In the following resumè, we set forth those conclusions in order to bring out the unity of our thinking.

Realism has never found favour with us in India. The Vedic approach is completely *religio-aesthetic*: the *idee maitresse* which inspired the drinkers of the Soma rasa was the overflow of the mortal and finite datum of experience with the immortal and infinite vision of truth, beauty and bliss. The raptures of the Vedic lyrics, the bold metaphor and the lilt of the music arose from the spirit yet unweary, from imagination yet undulled and from freshness and freedom of a child. The Vālmiki Aesthetics marks a distinct stage with the emergence of a new art-element, *viz.*, pathos arising from frustration of the Eros. Other emotions also cluster round it, but only to intensify the central motif. In the Mahābhārata there is the development of the Beautiful into the Sublime, a transition from Sundara to Śānta. At this stage, some social elements also enter Art, but only in an ideal form. Therefore even the *Socio-aesthetics* of this age is not realistic. Bharata takes cognizance of the human feelings at the empirical level. His outlook is *psycho-aesthetic*. But as Art flourished under the influences of Buddhism and Brahmanical Idealism, Bharata's psychological approach was also transfigured. The Art of the devotional cults, though it comes down to vulgarism in weak moments, is thoroughly idealistic. Idealism, whether religious, social, or philosophical, is the central note of our artistic life.

Realism goes with representation. Indian Aesthetics builds itself on articulation or utterance. Pictorial Art stands last on our list. Though we have developed vast literature on Embellishment (Alaṅkara), yet our authors insist on its organic nature. Ānanda Vardhana has formulated the Law of Organic Articulation, which indicates how the formal elements evolve a true unity under the stress of creative impulse. He calls it the process of 'internalization' (Śarīrikaraṇam). Rūpa Goswāmī has given a number of formalist conceptions, such as Rūpam, Lāvaṇya, Saundraya, etc. But even these are saturated with beauty of emotion. Bhartṛhari's forms also brim over with the same emotional beauty. An excess of it, however, led to the decay and vulgarization of our Art.

The form was subordinate to emotion. This does not mean that the forms were ever extremely overlaid with it. In the heyday of our Art, the bold bulge of our lines, the chants and melodies of our music, vigorous nymphs, yaksas, and other divine figures, etc., all evince the high tide of the formative will of the Isdian artists. Morphology of the Indian Art, besides revealing an essential identity of creative spirit, prove the rare inventiveness of delightful forms. Decay set in when the convention and canon lay like ice on the will-to-beauty divorcing the form from the formative emotion.

An art which articulates the inmost recesses of the soul rather than copy the ever-changing phenomena of superficial Nature, can follow only one natural idiom of expression, that is, the law of Dhvani. The discovery of Dhvani marks the main landmark in the evolution of our thought and our chief contribution to Art-Philosophy. The principle of Dhvani lays its finger just on the pulse-beat of Art. It gives rise to what we have called the Aesthetic Paradox: Art conceals as well reveals. The greater charm lies in the concealed core of Art. The concealed charm of a work of art rises as an

echoing sound (Dhvani), as a distant music, from the sensible element.

So vital is the conception of Dhvani that it sums up the main elements of Indian Art-Philosophy. Whether Art is graphic or auditory, static or dynamic, the enjoying human Psyche is in a state of flux. So the static elements of a Statue, the mass and volume of an architecture, the linear and chromatic configuration of a painting, have to be dissolved into dynamic musical elements. They have to be heard rather than seen, for if they are what they appear to be, they are only works of craftsmanship. Art in its purest form is Dhvani or music and all other arts are artistic in so far as, and to the extent to which, they approach the musical form.

The Principle of Sonus further proves that art-enjoyment is some form of self-activity. The more intense diffuse and pleasing is the self-activity, the greater is charm. A simple and superficial doll does not touch the main chords of our heart, while the Naṭarāja or the Buddha in meditation, are such deeply effective forms that they stir the very depths of our being. The capacity to arouse the pleasing forms of mental activity alone lends an infinity nature to Beauty. A thing of beauty is lasting joy and its loveliness increases because the mind is always able to discover in it the unrevealed charms. And true art-enjoyment is re-creation only because the sensible elements in an art-work stimulate the self to new forms of psycho-organic activity and thereby evolve higher order of emotional integration. Bharata was first to formulate the law of Aesthetic Causation. The law, in its essence, indicates the mode of psycho-somatic growth of the mind through artistic enjoyment. The artist so disposes the Vibhāvas, Anubhāva and Samcari Bhavas in a work of art that they awaken a rhythmic harmonic flow of emotional life. The intense and edifying emotional flow through the working of the aesthetic cause will be possible only through

Dhvani, for an art without it will have only one-point impact on our soul. Emphasis on the dynamic nature of Art brings another character in its wake. Nāṭya or the histrionic art is the prototype of all arts. Dance, Music and Poetry, on the one hand, sculpture, architecture and painting on the other, centre round one nucleus that is Nāṭya. Art-life in India, in so far as it was secular, grew round the stage in the centre of which stand the figure of Woman. Even in hieratic art, which developed from other sources, Woman stands in the forefront. She is the presiding deity of Art (Kalā). All laws of rhythm in musical arts, and, of form in visual arts are derived from, and refer to, the female figure. She is Prakṛti, the mother of all charms and creation, the eternal inspiration of all creative artistic activity.

The process of aesthetic enjoyment is meditation on the inexhaustible charms of Prakṛti, her sound and colour-harmonies. In Rasa experience, there is liquification of the soul (Citta-vidruti). It is full of aesthetic thrill. The conception of camatkāra in our Aesthetic Philosophy is the master-stroke of our thinkers. It is ineffable in its true nature, though we have some semblance of it in the erotic raptures of 'the earthly locked lovers' in embrace or the mystic illumination of Samādhi when the self returns to its primal rhythm. Camatkāra is caused by a sudden eflusion of spiritual light (citi) by a breaking of the individuality bonds (Āvaraṇa Bhaṅga) according to Jagannātha. This, in fact, is the conception of release. According to Viśvanātha, Camatkāra is an 'oceanic' feeling (Brahmasvada) experiened when the meum-teum consciousness is submerged under the flood of beauty-emotion. There is in Camatkāra self-merger like that of the spectator lost in the dramatic scene. It is the conception of Repose in Art. Lastly, Ānanda likens camatkāra to detonation in 'meaning-consciousness' (Sphoṭa). We have the experience of camatkāra when a large number of aesthetic stimulations start pleasing currents of self-activity in the

mind. Çamatkāra is due to Vyañjanā, the aesthetic function of the elements in Art.

Indian Aesthetics sets its back to representation. According to it, Art is created in symbols and enjoyed in the form of Dhvani. Art is articulation from within. The inner spiritual life cannot be represented: it can be only symbolized. The outward is the trifling nothing. It becomes symbolic the moment it is interpreted in terms of spiritual experience. An object is spiritualized when it becomes a symbol of some beauty-experience. A symbol has an unfathomable meaning and charm because the human psyche has immeasurable depths. Art in India has been inspired by the intense spiritual experiences of the Eternal and Infinite, which are no abstractions to us. In music the state of Laya (rhythm) means the merger of the empirical self in the timeless flow of life. In meditation on the symbols of the visual arts, we try to transcend the limits of the finite object and realise the same eternal and infinite surge of life. This metaphysical and transcendent note of Indian Art makes it a little difficult to appreciate it, for it requires undergoing a spiritual discipline and a deeply *prayerful mood* of the mind.

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NYĀYA VAIŚEṢIKA WRITERS-ŚRĪVATSA AND SĀNĀTANI

By DR. V. VARADACHARI

The worth of the literature of a nation is judged by the nature of the contribution made by the men of letters of that nation through their works. It sometimes becomes difficult to assess the value of the contributions made by the scholars due to want of access to their works in full. This results in the lack of correct appreciation of the worth of the contribution made by them or in an imperfect understanding of it. This is the state of affairs that is met with in the field of Śāstras. Apart from the stray quotations from works of the laterday writers, nothing is known about them. In some cases, the quotations that are available are to be found in the works of one or two writers of the later period.

In the field of the literature of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems, there appears to have existed a number of writers in the mediaeval period whose works have not come down to us. The fact that Śrīvatsa and Sānātani were two among them is known from the quotations associated with their names and available in the Tātparyapariśuddhi of Udayana and the works of Śaṅkaramiśra and Jayarāmanyāyapañcānana.

Śrīvatsa appears to have been a writer on the Nyāya system. Perhaps he was a commentator of the Nyāyasūtras or the author of an independent treatise on Nyāya. The following are the references to his views found in the *Tātparyapariśuddhi* of Udayana.

संशोध्य दर्शितरसा मरुकूपरूपा-
ष्टीकाकृतः प्रथम एव गिरो गभीराः।
तात्पर्यतो यदधुना पुनरुद्यमो नः
श्रीवत्सवत्सलतयैव तया तथापि॥

MS. Adhyāya II, p. 1.

Udayana seems to say that although he had brought out the greatness of the *Ṭīkā* (*Tātparyaṭīkā of Vācaspatimiśra*) by commenting on the first adhyāya of it, he takes up the task of commenting on the second adhyāya out of his regard for Śrīvatsa. The passages of the *Ṭīkā* are invaluable in the field of Nyāya like the wells (or oases) in the desert. Śrīvatsa probably had no liking to the *Ṭīkā*. Udayana seeks to convince Śrīvatsa of the greatness of the *Ṭīkā*.

ननु पदसमूहानां वाक्यानामित्यसंगतम् । न हि वाक्यान्यपि स्वार्थे संगतिग्रहणमपेक्षन्ते। पूर्वापरविरुद्धं च। यदूचे स्वयमेव न पदं तदर्थो वा वाक्यार्थबोधे लिंगम्। तत्र संबन्धग्रहणानपेक्षणादिति श्रीवत्सः। तत्रोत्तरं वाक्यान्यपि कानिचित् संकेत्यन्ते। यथा कारयाम्[illegible]त्यादि तदभिप्रायेणेयं टीका।

MS. Adhyāya II, p. 89.

The quotation cited here by Śrīvatsa beginning with **स्वयमेव** and ending with सम्बन्धग्रहणानयेक्षणादिति is found in the *Tātparyaṭīkā on the Nyāyasūtra* 2—1—52.

अत्र श्रीवत्सः ननु प्रथमेऽप्याह्निके प्रत्यक्षशब्दयोरनुमानेऽन्तर्भावमुखेन न्यूनतां पूर्वपक्षयित्वा चतुष्ट्वमेवाक्षिप्तम्। तत्समाधाने च विभागोद्देश एव समाहितः। अतः स इह न वक्तव्यः। अन्यथा अर्थसंकरेण पुनराह्निकसंकरप्रसंग इति।

Udayana refutes this position thus:—

अधिकसंख्याव्यवच्छेद एव केवलं न संगतः स्यादिति नाह्निकयोरर्थसंकर इति व्यापकत्वं वाभिधीय[1] सर्वमवदातम्।

MS. Adhyāya II, p. 91.

अत्र 'श्रीवत्सः']नन्वात्मपरीक्षारूपैकार्थतया मिथःसाकांक्षतया च एकवाक्यतां कथं नामामीभिरेकाह्निकमिति। Udayana refutes this in a long passage.

MS. Adhyāya III, p. 30.

ननु शरीरं पुरुषविशेषगुणप्रेरितभूतपूर्वकं पुरुषार्थक्रियासमर्थत्वात् रथादिवदित्येतद्यद्यपि सिकतादेः दृष्टान्तस्य साध्यसमत्वप्रतिपादनेन मूर्तत्वादित्यादिना न सत्प्रतिपक्षता नाप्यनैकान्तिकं तद्विपर्ययानिश्चयात्[2]। तथापि नित्यैर्मनः प्रभृतिभिरनैकान्तिकं तेषां पुरुषगुणप्रेरितभूतपूर्वकत्वाभावेऽपि पुरुषार्थक्रियासमर्थत्वादिति इति 'श्रीवत्सः'। Udayāna refutes this thus:—सत्यं कार्यत्वे सतीति विशेषणाददोषः।

MS. Adhyāya III, p. 106.

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[1] The reading is obscure.

[2] The reading is तद्विपक्षाभावनिश्चयात् in the Adyar Library Ms. of the Tātparyapariśudhi.

The argument referred to by Śrīvatsa is contained in the *Nyāyavārṭika* and *Tātparyaṭīkā* on the Nyāyasūtras 3—2—61—63.

`एवं च सर्वव्याप्तिः विभागोद्देशातिक्रमस्तु नित्यानित्यसमलक्षणयोः किमर्थमिति 'श्रीवत्स' प्रश्ने अध्यायान्तरे क्रमस्य सतात्पर्यतया इहापि तच्छंका स्यादिति। तन्निवृत्त्यर्थमित्युत्तरम्। तेन हि न्यायप्राप्तः क्रमो न त्वत्रापि प्रयोजनप्राप्त इति गम्यते।

MS. Adhyāya V, p. 27.

It is of interest to note here that Śivāditya in his *Lakṣaṇamālā* and Jayanta in his *Nyāyamañjarī* and *Nyāyakalikā* treat nityasama first and then anityasama. All commentators on the Nyāyasūtras follow the sūtra order. Bhāsarvajña however does not deal with anityasama.

स्वप्रयोजने निग्रहस्थानानां परस्परानपेक्षत्वसूचनाय जातिष्वप्येतत्समानमित्यसमासप्रसक्तिरिति 'श्रीवत्सः'। तत्रोत्तरं समशब्दाभ्यावृत्तौ सूत्रगौरवात्, अनानावृत्तौ तु संज्ञानुपपत्तेश्च समासः।[3]

MS. Adhyāya V, p. 40.

From the references given above, it is seen that Śrīvatsa came after Vācaspatimiśra (976 A.D.) and before Udayana (1054 A.D.).[4] He must have been an elder contemporary of Udayana. That he was a writer on the Nyāya system is evident from Udayana's references to his views on the topics of Nyāya. It is not known whether he could have been identical with Vatseśvara, the author of the *Nyāyamahārṇava*, a work on Nyāya cited by the commentators[5] on the *Tattva-*

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[3] A similar explanation is given by Varadarāja in the Tarkikarakṣā, p. 251.

[4] For the dates of these two writers, see the Journal of the Ganganatha Jha Research Institute, Vol. II, Part IV.

[5] *Tattvacintāmaṇyāloka* of Pakṣadharaniśra, pp. 39, 82, 99.
Tattvacintāmaṇyālokakaṇṭakoddhāra of Madhusūdanamisra, pp. 37, 41, 67, 145.

He is also referred tó as *Īśvara* by *Pragalbhamiśra,* the commentator on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi,* p. 169.

Tattvacintāmaṇi with commentaries, Part I, Sarasvati Bhavana Texts.

cintāmaṇi of Gaṅgeśa (C. 1200 A.D.). From these commentaries, we are able to know the views of Vatseśvara on the topic of maṅgala. Curiously enough, Udayana does not refer to him at all in his maṅgalavāda in the *Tātparyapariśuddhi* and *Kiraṇāvalī*. Jayarāmanyāyapañcānana refers to the view of Mahārṇavakāra who must be identical with Vatseśvara, on the categories. The Mahārṇavakāra admitted twelve categories.[6]

However, it is clear that this Śrīvatsa could not have been the same Śrīvatsa who is said to have commented on the *Padārthadharmasaṁgraha* of Praśastapāda.

Vide:—चतुर्थी तु लीलावतीतिख्यातां श्रीवत्साचार्यो बबन्ध ।

This is cited from the Pañjikā of Rājaśekhara on Śrīdhara's *Nyāyakandalī*.[7]

Udayana makes two references to Sānātani in the *Tātparyapariśuddhi*.

स प्रतिपक्षस्थापनाहीनो वितण्डेत्यत्र जल्पवत् वादस्यापि परामर्शात् । पुरुषाभिप्रायानुरोधेन चतुर्थो (च तथो) दाहरणस्यानुपपत्तेरिति सानातनिः ।

MS. Adhyāya I, p. 133.

Sānātani recognised the number of the types of Kathā to be four. This is corroborated by the evidences given by Śaṅkramiśra and Jayarāmanyāyapañcānana.

Vide:—कथा च वादजल्पवितण्डाभेदात् त्रिविधा । न तु तत्त्वबुभुत्सुरप्येकः स्थापनामेव करोति अन्यस्तादृश एव दूषणमात्रं प्रयुंक्ते तत्र वितण्डा तावत्कथान्तरमिति सानातनिमतमुपादेयम् ।

Vādivinoda, p. 2.

तत्र सानातनिः——यत्र तत्त्वबुभुत्सोरेवान्यतरस्य स्थापनानिवृत्तिस्तत्र विजिगीषोर्जल्पवितण्डावत्त्वादवितण्डारूपकथान्तरसंभवान्न्यूनोऽयं विभागः । कथायाश्चातुर्विध्यात् । स प्रतिपक्षस्थापनाहीनो वितण्डा इति सूत्रे च स इत्यनेन जल्पवत्वादस्यापि परामर्श इति आह ।

Nyāyasiddhāntamālā, p. 54.

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[6] *Nyāyasiddhāntamālā*, p. 171.

[7] Introduction to the *Nyāyakandali*, p. 19.

तथा च द्वितीयादिपरीक्षापर्वणोऽपि प्रथम एवान्तर्भावः प्रसज्येत। तस्मा-त्परीक्षापरत्वेऽस्य[8] व्यवस्थिते निराश्रयोऽसौ[9] मा प्रसांक्षीदिति हेतुत्वेन लक्षणाना-मनु प्रवेश इति सानातनिप्रभृतयो[10] मेनिरे।

MS. Adhyāya V, p. 3.

Apart from these references, nothing is known about Sānātani. He must have been a writer on Nyāya, as is evident from the above references.

The references given above are taken from the MS. of the *Tātparyapariśuddhi* belonging to the Department of Sanskrit University of Madras.

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[8] Adyar Ms. of the *Tātparyapariśuddhi* reads अपि

[9] Adyar Ms. of the *Tātparyapariśuddhi* reads निराश्रया

[10] Adyar Ms. of the *Tatpanyapariśuddhi* reads सनातनि

THE ORIGIN OF THE NANDAS

By SHRĪ NATH TIWARI

The question of ancestry and caste of the Nandas is one of the most complex ones in the history of ancient India. From a very early period widely divergent views seem to have been prevalent on the subject and even today the controversy is not yet regarded as finally settled. Different sources reveal different facts about the history of Nandas, and are very hard to be reconciled. So the general tendency is to accept the one and to reject the other without any clear discussion.

The most accepted and trustworthy account seems today to be known from the Greeco-Roman literature. The often quoted lines as the conclusion of this question are those of Curtius, who refers to the Nanda King contemporary of Alexander as narrated by Porus. According to this "His father was in fact a barber, scarcely staving off hunger by his daily earnings, but who from his being not uncomely in person had gained the affections of the queen and was by her influence advanced to too near a place in confidence to the reigning monarch. Afterwards, however, he treacherously murdered his sovereign and then under the pretence of acting as guardian to the royal children usurped the supreme authority and having put the young princes to death, begot the present king."

The present king referred to by Curtius, Agrammes by name was undoubtedly Ugrasena—Māhāpadmananda himself as identified by an eminent scholar Pt. K. Chattopadhyaya. (Proceedings of Indian History Conference—Lahore).

Diodorus also supports the above statement of Curtius—"The king of Gangaridae was a man of quite worthless character and held in no respect as he was thought to be the son of a barber."

This classical account is somewhat confirmed by the Indian literature of the Jains. Parisiṣṭaparvaṇa represents Nanda as the son of a courtesan not by a barber as is informed by Avasyaka Sūtra "Ekasya gaṇikā Kukṣi Janmā Nandaḥ". Buddhist—Mahāvamsa ṭīka refers to him as the leader of a robber's gang. The Purāṇas describe him as a son of the last Kṣatrabandhu (so called Kṣatriya) king of the preceding line by a Śūdra mother—(śūdrā garbhodbhava).

It seems very hard to reconcile all the seemingly contradictory information derived from different sources and still more hard to accept the one and to reject the other. But it has been our general tendency to accept what the westerners say, right or wrong, which cannot be regarded to be free from partiality. So the generally accepted theory of the sūdra origin of the Nandas mainly based on the accounts of the writers whose sovereign did not dare to interfere with the mighty Nanda king, while in the way of his world conquest, needs not to be accepted without a thorough—critical analysis. There is however nothing to suggest in native sources what the Greeco-Roman literature says about the Nanda. Even Plutarch, the leading historian of Rome does not mention about the barber ancestry of the Nandas but merely informs "The king was hated and despised by his subjects for the wickedness of his disposition and the meanness of his origin."

It seems therefore, that the Greek-writers did get surely some information about the barber to have been related to the Nandas whom they wrongly interpreted as to have been the father of the then sovereign.

Purāṇas, the best sources of information about the Nandas contain self contradictory statements not yet marked and taken seriously by any writer of eminence. Some of the

Purāṇas have different texts. Vāyu Purāṇa informs "Mahānandī sutáscāpi śūdrā-yām kali kāmsájaḥ—Utpatsyate Mahāpadma" and Viṣṇu Purāṇa also gives a similar reference—

"Mahānandinastataḥ śūdrāgarbhodbhavo Mahāpadmo Nanda nāmā bhaviṣyati." But if this only had been the text of all the Purāṇas, it would really have been very difficult to reconcile all the contradictory statements but fortunately we have something more, surprising enough unnoticed uptodate which paves the way for the clear reconciliation. Śrimad-bhāgavata Mahā Purāṇa informs—

"Mahānandīsutorājan śūdrī garbhodbhavo balī Mahāpadmapatiḥ kaścit Nandah. . . ." (Śrīmad Bhāgavatā—12th skandha—first chapter 8th śloka.) I have seen certain old manuscripts too expressing likewise without any controversy. It is a matter of great curiosity to note that Pargiter who has thoroughly gone into the texts of the Purāṇas has also missed or more probably omitted to notice this version. The satisfactory explanation to this seems to be that even noticing the difference he deliberately neglected it as he did not find this version in other Purāṇas and regarded it as the mistake of the writer as he himself admits (P.T.D. of Kali Age—Page XXIX) that manuscripts found are "fairly well written with few clerical errors" so he would have omitted to note this version śūdrī as to be merely a clerical error.

But a thing so valuable as to be able to reconcile all the diversities and being corroborated by all the other sources cannot be neglected as merely to be the clerical error. It is a fact, that other Purāṇas have the other different version (śūdrā) but all of them have been derived by the same source—Bhaviṣya Purāṇa only; so their quantity is not the sure proof of their version. Śrīmad Bhāgavata has been regarded as Mahā Purāṇa by all eminent scholars in a tone. Even Pargiter does not deny its value and refers it to have been surely of remarkable value "here for the first time Bhāgavata gives the tradition in slokas. . . .and are not a mere

list of names. Both the versions (Bhāgavata and the rest) are independent and valuable".

So why should we deny the value of Bhāgavata's information and discard it only on the basis of the rest that are in no way superior to it? If one neglects a thing though little in form but great in importance as to be a clerical mistake without much base—why should we too? Will it be proper to reject the text corroborated by all other native and foreign sources. Moreover we need not contradict the version of the other Purāṇas by accepting that of Bhāgavata.

Every one must be given what is its due.

Here is a version different from that of the Purāṇas referred to above. Instead of śūdrā we find śūdrī here which surely deserves no less importance. Both the words are quite correct according to Sanskrit grammar and express different meanings. Sanskrit pratyaya Ṭāp is added in śūdrā and therefore it means "a woman of śūdrā class" or caste—irrespective of the caste of her husband. She may be married to a person of whatever caste (Rule—Ajādyataṣṭāp—pāṇini 4. 1. 41.

Varadarājācārya, the famous author of Laghusiddhānta kaumudī comments it as "ajādīnām akārāntasya ca vācyam yat strītvam tatra dyotye ṭāp syāt. The famous writer Kātyāyana comments "śūdrā ca amahat pūrvā jātih"). Therefore the Purāṇas—Vāyu and Viṣṇu may be taken to refer that Mahāpadma was the son of Mahānandi by a śūdra-woman. But its acceptance will at once raise a question—then what about the other informations—of Greeco-Roman literature, of Jains or of Buddhist? For the answer of this question and even for the clear reconciliation of the diverse expressions we must attach due importance to the version of Bhāgavata.

According to the rules of Sanskrit grammar in order to have faminine form of any masculine word another pratyaya-'ṅīṣ' is added and it will bring the word śūdrī from masculine śūdra meaning the wife of a śūdra (of whatever caste).

(Panini—Pumyogādākhyāyām— (4. 1. 48) Varadarāja accounts it as "yā Pumākhyā pumyogāt striyām vartate tato ṅīṣ". He gives an example too—Gopasya strī Gopī (caste of her—no bar). Śūdrī means wife of a śūdra, of any caste. It is also fully referred in Amarakoṣa "Śūdrī śūdrasya bhāryā syāt evam bhinna jātyāyā api").

So while śūdrā will merely mean the scion of a śūdra not necessarily the wife of a śūdra, the term śūdrī means a woman of whatever caste necessarily the wife of a śūdra. So in order to avoid the confusive complexity of the last version of the purāṇas, it will be totally proper to hold that the mother of Mahāpadma of whatever caste was first the wife of a sūdra and later attached some how to Mahānandi the then ruling kṣatriya sovereign of saisunaga dynasty. But because other purāṇas say her to be śūdrā therefore nothing stands in our way to hold that the mother of Mahāpadma was a śūdra by birth too.

Now there remains no diversity at all between all the original sources of information to be solved. Greeco-Roman literature informs that "his father was in fact a barber and his mother the queen". Somehow or other the śūdrī had become related to the king (Mahānandi) and so she was the queen and the Greek and the Roman writers were mistaken to hold the barber, most possibly the previous husband of Mahāpadma's mother to be his father, though actually Mahāpadma was the son of the same barber's wife by Mahānandi. In fact such errors need not be taken seriously.

The Jain parisiṣṭa parvana may also stand to support it. The text runs—"Itaśca-tatraiva pure divākīrterabhutsutah—Ekasya gāṇikākukṣijanmā Nandābhidhānataḥ". He was born to a courtesan by (a king named) Divākīrti, and because the immediate predecessors of the Nandas were kālāśoka and his sons, it will not be wrong to hold that Kālāśoka and his successors were killed by the first Nand king who felt his illegal origin, as Vidudabha had tried to do earlier (or even the

case of parricide was not unknown till then and surely it caused Buddhist writers to hold him as the chief of the robbers' gang because he did not follow Buddhism).

Therefore on the basis of the arguments mentioned above, it will not be improper to hold that the first Nanda king—Mahāpadma Nanda (Ugrasena or Agrammes) was the son of a barber's wife by the last Saisunagi king and his mother naturally had become the concubine of the king and thereby courtesan of Hemchandra.

On this basis we can challenge the theories holding that the Nandas were the śūdra rulers. None of the sources informs them to be śūdras. They all merely say him (the founder of the dynasty) to be "originally a man of no distinction" a man of "meanest condition", "of quite worthless character and to be held in no respect" or to be "hated and despised by his subjects for the wickedness of his disposition and the meanness of his origin" or to be "śūdra-prāya and adhārmika" but in no way a śūdra. Moreover among Hindus it is the caste of the father that determines that of his progency. A son of Kṣatriya will always be a Kṣatriya by a woman of whatever caste as we have definite evidence in Mahābharat. The sons of king Śantanu named Vicitra Vīrya and Citrāngada by a daughter of the navigator (dhīvarakanyā). (Bhāgavata IX/22—Śantanor dāsa kanyāyām jājñe citrāngado sutah. Vicitra Vīryas ca. . . .)" were always considered to be Kṣatriyas and one of them was installed according to Vedic rituals as a true Kṣatriya "Vicitravīryam tadā bālamaprāpya yauvanam kururājye mahābāhuḥ abhyasiñcyat anantaram" (Mahābhārat-(1) 101, 12) and in the very same century Vidudabha, the son of Mahānāman by a slave girl had been on the throne and no where he has been styled as śūdra. On the other hand every where he is referred to with respect as a Kṣatriya. Manu has also some how allowed the sūdra-wife of Kṣatriyas. "Śūdraiva-bhāryā śūdrasya, sā ca swā ca viśah smṛtah te ca swā caiva rajñyaś-ca. . . ." (Manu—3—13).

Commentators have simplified it. Kullūka Bhaṭṭa comments "kṣatriyasya vaiśyā sūdrā-kṣatriyā ca "or a kṣatriya may have vaiśyā, sūdrā or kṣatriyā as his wife and he further proves it on the basis of another authority—"vasiṣṭho pi śūdrāmapi. . . . dvijatīnām—śūdrā vivāhamāh" (Mānavadharmāśāstra—edited by Vishwa Nath Sharma).

But the case with Mahāpadma was somewhat different as his mother was a śūdrī and not (a pure) śūdrā only; otherwise he would have been pure Kṣatriya as prescribed by Manu. Impurity of the mother prevented him from being regarded as a pure Kṣatriya. Manu clearly mentions that persons born like this are degenerated.

"Hīnajātistriyam mohādudvahanto dvijātayah kulānyeva nayan-tyāsu sasantānāni śūdratām" (Manu 3—15) and he further refers that the person born under such condition (as was Mahāpadma) does not remain pure. . . . "kṣatriyātśūdrakanyāyāın krūrācāravihāravān kṣatraśūdravapurjantuh ugronāmaprajāyate" (Manu 10—10) (Śūdrā-kṣatriyotugrah" (Amarkoṣa) So Mahāpadma must be regarded as Ugra or in some way vrātya kṣatriya and never a śūdra. Several other evidences also support the Nandas to be kṣatriyas. According to Mahāvamśa Nandas were the descendants of the previous ruling dynasty, or at least they were of the ṣame caste Cf. "navanandā tato āsum-kam-eneva narādhipā-rājam samanusāsium" (mahāvamsa 30—5—15) Mudrā Rākṣasa declares them to be "prathitakulaja" and parisiṣṭaparvana clearly declares them to be pure kṣatriyas. It refers to a story that "Nanda throwing himself on the mercy of Cāṇakya was permitted to leave his kingdom and while driving off the princess (daughter of Nanda) instantly fell in love with Çandra Gupta and on her father's advice she selected him for her husband by the right of svayamvara (parisiṣṭa-parvaṇa—Jacobi, page 59) because "it was customary to kṣatriya girls to marry according to their choice "prāyah Kṣatriya Kanyānām śasyate hi svayamvarḥ".

But Mahāpadma cannot be pure Kṣatriya due to circumstances referred to above but certainly there is nothing to show that he was not a Kṣatriya though not pure but vrātya. There is an epigraphical evidence too. Dr. Jaiswal read the inscription on the headless Ratnā statue to be "....vatanandi". Dr. Smith too supports the above readings of Dr. Jaiswal. It is therefore totally evident that the Nandas belonged to no other class or caste than Kṣatriya in some form. They can hardly be śūdras as is the most popular view today.

The sources are silent about the Nandas to be a Śūdras and there are clear evidences indicating them to be Kṣatriyas. Is this not sufficient enough to challenge the Śūdra origin theory about them and to hold them as a Kṣatriya rulers descending from Kṣatriya parentage—and more properly, to be vrātya (degenerated) Kṣatriyas but in no way Śūdras or any thing other than Kṣatriyas?

SHORT NOTE
ON
THE RELIGIOUS ASPECT OF THE SANGAMA DYNASTY OF VIJAYANAGAR EMPIRE
(1336 A.D. to 1487 A.D.)

By Shri B. V. Srinivasa Rao

I earnestly draw the attention of the Readers to go through the following evidences:—

A. The Sangama Rulers were strict Ṣaivas (*vide*, p. 1654: Vol. II, Part III, Mysore Gazetteer, edited by Rao Sahib C. Hayavadana Rao).

B. The Sangama Rulers were Śaivas and Salva Rulers were—Vaiṣṇavas (*Vide* p. 10, Article on the literature of Kannada of 13th Centuay A.D. by Professor S. S. Malvad in Prabuddha Karnātaka, Vṛṣa Samvatsara; Deepavali Issue, Mysore University).

C. Commencing from 1336 A.D. up to 1422 A.D. the Rulers of Sangama Dynasty were Śaivas (*Vide* Part III, Vol. II, Mysore Gazetteer, Edited by Rao Sahib C. Hayavadana Rao).

D. But from 1422 upto 1487 A.D. the Sangama Rulers, such as Devarāya the II, Mallikārjuna and Virupākṣa-III were Veeraśaivas (*Vide*, My Article published in the J. A. H. R. S., Volume XXIV, p. 101 to 104, 1956—58).

E. The Salvas who were Vaiṣṇavas, came to Chola and Pāṇḍyan Rulers in the latter half of the 15th Century, after the death of Lakkanna that is to

say, during the reigns of Mallikārjuna and Virupākṣa-III (*Vide*, page 13, Indian Antiquery Volume XLIII, 1914).

F. The Representative of Salvas by name Salva Narasimha had made himself the Chief in the Counsels of the Empire. His name occurs in the Epigraphical Records during the generation of thirty years from 1456 A.D. to 1486 A.D. He gradually obtained the Chief Place in the Imperial Court and became a *de-facto* Ruler of the Empire (*Vide*, page 14, Indian Antiquery, Vol. XLIII, 1914).

G. By the year 1486 A.D. the usurpation of the Salvas was complete. The Sangama Line which had been on the throne for 150 years was deposed and the Salvas were the masters of the south India (*Vide*, p. 14, Indian Antiquery, Volume XLIII, 1914).

H. Salva Narasimha assumed royal titles: about 1484 A.D. (*Vide*, page 9, Indian Antiquery, Vol. LII, Jan. 1923).

Conclusion:

According to my above evidence from A to H, I have come to the following conclusion:—

The Sangama Dynasty was composed of Śaiva Rulers from 1336 A.D. to 1422 A.D., Veeraśaiva Rulers from 1422 A.D. to 1487 A.D. and from 1486 onwards that is to say, the tail-end of the Sangama Dynasty was under the Control of Vaiṣṇava Rulers. That is all.

FRONTIERS OF VIJAYANAGAR HISTORICAL KNOWLEDGE SERIES

(Numismatics on Sangama Dynasty—1419 to 1487 A.D.)

SRI B. V. SREENIVASA RAO

Let us examine the following Coins of the Sangama Rulers of Vijayanagar Empire (1419 to 1497 A.D.) recorded in Travancore Archaeological Department, Administration Report, 1122 M.E. (1946-47). Here, the Director of Archaeology while examining the Coins collected by Rao Bahadur Sreenivasa Gopalachari of Madras gives the description of the following coin of Devarāya-II (1419 to 1446 A.D.) which is as follows:—

Ist Type:—Obverse: Pratāpa Devarāya.
Reverse: Elephant between Conch and Discuss.

IInd Type:—Obverse: Rāja Gaja Gaṇḍabheruṇḍa below the legend, a Conch between Sun and Moon.
Reverse: King attacking Elephant which holds sword in its trunk with tail uplifted.

IIIrd Type:—Obverse: Sree Pratāpa Devarāya.
Reverse: Bull to right: with Sun and Moon and Dagger above and Conch in front.

My Remarks:

The above three types of coins belong to Devarāya-II (1419 to 1446 A.D.) who was a Veeraśaiva or a Iṣṭalingārādhaka—*vide* My Research Articles published in the Journal

of the Andhra Historical Research Society, Vol. No. XXIV, p. 101 to 104, 1956–58 Rajamundry (Andhra Pradesh) and in the Malabar Herald, Annual, Cochin (Kerala State) December 1958.

As a result, the titles found on the above types of coins such as, Sree Pratāpa Devarāya and Rājagaja Gaṇḍabheruṇḍa belong to Veeraśaiva Devarāya-II (1419 to 1446 A.D.)—one of the later Rulers of the Sangama Dynasty of the Vijayanagar Empire. The symbols found on the coins such as Dagger, Elephant, mark the might of Veeraśaiva Devarāya-II and the symbol such as Conch, the mark of Vaiṣṇavism, in turn records the friendship or mutual religious toleration between Veeraśaiva Devarāya-II and Vaiṣṇavas. That is all.

A GUIDE TO THE PATTADAKAL TEMPLES, by A. M. Annigeri. Published by the Kannaḍa Research Institute, Dharwar; VI: 64 pp., 14 Plates: 1961. Price Rs. 1·75.

South India abounds in places containing ancient big temples which are famous for their religious historical and architectural importance. But many of them go unnoticed by interested persons for want of adequate information about them. This small hand book furnishes such information about the ten ancient temples situated in Paṭṭadakal, once the secondary capital of Chalukya and Rāṣtrakuta kings, but now a small village in Bādāmi Taluk of the Bijapur district in the present Mysore State. In his brief introduction the author has explained the sanctity of Paṭṭadakal, name and description of Pattadakal, how to reach Pattadakal, the historical importance of the place and has given a short account of the Chalukya kings of Bādāmi. The text gives a vivid and detail description of the ten temples situated in that place. The fourteen plates included in the book give an idea of the sculptural advancement reached by the people of those days. A glossary of proper names appearing in the text is appended. Tourists and students of archaeology and early Indian history especially will find this book highly interesting.

V. HANUMANTHACHAR

A DESCRIPTIVE CATALOGUE OF MANUSCRIPTS IN THE KANNAḌA RESEARCH INSTITUTE. Dharwar, Vol. IV. Edited by A. M. Annigeri and S. B. Purohit. Published by Kannaḍa Research Institute. Dharwar: 14: 180 pp. 1961.

This volume is prepared on the same lines as the three previous volumes published by Kannaḍa Research Institute, giving a description of each manuscript in detail—material.

size, number of folios, subject, author, etc., followed by relevant extracts from the manuscript. Seventy five Kannaḍa works are noticed in this volume, bearing on Vīraśaiva literature, Bhārata, Bhāgavata, Dāsasāhitya, Aśvaśāstra and Jyotisa. In the short introduction the editors have drawn attention to some rare works, described in this volume. For ready reference of the reader, a subject index of the works described herein would have been convenient. Even as it is, this catalogue would be found useful to the students of Kannaḍa language.

V. HANUMANTHACHAR

KARNATAK INSCRIPTION, Vol. IV (with introductory notes in English). Edited by A. M. Annigeri. Published by Kannaḍa Research Institute, Dharwar, XXIV: 131 pp. 8 Plates. Price Rs. 7|-.

In writing history of India, especially pertaining to early and middle ages, stone inscriptions and copper plate grants have been of immense help to the historian as valid sources of information. This volume contains fifty three stone inscriptions and two copper plate grants, all from Dharwar district of the present Mysore state. These inscriptions were written during the time of the Chalukyas of Kalyan, Kalachuryas of Karnataka, Hoyasalas of Halebid, Yadavas of Devagiri and the kings of Vijayanagar. The oldest of them, the Medur inscription, is of about 8th century A.D. These inscriptions are mainly meant to record some gift made to temples and individuals. Nevertheless they throw light on the political and social condition of the times. The editor has given the text of the inscriptions in Kannaḍa, introducing each with notes in English explaining its contents and its historical importance. Two lists of inscriptions are furnished, one arranged according to dynasty and king during whose time the particular inscription was recorded and

the other according to the localities from where the inscriptions were acquired. In his introduction the editor has put together what all information, political, social, etc., could be collected from these inscriptions and has made this volume to be of as much help as possible to a student of history. We hope the other volumes of Karnatak Inscriptions by the same editor would come out in due course.

V. HANUMANTHACHAR

A HISTORY OF THE DVAITA SCHOOL OF VEDANTA AND ITS LITERATURE, Vol. II (From the 15th century up to our time). By Vidyabhuṣaṇa Dr. B. N. K. Sarma. Published by Book Sellers Publishing Co., Mehendale Building, V. P. Road, Bombay 4. XIV 4: 417 pp. Price Rs. 20.50.

As indicated by the author, this volume traces the history of Dvaita literature from the 15th century to our own time. The author has given biographical sketches of writers mentioned in this volume, discussed their place in Dvaita system and has given critical estimate of their contributions to the Dvaita literature. The history is brought under five parts, each part dealing with a distinctive type of literature. The first part under the heading "Age of Neo Dialecticism in Dvaita Vedanta" introduces writers and their works which are of polemical type. These writers taking a strong foothold on the foundations laid by Madhvācārya and Jayatīrtha, challenged the position taken by other systems of philosophy. Advaita Vedanta of Śankarācārya was the main target of attack for these writers. Viṣṇudāsācārya pioneered this type of literature during this period. This lead was later taken up by Vyāsarāya. Next to Jayatīrtha, Vyāsarāya was pre-eminently the greatest polemic and exponent of Madhva's philosophy and rightly the author has treated him in greater detail. Vyāsarayā's works, Nyāyāmrta, Tātparya-candrika and Tarkatāṇḍava are the standard works of very high order and

their correct understanding is considered to be an achievement. Dr. Śarma has critically analysed them and has demonstrated with instances the greatness of Vyāsarāya as an unrivalled polemic. In his appreciation of Vyāsarāya's works Dr. Śarma so loses himself in admiration that he transgresses the limitations of a historian, taking the role of a Vedantin alongside Vyāsarāya. In this section Dr. Śarma has dealt with the vast controversial literature, for and against, that sprang up with the advent of Vyāsaraya's Nyāyāmrta, discussed the place of Vyāsarāya in Dvaita system and has shown how he was held in great esteem in the Court of Kṛṣṇadevarāya of Vijayanagar.

In part II under the heading: "Theological *controversies* and re-inforcement of Siddhanta" the author has given an account of the contributions made by Vijayindra Tirtha Vādiraja Tirtha. Nārayanā Cārya, Satyanāthayati and Gauḍa Pūrnānanda Cakravartin as against the adversaries like Appayadikṡita.

Part III under the heading "Non-Polemical Literature" refers to 13 writers as "Major Commentators" who were like home guards, defending and enriching the Dvaīta literature with their Ṭikas and Ṭippanis. Under "Major Commentators", mention may be made of Raghavendra Tirtha who is credited with the authorship of 38 works and whose Commentary, Parimala is considered almost indispensible for the correct understanding of Jayatirtha's Nyāyasudha.

Part IV traces the history of the Haridāsa literature which lays exclusive emphasis on Bhakti, mentioned by Madhva carya as the means for self emancipation, and deals with the expansion of Mādhva influence into Bengal, Maharāshtra and other parts of India.

Part V "Modern Period" brings this history upto date with a running survey of various works in different languages, Indian and foreign that have bearing on Dvaita Vedanta, during the 19th and 20th centuries.

This work of Dr. Śarma, combines in itself clarity exposition and accuracy of facts and details with nothing that pertains to Dvaita Vedanta, worth mentioning left untold. 'An outline of Madhva philosophy' by Dr. K. Narain has since come into the domain of Dvaita literature. Considering the volume and variety of the subject, the task of writing the history of Dvaita literature which has been developing for over eight hundred years is really herculean. But Dr. Śarma has admirably succeeded. This work brings to light many writers and works on Dvaita literature who were very little known even among Madhva circles. Dr. Śarma has so to say, dived deep into the vast expanse of Dvaita literature critically analysed it and has presented it in a manner that any student of philosophy can see how it has flown in different channels. By this work he has placed the followers of Madhva under a deep sense of gratitude. Any historian of Dvaita literature in future may easily look to this work as an ākaragrantha. We eagerly await the publication of the larger work on Madhvaś philosophy promised by the author.

V. Hanumanthachar

Rise of the Maratha Power and other Essays by M. G. Ranade and Gleanings from Maraṭha Chronicles by K. T. Telang XX 236 pp: Published by the University of Bombay, University Buildings, Fort Bombay:—1961.

This book embodies four essays of which three viz: "Rise of the Maratha Power", "Introduction to the Peshwas Diaries" and "currencies and Mints under the Maratha Rule" are by Justice M. G. Ranade and one viz "Gleanings from Maratha Chronicles" is by Justice Telang. It was first published in 1900. This second edition is edited by Profs G. S. Ghurya, R. P. Patwardhan and R. V. Oturkar and their findings in the light of later research are appended separately.

The Essays of M. G. Rande are mainly occupied with

the political history of the Marāṭhas, which the author styles as a history of the struggle of the Marāṭha people for political independence against the Muslim rulers at Delhi. When Sivaji appeared on the political scene, the author says, the ground was already prepared for him and what was needed was a resourceful leadership. Sivaji endowed with the qualities of such leader took advantage of the situation. The author traces the history of the incessant wars of Sivaji and his successors with Moghal Emperors at Delhi and the Musalman Chiefs at Golconda and Bijapur and how the Marāṭha confedaracy was formed by Balaji Vishwanaṭh. Sivaji is dipicted not only as a brave warrior but also as an eminent administrator. His institution of Aṣṭapradhan is likened to the Executive Council of the Viceroy in India. According to the author, it is patriotism coupled with religious fervour which constitutes real nationalism and helps sustained maintenance of strength and power of a people. But religion as envisaged by the author is not the religion of the Vedas and puranas but a religion based on ethical and moral principles free from communal distinctions. It is the "Dharma of Maharashtra" taught by Saint Ramdas to Sambhaji. In his second essay, the author has set forth the circumstances that lead to weaken the Marāṭha power which was so ably built and well established by Sivaji, Sambhaji, Rajaram and Sahu during the latter half of 18th century; and holds the Peshwas responsible for that.

K. T. Telang in his essay "Gleanings from Marāṭha Chronicles" has quoted a large number of instances and has shown how during the Marāṭha period the traditional social customs were observed and honoured. The duty of one of the members of the Aṣṭapradhan was to enforce the traditional social practices and to punish offenders. Even Sivaji, the author states, was accepted as a Kṣatriya only after careful enquiry into the descent of his parents.

It may be noted here that while M. G. Ranade opines that there was mass upheaval against the traditional—Vedic and Puranic dharma, the instances furnished by K. T. Telang go to show that traditional customs were strictly observed and when in doubt the Brahmin Pandits at Banaras were consulted.

Books on the history of Marāṭas written by English men and others are no doubt available. But coming from the pen of two eminent Maraṭha dignitaries and revised and edited by three learned professors this book certainly occupies a unique place as a social and cultural history no less than a political history of the Maraṭha people.

V. Hanumanthachar

An Outline of Madhva Philosophy by Dr. K. Narain. Published by Udayana Publications, 10, Allengunj, Allahabad-2, India. Price Rs. 30/-.

Though the recent researches in Indian Philosophy have evinced considerable interest in Śrī Madhva's philosophical position, yet a problem-wise study of his views has not been attempted so far. It is for the first time that we have a book which has been written with only this point in view. In his dissertation, which covers almost every problem of philosophical interest, the author has referred not only to the views of Madhvācārya but also to those of his eminent followers, such as Jaya-Tīrtha, Vyāsa-Tīrtha and others in order to make the book an authoritative text for the reader. Comparisons with the other systems of Indian Philosophy and with some of the contemporary trends in Western Thought, which the author has undertaken, have added to the value of the book befitting a work of this sort. It is really a matter of satisfaction that in his exposition, which is quite lucid and precise, the author has based himself only on Sanskrita sources most of

which have not been translated in English as yet. The book as such is a worthy contribution to Indian Philosophy in general and Madhva Philosophy in particular.

Besides the scholarly merit of the book, the quality of its publication is also commendable. The printing and get-up is of such a nature that the book can very well be placed with any of the foreign publications.

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